VZCZCXRO5526
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #1707/01 3401714
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061714Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0402
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0518
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001707 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, EB AND INR/I 
ENERGY FOR MOLLY WILLIAMSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2017 
TAGS: PREL EPET PBTS PINR KU KUWAIT IRAN RELATIONS
SUBJECT: READOUT OF IRAN FM MOTTAKI VISIT TO KUWAIT 
 
REF: A. STATE 160447 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 1697 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ALAN G. MISENHEIMER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B 
) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 25, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Manouchehr Mottaki visited Kuwait as part of his tour of 
Arabian Gulf States.  According to the Kuwaiti media, FM 
Mottaki discussed the Kuwait-Iran maritime border, bilateral 
energy issues, foreign relations, Iraq and the Iranian 
nuclear program with his Kuwaiti counterparts.  MFA officials 
indicate that another motive for his visit was to repair 
strained relations with Kuwait following an assault on a 
Kuwaiti diplomat in Tehran on June 20, 2007.  The MFA 
reiterated to Poloff Kuwait's opposition to a both a 
nuclear-armed Iran and a pre-emptive American military 
strike, and noted that Kuwait remains committed to a 
diplomatic solution.  (Note: Poloff's discussions took place 
before the release of the NIE announcement.  Post will report 
separately on Kuwait's reaction to the NIE. End Note) END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PUBLIC FOCUS ON OIL, GAS AND TRADE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) According to the Kuwaiti media, Iranian FM Mottaki 
focused on resolving a decades-old maritime border dispute 
with Kuwait during his visit on November 25.  The dispute 
originated in the 1960s when Iran and Kuwait awarded 
overlapping concessions in the northern part of the offshore 
Dorra gas field (known in Iran as Arash) to both the 
Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company (precursor of BP) and Royal 
Dutch Shell.  Recoverable gas reserves in the Dorra field 
(approximately 70 km east of Kuwait's southern border) are 
estimated at seven billion cubic feet.  FM Mottaki stated to 
the press that Iran hoped to have a finalized border 
demarcation by the end of the year. 
 
¶3. (C) Mottaki also reportedly discussed revitalizing a 
non-binding energy MOU signed between the two countries in 
¶2005.  According to the deal, Iran would construct an 
undersea pipeline and provide 300 million cubic feet of 
natural gas per day to Kuwait over a period of 25 years.  The 
MOU had called for gas delivery to begin in 2007 but there 
has been no movement toward contract-signing and no 
indication that any serious pipeline construction plans are 
underway.  (Note: The Kuwaitis have repeatedly told Emboffs 
that they do not consider Iran to be a reliable supplier. 
Kuwait is actively pursuing plans to import LNG from Qatar 
instead.  End Note.) 
 
¶4. (U) According to press reports, FM Mottaki highlighted his 
country's close bilateral relationship with Kuwait and 
thanked the Government of Kuwait (GOK) for supporting a 
proposed Free Trade Agreement between Iran and its Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors.  The media also reported 
that Mottaki discussed an upcoming Kuwaiti-Iranian high 
committee meeting, to be held in January 2008, with Kuwaiti 
FM Shaykh Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al Sabah. 
 
¶5. (U) On the subject of Iraq, FM Mottaki said that, "Iran 
and Kuwait are important neighbors to Iraq, and they are keen 
on preserving the security and stability of the region," and 
that, "lack of security in Iraq harms Iran and Kuwait more 
than others."  Concerning the Iranian nuclear program, FM 
Mottaki claimed that Iran had recently taken "transparent 
steps over its nuclear activities," particularly concerning 
the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge file, which he anticipated would 
result in a favorable interim report by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
 
-------------------------------------- 
DIPLOMATIC FOCUS ON BILATERAL TENSIONS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) On November 28, Poloff met with Rashed Al-Hajiri, 
First Secretary with the MFA's Asia Bureau, concerning 
Mottaki's visit.  Al-Hajiri noted that Kuwaiti FM Mohammed Al 
Sabah had spoken to Mottaki on the margins of the UN General 
Assembly in September and specifically requested that Mottaki 
visit Kuwait.  Al-Hajiri said that relations between the two 
countries have been strained since the assault on Kuwaiti 
diplomat Mohammed Al-Zo'bi in Tehran on June 20, 2007.  The 
assault prompted outrage in the Kuwaiti media and among the 
GOK leadership, which drew down its Tehran embassy staff in 
 
KUWAIT 00001707  002 OF 003 
 
 
response.  FM Mohammed Al Sabah stated at the time that the 
assault was tantamount to "aggression on Kuwait, 
international law and Islamic values."  Immediately after the 
incident, MFA Undersecretary Khalid Suliman Al-Jarallah 
summoned Iranian Ambassador Ali Jannati and handed him an 
official memo of protest along with a demand for the results 
of an Iranian investigation into the assault.  Subsequent 
Iranian threats to retaliate against any countries harboring 
U.S. forces in the event of an American strike against Iran 
have further dampened relations between the two countries. 
 
