VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #1813/01 3651840
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311840Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5778
INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN SAN JUAN PR
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T KINGSTON 001813 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/LP BOZZOLO, BROWN, INL/C KOHN, WHA/CAR 
TILGHMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017 
TAGS: SNAR PREL AA
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE TOP PRIORITY IS 
FIGHTING CORRUPTION 
 
REF: KINGSTON 1805 
 
Classified By: CDA James T. Heg, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  One of Commissioner Lewin's first 
official acts on December 17, the day he took office, was 
to approve the proposed Anti-Corruption Strategy Paper, 
presented by the new Anti-Corruption Division Chief.  In a 
meeting with NAS Director on December 19 (Reftel), and 
again in his inaugural press conference on December 20, 
Commissioner Lewin commented that fighting corruption 
within the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) was one of his 
top priorities.  Lewin further asked for U.S. financial 
support for this endeavor, particularly the Anti-Corruption 
Division's Undercover Unit.  NAS is working with the Core 
U.S. Law Enforcement Working Group at Post to determine 
what U.S. assets could be engaged.  End Summary. 
 
Anti Corruption Strategy Paper 
 
¶2. (S)  The strategy paper was developed by the new 
Anti-Corruption Division Chief and a subject matter expert 
on anti-corruption from the London Metropolitan Police 
(MET).  (Note NAS funding was used to engage the services 
of the MET).  It calls for a bifurcated structure for the 
Division - one unit made up of Jamaican Police Officers who 
will handle low level corruption cases, i.e. traffic stop 
bribes, other minor bribery and extortion schemes being 
conducted by low-ranking officers; the other unit, which 
will be covert/undercover, would ideally be staffed by a 
team of foreign law enforcement officers/analysts (target 
nations are U.S., UK, and Canada)  experienced in 
anti-corruption cases.  The only link between the 
undercover unit and the outside world will be the 
Anti-Corruption Division Chief, ACP Justin Felice, who is a 
British Police Officer currently serving in the JCF.  The 
strategy also has a public education/awareness plan, as 
well as development of a better internal reporting 
structure for the JCF.  Both Commissioner Lewin and Felice 
are hopeful that given Lewin's take over of the JCF that 
not only will the public be more comfortable reporting on 
bribery and extortion activities by the police, but that 
JCF officers also will begin to come forward to report on 
the dirty cops within their ranks. 
 
Undercover Unit's Operations 
 
¶3. (S) If Felice's plan is followed, the Undercover Unit 
would be made up of four British officers/analysts, two 
U.S. officers (one analyst, one investigator) and two 
Canadian officers.  The only "Jamaican" police officer who 
would have direct access to the Unit's analysis is Felice. 
The Unit's primary focus is to develop and analyze 
intelligence on corrupt cops under investigation. Target 
selection for the Unit will be determined by the Tasking 
Committee.  Given the extent of the corruption within the 
JCF, cases may have arms trafficking, money laundering, 
drug smuggling, and human trafficking links.  The Unit's 
investigators and analysts would have the ability to task 
both covert and overt assets of the JCF and Jamaica Defence 
Force. It is the Jamaican assets who would collect bank 
records, perform surveillance, effect arrests etc.  Members 
of the Foreign Team would sit on the oversight and 
governance committee and on the tasking committee to ensure 
that standards of performance for the Jamaican assets are 
being adhered to; and, the activities of the Unit would be 
completely segregated from the regular Anti-Corruption 
Division's activities. 
 
¶4. (S) If there is a link to police corruption, any 
information developed by the Unit on public corruption 
involving GOJ officials would be handled by the Unit. 
Other corruption cases with no police link will be 
handled outside the Unit.  The sources and methods used to 
develop evidence behind the Unit's firewall will 
not be discoverable, nor would any member of the Unit be 
expected to testify in a Jamaican court. For any 
subsequent prosecution, the evidence chain begins once the 
sanitized package leaves the Unit for action.  The 
expectation is that the foreign members of the Unit would 
agree to the extent they are legally capable to 
share any intelligence they are able to glean from their 
own systems.  Felice, although a British national, 
understands that the current MOU that governs law 
enforcement sharing between the U.S., UK, and Canada may 
necessitate his absenting himself from certain meetings and 
that he may not have access to certain information. 
 
 
Undercover Unit needs International Support 
 
¶5. (S) Once established, the Undercover Unit would be 
governed by a multi-national Governance Board, and tasking 
of its operations would come also come from a separate 
multi-national Tasking Committee.  Note: the U.S., UK and 
Canada have all been asked to participate in these boards 
and to provide funding for the undercover units members. 
If U.S. law enforcement were to participate in staffing the 
Unit, we would have the ability to task and collect 
evidence for use in U.S. prosecutions.  Both Felice and 
Commissioner Lewin have requested U.S., UK and Canadian 
financial support for the Unit.  It is an acknowledgment of 
how pervasive the corruption is in the JCF that the 
organization is seeking outside members to form the 
undercover Unit. 
 
 
Potential use of Task Force Building by Anti-Corruption 
 
¶6. (S)  Because of its undercover nature, Felice has been 
very concerned about finding an appropriately secure yet 
remote location to house the Unit.  One option that he and 
the new Commissioner have mulled over was to put the Unit 
on the grounds of the Jamaica Defence Force.  However, that 
doesn't seem to be a realistic solution.  An additional 
option currently under discussion is to transfer the 
underutilized Airport Interdiction Task Force Building 
temporarily to the Anti-Corruption Division. (a further 
discussion of these deliberations available in Septel)  The 
Task Force would continue to operate as it has done since 
its inception out of the Airport terminal.  In her December 
19 meeting with Commissioner Lewin, the NAS Director raised 
this possibility.  As the Task Force Building would really 
make an ideal office for the Unit, and as the Task Force 
staff have not fully embraced the space, it was NAS 
recommendation to Lewin that the building be transferred to 
Anti-Corruption.  The final decision rests with the 
Commissioner. 
 
 
¶7. (S) Comment:  The design of the Strategy is 
comprehensive but a comprehensive plan is not enough.  What 
makes this initiative different than others that have come 
before, is that Lewin has given his full public support to 
the Unit's mission.  Lewin, unlike his predecessor, truly 
wants to bring about change to the JCF.  In his previous 
life as Chief of Staff of the Jamaica Defence Force, Lewin 
showed that he has little toleration for corruption.  It is 
Lewin's own support and strength of resolve to 
fundamentally change the JCF, combined with Felice's 
experience in fighting corruption in the Northern Ireland 
Constabulary that will be the real key to the Division's 
success.  Given the ability of the U.S. to influence the 
tasking for the Unit and its further capability to tap into 
intelligence and evidentiary sources that heretofore were 
perhaps not available, careful consideration should be 
given to funding this Unit.  Its design and function could 
provide a win-win for U.S. law enforcement.  End Comment 
 
JOHNSON