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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0002/01 3651335
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311335Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4497
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5414
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0306

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CODEL 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2037 
TAGS: PREL KPAL KDEM PGOV PHUM SY IS IZ LEB
SUBJECT: CODEL SPECTER MEETS WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT BASHAR 
AL-ASAD 
 
Classified By: Classified by CDA Todd Holmstrom for reasons 1.4 b and d 
. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: President Bashar Al-Asad said he was 
optimistic about restarting peace negotiations with Israel, 
claimed (erroneously it appears) the seven opposition 
activists recently jailed had been released, expressed 
pessimism on reaching a political resolution in Lebanon given 
what he described as the growing differences among the 
parties, and defended Iran's right to retain its civilian 
nuclear program, all in the course of a meeting with Senator 
Arlen Specter and Representative Patrick Kennedy.  They also 
discussed the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and 
Hezbollah, the relocation of the U.S. Embassy compound, and 
the processing of Iraqi refugees for immigration to the 
United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) On December 30, Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad met 
for 60 minutes with Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) and 
Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-RI).  Asad warmly welcomed 
the U.S. congressmen, remembering the many times he and the 
Senator met in the past.  Foreign Minister Walid Muallem also 
attended the meeting.  The Charg d'Affaires and an Embassy 
notetaker attended at the delegation's request. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
The Messages: Olmert is Willing to Find a Way, Bush Can Help 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Specter opened the meeting by telling Asad "Olmert 
wants to find a way" to promote peace on the Syria-Israel 
track.  Specter said Olmert's leak to the media was a message 
itself of Olmert's willingness to pursue peace with Syria. 
(Note: Damascus has been following closely the Israeli press 
statements on a message Specter would supposedly be carrying 
to Asad from PM Olmert on restarting the peace process.  End 
note.)  Specter commented that Asad would be wise to take 
advantage of the perishable opportunity of engagement that 
the post-Annapolis environment offered Syria.  In response to 
a query from Asad, Specter opined that the willingness of 
President Bush to take on a greater role in the Middle East 
peace process was directly proportional to the likelihood of 
success -- which made it imperative for Asad to take positive 
action now to allow further progress if he were truly 
interested in peace.  Specter stressed, however, the parties 
themselves must find their own answers. 
 
¶4.  (C) Asad commented to Specter that had they met two 
months ago he would have told the Senator no progress was 
possible until a new U.S. administration took office. Asad, 
however, termed his post-Annapolis mood as "optimistic" and 
was pleased by Senator Specter's comments on Israeli Prime 
Minister Olmert's openness to re-starting the Syria-Israel 
track and on President Bush's willingness to take on a larger 
role in the Middle East peace process.  Outlining a plan laid 
out the night before to Specter by FM Muallem (septel), Asad 
identified three necessary phases to pursuing a peace treaty 
with Israel. 
 
-- First, Israel needs to commit to a complete withdrawal 
from the Golan once a peace treaty is signed. 
 
-- Second, Turkey would act as a mediator between Israel and 
Syria with the goal of attaining guarantees on border and 
security issues.  Asad indicated that Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan was already playing a mediator role between Israel 
and Syria since May 2007. 
 
-- Third, the United States would then sponsor direct 
negotiations between Syrians and Israelis sitting at the same 
table. 
 
Asad was adamant about the critical role the United States 
must play in bringing Syria and Israel to the negotiating 
table, and keeping them there.  Specter promised to report 
Asad's positive response and their discussion to both PM 
Olmert and President Bush. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Release of National Council Members Promised 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Interjecting the subject of human rights, Kennedy 
pressed Asad on the jailing of opposition activists from the 
recently formed Damascus Declaration National Council.  Asad 
said individual members of the opposition were held briefly 
for investigation, but were not jailed as Syrians could only 
be arrested if they "had violated Syrian law."  Asad claimed 
 
DAMASCUS 00000002  002 OF 003 
 
 
all of the National Council members previously detained had 
been released.  He stressed internal criticism of the 
government was permitted in Syria; only "contacts with 
foreign powers" would be severely punished.  FM Muallem 
confirmed the releases, stating he had personally looked into 
the cases after Congressman Kennedy raised the issue with him 
the night before (septel).  He asked the Congressman to pass 
through the Embassy the names of anyone he believed were 
still in custody.  (Note: Embassy passed the seven names the 
same afternoon, but no contact has been able to confirm the 
seven detainees' release.  End note.) 
 