¶7. (C) When asked about the reason for the assault, Al-Hajiri 
speculated that the Iranian leadership may have ordered it as 
a way of demonstrating its displeasure with Kuwait's strong 
support for the USG.  Al-Hajiri noted that the primary 
purpose of Mottaki's visit was to seek a return to normal, 
"cordial" diplomatic relations between Iran and Kuwait.  He 
said that the Minister's visit was successful in overcoming 
this incident and restoring a "clear and transparent nature" 
to bilateral relations. 
 
¶8. (C) Al-Hajiri continued that Iran was a very important 
country in the region, and that Kuwait views strong bilateral 
relations with Iran as essential to its national interests. 
According to Al-Hajiri, Kuwait believes that Iran should 
focus on improving its domestic economy, further integrate 
itself economically with its GCC neighbors and increase its 
cooperation with the international community in general. 
 
¶9. (C) Concerning Iran's nuclear program, Al-Hajiri said that 
Kuwait supports Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes only, but that Kuwait is "totally against" 
an Iranian nuclear weapons program.  He said that GOK 
interlocutors had expressed to Mottaki their fears concerning 
Iran's nuclear program and asked the Government of Iran (GOI) 
to cooperate with the IAEA and the international community on 
this issue.  The GOK's position is that escalation is not in 
the region's interest, and a military confrontation with the 
United States can only have negative consequences for the 
entire region.  Al-Hajiri said that Mottaki had assured his 
GOK interlocutors that the Iranian nuclear program was 
strictly peaceful. 
 
----------------------------------- 
VIEW FROM THE GULF MONITORING GROUP 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) On November 29, Poloff met with Dr. Saad bin Tefla, 
the former Kuwaiti Minister of Information and currently head 
of the Gulf Monitoring Group, a Kuwaiti think tank dedicated 
to local and regional issues.  Poloff queried bin Tefla on 
the objectives of FM Mottaki's visit and its overall degree 
of success.  Bin Tefla said that the visit served to 
normalize relations with Kuwait in light of the assault 
incident in Tehran.  He noted that this rapprochement was 
successful, and that FM Mottaki was also successful in 
re-invigorating the long-standing maritime border dispute 
with Kuwait. 
 
¶11. (C) On Iran, bin Tefla said that the Gulf countries are 
feeling increasingly apprehensive about Iran's growing 
influence in the region and the possibility of a military 
conflict between Iran and the United States.  He noted that 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demise of the Taliban 
in Afghanistan and the elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime 
in Iraq had given Iran a freer hand in the region.  He 
speculated that Iran's ultimate objectives are greater 
regional and global influence, to be exercised by both itself 
and via its regional proxies. 
 
¶12. (C) Nevertheless, he said that Iran is feeling the 
effects of increased international pressure concerning its 
nuclear program and is now especially concerned that Russia 
has apparently shifted its position on this issue.  He 
attributed Russia's change of heart to "weariness" of being 
kept in the dark about Iran's nuclear program and 
reservations about multiple states along its southern border 
possessing nuclear weapons.  He added that Russia had "no 
more influence" over the GOI, and that the Russians are wary 
of the GOI's ideology. 
 
¶13. (C) Regarding the upcoming parliamentary elections in 
Iran (Ref A), bin Tefla said he expected the hard-liners to 
make further gains due to Iran's economy.  Record oil prices 
and several years of good agricultural harvests have 
increased overall prosperity in Iran, according to bin Tefla, 
which contrasts sharply with the leaner times under President 
 
KUWAIT 00001707  003 OF 003 
 
 
Khatami and his reform party.  He noted that the Iranian 
Council for the Protection of the Regime and the Guardians 
Council vet parliamentary candidates in advance, and that 
those whom the GOI supports receive funding via the 20% Shi'a 
Islamic tax collected by government-approved religious 
institutions. 
 
 
¶14. (C) Concerning the GCC, bin Tefla noted that the Gulf 
countries share apprehension about Iran's growing regional 
influence and its potential for developing nuclear weapons. 
He said that these countries share the opinion that a 
military conflict would be disastrous for the region, and 
that the most appropriate long-term strategy for dealing with 
Iran is regime change.  To this end, he anticipated increased 
outreach from GCC countries to the USG to advocate for this 
strategy.  He observed, though, that the GCC is split in its 
approach to Iran, and that the current GCC summit in Qatar 
would help to clarify the various positions of the GCC 
countries vis-a-vis Iran. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) This cable reflects meetings and exchanges with 
Kuwaiti officials prior to the December 4 release of the NIE, 
which is having a significant impact on GOK, and broader 
Kuwaiti public, thinking on Iran.  Post will report 
separately on discussion of Mottaki's visit in pending 
meetings with senior GOK officials, and on the impact of the 
NIE in Kuwait.  END COMMENT. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
MISENHEIMER