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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH ALEVIS HOPEFUL FOLLOWING ECHR DECISION ON 
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
 
REF: A. ISTANBUL 0015 
     ¶B. ANKARA 3016 
 
Classified By: Consul General Sharon A. Wiener for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Some 15 million Turkish Alevis have reason 
to be hopeful following an October 9 European Court of Human 
Rights ruling and press reports that the government may soon 
propose a plan to address their long-disputed grievances. 
Prominent Alevi advocate Izettin Dogan recently told us that 
the Court's decision in favor of an Alevi parent who argued 
his child should be exempt from mandatory religious courses 
was "very important."  He expressed optimism that the 
decision would soon lead to favorable results in two other 
key Alevi cases currently before the Turkish Higher Court of 
Appeals.  How the government responds to the ruling may have 
implications that go well beyond the Alevi community, testing 
the boundaries of Turkish secularism by loosening the 
government's control over religious education.  End summary. 
 
ECHR Decision 
------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled on 
October 9 that the Government of Turkey (GOT) had breached 
the rights -- accorded by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the Convention), of which Turkey is a signatory -- of 
Alevis Hasan Zengin and his daughter Eylem when it denied 
Zengin's request to exempt his daughter from compulsory 
religious courses, which many Alevis claim have a Sunni bias. 
 Specifically, Protocol No. 1 of the Convention (Article 2) 
provides: "In the exercise of any functions which it assumes 
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions."  The Court awarded the Zengin's 
3,726.80 Euro in court costs minus 850 Euro already granted 
in legal aid and in addition -- somewhat ambiguously -- 
deemed it would be an "appropriate form of compensation" for 
Turkey to bring its educational system and domestic 
legislation into conformity with Article 2. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The ECHR based its decision on three important 
conclusions.  First, it determined that Alevism is distinct 
from the Sunni understanding of Islam and meets the 
definition of "religious conviction," as required by Article 
¶2.  GOT officials have long argued that Alevis are Muslims 
and thus not distinct from Sunnis in a manner that would 
allow exemption from compulsory religious education courses 
or eligibility for Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) 
funding that Sunnis receive to build mosques and pay imam 
salaries.  Secondly, the Court concluded that the compulsory 
religious courses did not meet Article 2's criteria of 
objectivity and pluralism.  The Court noted that if the 
courses did meet these criteria, there would be no need for 
current procedures that allow Jews and Christians to be 
exempt, pursuant to a 1990 Turkish Supreme Council for 
Education decision.  The Court observed that the current 
exemption procedures seemed to conflict with the Turkish 
Constitution, which ensures that "no one shall be 
compelled...to reveal religious beliefs and convictions." 
Finally, the Court determined that given the Sunni-oriented 
curriculum of these courses, there was no appropriate 
exemption procedure in place to ensure the religious freedom 
rights of non-Sunni parents. 
 
Possible Implications 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Alevi Cem Foundation Chairman Izettin Dogan told us 
that the ruling was "very important," though it was not yet 
clear how the government would respond.  The government could 
attempt to argue it would be complying with the ECHR decision 
simply by exempting Zengin's (now 17-year old) daughter from 
having to attend religious courses, he said.  He had heard 
however, that the Education Ministry had already added 10 
pages of instruction on Alevism in year 12 -- the final year 
-- of the religious course curriculum.  Though this would be 
a positive step, it would not go far enough to meet Alevi 
demands because the Alewite community had not been consulted 
in developing course materials. 
 
¶5.  (C) Dogan was more optimistic about the ruling's effect 
on two prominent Cem Foundation cases against the government 
(ref A), including one against the Prime Ministry requesting 
proportional government funding and one against the Ministry 
of Education requesting Alevi principles be included in 
 
ISTANBUL 00001088  002 OF 002 
 
 
religious education.  He hoped the decision would encourage 
the Turkish courts to rule in the Foundation's favor, if for 
nothing else, to avoid the risk of an appeal to the ECHR, 
which Dogan expected would rule against the GOT.  He noted a 
decision in the case against the Prime Ministry is long 
overdue according to court regulations and suspects the GOT 
is trying to pressure the court to delay so the government 
could argue the issue is being addressed in the new 
constitution. 
 
¶6.  (C) Recent press reports have highlighted ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) plans to reach out to Alevis, 
including an initiative proposed by AKP MP Reha Camuroglu, 
himself an Alevi (ref B).  Camuroglu's proposal includes, 
among other goals, establishing a mechanism to build and 
maintain government-funded cem evis (Alevi places of worship) 
and reforming the religious course curriculum to include more 
information on the Alevi faith.  According to Dogan, Alevis 
thus far remain skeptical of AKP overtures.  He believed 
AKP's inclusion of four Alevis (including Camuroglu) on its 
party list for the July 22 parliamentary election was "only 
for show."  Though the Cem Foundation leader has always had 
good personal relations with AKP leaders, he suspects they do 
not want to give in to Alevi demands out of fear that Sunni 
Turks would adopt the more tolerant Alewite interpretation of 
Islam.  Other skeptical Alevi representatives, especially 
those who view Alevism as separate from Islam, have publicly 
argued that the recent AKP proposals are intended to 
"Sunnify" the diverse Alevi community. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment.  The ambiguity of the ECHR decision stating 
it would be an "appropriate form of compensation" for Turkey 
to align its education system with Article 2, seems to allow 
the government some room to maneuver.  Camuroglu's proposal 
suggests the government has taken note and is trying to take 
matters into its own hands before future potential Court 
rulings limit its ability to do so. 
 
¶8.  (C) Comment continued.  Truly complying with Article 2 
would involve a solution that extends to Turks of all faiths: 
one that uses the existing curriculum but grants exemption 
rights to all who choose, without requiring proof of 
allegiance to a non-Sunni faith; or one that significantly 
modifies the religious course curriculum to remove any bias 
to a single faith.  Adopting the latter solution could impact 
the government's control over religious education by 
prompting some Sunnis, whose study of their faith in public 
elementary and secondary schools would be diluted, to seek 
alternative, private means of religious education.  Those who 
suspect the Islam-rooted AKP of having a "secret agenda" will 
closely scrutinize any attempts to liberalize age and 
participation regulations for existing, voluntary, 
extra-curricular "Koran courses" now closely regulated by the 
Diyanet.  End comment. 
WIENER