VZCZCXRO5281
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDO #1141 3401304
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061304Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7331
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 001141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 
TAGS: PREL EFIN GCC IR QA
SUBJECT: READOUT ON GCC SUMMIT FROM THE DOHA ORGANIZER 
 
REF: A. DOHA 1133 
     ¶B. DOHA 1127 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Ratney, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
-------------------------------- 
QATAR-SAUDI RELATIONS ON THE MEND 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C) MFA Director of GCC Affairs Yousef Al-Jaber (strictly 
protect), who was the organizer of the December 3-4 Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Doha, provided P/E Chief 
December 5 a readout of the event and the preparations 
leading up to it.  Had it not been for Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's participation, observed Al-Jaber, the 
headline of the summit would have been Saudi King Abdullah's 
appearance.  To ensure the King's participation, Abdullah and 
the Amir of Qatar had formed a bilateral joint committee to 
address remaining difficulties in the relationship.  The main 
Saudi complaint had been "objectionable" Al-Jazeera coverage 
of the Kingdom's ruling family and government policies. 
According to Al-Jaber, Al-Jazeera has taken steps to correct 
the Saudi perception, and King Abdullah would "soon" post an 
ambassador to Qatar. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
AHMEDINEJAD HELD UP HIS END OF THE BARGAIN 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) On the issuance of the invitation to Ahmedinejad, 
Al-Jaber said the Iranian FM, in the lead up to the December 
summit, solicited an invitation for Ahmedinejad from all his 
GCC counterparts.  This, he said, is why the Kuwaiti FM's 
public assertion in Doha that he learned of Ahmedinejad's 
visit from the newspapers amounted to a "double standard." 
After consultation with the other GCC members, Qatar as the 
host extended Ahmedinejad an invitation, as it did to the 
heads of a number of regional states.  Al-Jaber said it was 
not by design that only Ahmedinejad accepted the invitation. 
After the invitations were issued, he remarked, it was as if 
"an invisible hand" interceded to prevent other leaders from 
attending.  For example, Egyptian President Mubarak canceled 
for health reasons; his Turkish counterpart regretted, 
preferring to visit Doha on a state visit in early 2008; and 
the Yemeni President -- who had eagerly sought an invitation 
based on Yemen's interest in becoming a GCC member -- 
ultimately declined to travel. 
 
¶3.  (C) Al-Jaber expressed satisfaction that Ahmedinejad 
abided by his commitment to the GCC not to include "sensitive 
topics" in his remarks at the summit.  Al-Jaber identified 
the United States and the nuclear portfolio as two examples 
of topics the Iranian President was told to avoid on 
condition of his appearance.  By design, said Al-Jaber, the 
heads of state did not discuss the nuclear portfolio, the GCC 
leaders having agreed ahead of time that their first group 
meeting with Ahmedinejad should aim to establish a working 
relationship that would facilitate discussion of the nuclear 
issue at a subsequent meeting.  While Al-Jaber would not say 
if any private messages were passed to Ahmedinejad in Doha, 
he stressed that the Iranian President had been told 
authoritatively that the GCC states expected Iran to comply 
fully with all IAEA requirements. 
 
---------------------------- 
GCC STICKING WITH THE DOLLAR 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Asked if the heads of state discussed the pegging of 
their currencies to the U.S. dollar, Al-Jaber stated that 
there had been no discussion of the topic.  Prior to the 
summit, he said, it was decided that the GCC Finance 
Ministers would meet in January or February to establish a 
common position on the dollar and inform the United States of 
the GCC position following their meeting.  The Finance 
Ministers would not, however, be discussing the pegging of 
their nations' currencies to a basket of currencies.  Their 
marching orders were to "stick with the dollar."  Turning to 
other economic issues, Al-Jaber lamented that pre-summit 
discussions were not conducive to making tangible progress on 
forming a GCC customs union.  He cited the UAE's insistence 
on collecting for its coffers duties on any goods passing 
through Dubai as one of the primary hurdles to be surmounted 
before any progress in this area could be made. 
RATNEY