¶6.  (C) On the subject of reform, Asad stressed his belief in 
"development, culture, and dialogue", especially economic 
development, as the prerequisite for political change. 
According to Asad, he had modified his plans for political 
reform now that Syria found itself between a sectarian 
political crisis in Lebanon and a second sectarian conflict 
in Iraq.  In these circumstances, he said, Syria must take a 
different approach toward democracy.  Asad said Syria was not 
perfect, but it was moving forward, albeit at a slower pace 
than before. Results may not be achieved in this generation, 
warned Asad. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
In Lebanon, Failure or Success in Syria's Hands 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7.  (C) Raising the issue twice during the course of the 
discussion, Specter and Kennedy told Asad, "rightly or 
wrongly," Syria would be blamed for the continuing political 
impasse and/or any associated violence in Lebanon.  Asad 
replied Syria had been working with the French to see a 
President elected, but the gap between the parties remained 
very wide and an agreement, if reached, "may not be enough." 
Asad asserted the parties were previously close to an 
agreement, but the visit of Assistant Secretary Welch and 
Deputy National Security Advisor Abrams set negotiations 
"back to zero." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Iran, Intelligence Cooperation, Hamas and Hezbollah 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Turning to Iran, Specter pressed Asad to use his 
influence with the Iranians to convince them to accept the 
Putin compromise whereby Russia would conduct uranium 
enrichment for Iran.  Asad argued Iran had a right under 
international law to pursue a non-military nuclear program 
and it was cooperating fully with the IAEA.  According to 
Asad, IAEA inspections of Iranian enrichment and associated 
activities was the only viable option.  Asad urged direct 
U.S. dialogue with the Iranians to help solve the current 
crisis.  Specter commented he had a long-pending request to 
visit Tehran, which remained unanswered.  Asad promised to 
encourage the Iranians to approve a visit.  Specter also 
asked Asad to host a meeting between Iranian and American 
parliamentarians if a visit to Tehran was impossible. 
 
¶9.  (C) Asad said intelligence cooperation could only be 
resumed once Washington re-engages the SARG on a policy 
level.  Like FM Muallem (septel), Asad complained bitterly 
about American "hostility" toward Syria.  According to Asad, 
evidence of U.S. ill-intentions toward Syria included the 
absence of an U.S. ambassador in Syria and President Bush's 
comment during an  end-of-year press conference that he had 
long ago lost patience with the Syrian regime. 
 
¶10.  (C) Asad said Egypt was playing a positive role in 
efforts to secure the release of the Israeli soldier held by 
Hamas in Gaza, and Egypt preferred to work on the issue 
alone.  Regarding the soldiers held by Hezbollah, Asad said 
he had spoken with Hezbollah and encouraged its leadership to 
find a way to return the soldiers.  Hezbollah was waiting for 
an Israeli proposal on a prisoner exchange before returning 
the Israelis, according to Asad.  Hezbollah, said Asad, was 
ready to make a deal.  And, Syria remained ready to take any 
Israeli proposal to Hezbollah.  Regarding the whereabouts of 
Ron Arad, Asad said Hezbollah could not find him and no one 
knew where he was or what had happened to him.  He added, 
however, if Hezbollah found Arad, they would use him as part 
of a prisoner exchange 
 
------------------ 
Embassy Relocation 
------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Following up on Asad's commitment to respond 
 
DAMASCUS 00000002  003 OF 003 
 
 
positively to U.S. Embassy security needs, made to Specter 
during their December 2006 meeting, Specter asked about the 
long-pending relocation of the U.S. Embassy to a proposed 
diplomatic compound in a Damascus suburb.  (Note: the project 
has not progressed since 2002.  End Note.)  After conferring 
with FM Muallem, Asad said the Syrian government needed an 
additional year to build the necessary infrastructure.  Asad 
regretted the delay, which he attributed to "bureaucracy", 
but made no further promises on the subject. 
 
¶12.  (U) Codel Specter did not clear this cable. 
HOLMSTROM