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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001783 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 
TAGS: PREL AS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' 12/4 MEETING WITH JAPAN DEPUTY FOREIGN 
MINISTER YABUNAKA 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Clune for reasons 1.4 (b and 
 d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: In a December 4, 2007 meeting in Canberra, 
Australia with Under Secretary Burns, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Mitoji Yabunaka outlined Japan's goals to improve the 
relevance of multilateral fora in Asia and its desire for 
greater United States engagement in the region. The two also 
addressed the necessity to engage China to be a more 
responsible actor in world affairs, UNSC Reform, and next 
steps in combating Iran's nuclear program following release 
of the unclassified NIE.  Under Secretary Burns expressed 
confidence that India would meet the requirements to conclude 
the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative and emphasized 
Japan's support would be helpful. 
End summary. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Stronger U.S. Commitment to Asia Needed 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) While expressing pleasure at the success of the recent 
meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Fukuda in 
Washington, DFM Yabunaka's extended opening statement 
conveyed GOJ concern that a change in the U.S. administration 
in 2009 would also bring about significant shift in U.S. 
priorities in Asia.  In particular, the Japanese feared a 
downgrade in the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in 
favor of China.  Japan desired the United States to display 
much stronger engagement and commitment to regional 
architecture in East Asia in the light of China's rise, 
noting that the success of Japan's regional strategy depended 
upon improving the effectiveness and relevance of 
multilateral fora such as the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), and 
APEC.  A more robust U.S. commitment to multilateral fora, 
Yabunaka said, was central to their success. Yabunaka also 
said that a broadening of the mandate of the Six Party Talks, 
after the immediate issue of the DPRK's nuclear program was 
resolved by measurable actions 
by North Korea, of course, would be an effective method of 
advancing interests in the region.  There were some bilateral 
issues requiring resolution, including Host Nation Support, 
renewal of the counterterrorism bill allowing refueling 
operations in the Indian Ocean, and beef. 
 
¶3. (C) In reply, U/S Burns said that he believed strongly 
that the U.S.-Japan alliance was a fundamental pillar of 
American diplomacy.  He assured Yabunaka that the U.S.-Japan 
alliance enjoyed strong bipartisan support and that Japan 
would continue to be a great ally regardless of who was in 
the White House in 2009.  Stating that in the twenty-first 
century many of America's most vital interests resided in 
Asia, compared to Europe in the 20th century, U/S Burns said 
the United States would be happy to discuss regional 
architecture with Japan and noted that 2008 would see many 
high level visits by USG officials to Japan, host of the G8 
process.  He also assured Yabunaka that North Korea must 
achieve a verifiable disablement of its nuclear program. 
 
China: Warming Relations with Japan, a Responsible 
Stakeholder? 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶4. (C) DFM Yabunaka noted that PM Fukuda's diplomacy with 
China was already yielding dividends.  As proof, Yabunaka 
QChina was already yielding dividends.  As proof, Yabunaka 
listed successful recent meetings in Singapore between 
Japanese and Chinese officials, the advent of the High Level 
Economic Consultations (HEC), a resumption of military 
exchanges, and a genuine change in tone by the Chinese.  He 
noted that PM Fukuda would visit China in either late 
December or early January and that China's President Hu 
Jintao would visit Japan in the spring of 2008.  Even serious 
irritants, such as the boundary dispute in the East China 
Sea, were not insurmountable in this new era of improved 
relations, Yabunaka observed, as there seemed to be some 
 
CANBERRA 00001783  002 OF 003 
 
 
bilateral desire to reach an accord on that issue before PM 
Fukuda visited, although specific proposals had yet to 
emerge. Yabunaka also said Japan wanted to increase 
cooperation with China on environmental protection, but 
China's lax observance of IPR hindered greater technology 
transfer. 
 
¶5. (C) U/S Burns reiterated that the United States sought 
engagement with, not containment of China.  While we 
disagreed on human rights, religious rights, intellectual 
property rights, and other issues, we saw China as an 
emerging stakeholder on key foreign policy issues.  In 
particular, China had been extremely responsible in its role 
in the Six Party Talks since the DPRK 2006 nuclear test, 
though they had been less helpful on Sudan and Burma, with a 
mixed record on Iran. 
 
UNSC Reform 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) U/S Burns said that the President's UNGA speech was 
an opening; he had told Indian Foreign Secretary Menon in 
Madrid that India should seriously engage Japan and Brazil to 
design a package that could receive the necessary 128 votes 
in support.  The U.S. saw two basic options: increase the 
permanent members by a small amount; or look into a ten-year 
arrangement, open to renewal.  The U.S. would not agree to 
any formulation without Japan as a new member.  We were ready 
to negotiate seriously with Japan, Brazil, and India to 
create plans that had a good chance of capturing the 128 
votes necessary to succeed in the General Assembly, although 
we thought the barriers to a successful resolution were 
considerable.  Yabunaka expressed hope that such proposals 
stand a better chance of success with improving Sino-Japanese 
ties; he later passed U/S Burns the latest Japanese UNSC 
reform proposal. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Greater Engagement by Japan on Iran 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) U/S Burns said that by virtue of Japan's G8 Presidency 
in 2008, the GOJ could play a major role in resolving the 
Iranian issue by promoting the effectiveness of sanctions. 
U/S Burns emphasized that the recently released unclassified 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which stated that Iran 
had abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003, showed 
that Iran was both a rational actor and susceptible to 
strong, coordinated, international pressure, especially 
financial.  Significantly, uranium enrichment and its 
ballistic missile program continued; further sanctions would 
strengthen diplomatic efforts.  DFM Yabunaka said that Japan 
would continue to apply pressure. 
 
¶8. (C) U/S Burns said that his December 1 meeting in Paris 
and subsequent phone calls with Chinese Assistant Foreign 
Minister He Yafei represented significant strides in 
cooperation in creating a united front in opposition to 
Iran's nuclear program.  The Under Secretary said he was 
reasonably confident that China would support a third UNSC 
resolution sanctioning Iran. 
 
9.(C) Stating that effective pressure on Iran would encompass 
tiered travel bans, an expanded asset freeze, inspections of 
cargo bound to Iran from certain nations, arms restrictions, 
a reduction in export credits, and sanctioning the Qods 
Force, U/S Burns said he hoped to convince China to agree to 
most of the above, which would allow some negotiation on the 
Qmost of the above, which would allow some negotiation on the 
questions of export credits.  While pleased with China's 
progress on the Iranian issue, U/S Burns noted that China and 
Russia - and most certainly Iran - might point to the NIE 
conclusion as a reason for lessening sanctions or delaying 
action. 
 
India: Progress on Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10. (C) The United States hoped India would be able to reach 
an acceptable and comprehensive safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency by the end of December, 
after which the deal would need to be reviewed by the Nuclear 
 
CANBERRA 00001783  003 OF 003 
 
 
Suppliers' Group, noted U/S Burns.  DFM Yabunaka said that 
Japan understood and agreed with the basis of the plan, 
although the government did face some domestic political 
pressure due to very strong non-proliferation sentiments 
among the Japanese public.  U/S Burns replied that the United 
States had been very clear with India that any nuclear tests 
would have extremely adverse consequences for the agreement. 
He suggested that the Japanese representative should be in 
touch with the U.S. lead, Dick Stratford. 
 
¶11. (C) Turning briefly to Pakistan and Afghanistan, U/S 
Burns noted that a stable Pakistani border region was 
essential to successful operations in Afghanistan.  DFM 
Yabunaka said Japan was ready to double aid to Pakistan, but 
needed to monitor the situation very closely.  He also said 
that Japan intended to complete the ring road in Afghanistan 
by the end of 2009. 
 
CLUNE