O 110214Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8703
INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 001742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN E.SIDLER, EAP AND T 
JAKARTA ALSO FOR TONY FOLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL PHSA PBTS MNUC ETTC KNNP EWWT AS ID
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA'S PARTICIPATION IN DECEMBER 12 
PSI-RELATED SEMINAR IN INDONESIA 
 
REF: STATE 164809 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS James F. Cole for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) 
 
¶1.  (C/NF) Gerry McGuire, Director for Counter-Proliferation, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, told poloff December 
11 Australia agreed with the U.S. judgment that Jakarta's 
December 12 seminar on "PSI in the Framework of Maritime 
Security" does not meet its requirements as a venue to 
advance the PSI agenda with Indonesia, and should have 
included more Southeast Asian participants. 
 
¶2. (SBU) McGuire advised that Ted Knez, Executive Officer in 
the Counter-Proliferation Section, would attend the seminar 
and deliver a presentation of about 15 minutes in length, 
titled "Australian Perspectives on the Proliferation Security 
Initiative."  (A copy of the final version of the 
presentation follows below at para 4.) Knez is armed with 
extensive briefing materials, put together following a GOA 
interagency meeting last week, and will be prepared to 
correct misperceptions about PSI. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The GOA welcomes the Department's offer for Mr. Knez 
to coordinate on tactics with ISN/CPI Tony Foley in advance 
of the seminar. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Following is the final text of Knez' prepared PSI 
remarks. 
 
Begin text: 
 
Seminar on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in the 
Framework of Maritime Security "Australian Perspectives on 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)" Borobudur Hotel, 
Jakarta, 12 December 2007 
 
I am very pleased to have the opportunity to address you 
today. 
 
I thank the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Indonesia for organising this seminar to facilitate 
discussion on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 
our discussion today, I believe we can start from a single 
point of agreement that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is a serious threat to international security. 
That threat is the very reason why the PSI exists. 
 
Following on from Tony Foley's presentation, I would like to 
talk to you about Australia's perspectives as a 
PSI-supporting country and on what the PSI means to us. 
 
Let me say at the outset that the Australian Government is 
strongly interested in, and committed to, non-proliferation 
and disarmament. 
 
I would like to begin, perhaps paradoxically, by mentioning 
some of those things which Australia believes the PSI is not. 
Firstly, the PSI is not a substitute for maintaining and 
strengthening the existing multilateral WMD treaties. In this 
regard, we still have a lot of work to do. The Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, while almost 
universal, is under stress as a result of North Korea's 
nuclear test last year, and the discovery in 2002 that Iran 
had been developing a secret nuclear program and has still 
not provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
with all the information that the Agency has requested on 
this program. 
 
Nor is the PSI a substitute for all countries having 
effective export controls. It is in our own security interest 
to deny proliferators the materials and technologies they 
need to produce WMD. And we have an obligation, in this 
regard, following the adoption of UNSCR 1540 in 2004.  I 
Qregard, following the adoption of UNSCR 1540 in 2004.  I 
should add here that the PSI does not presuppose new 
multilateral structures or laws.  It effectively complements 
and reinforces existing ones. 
 
The PSI does not discriminate against any country. It is not 
an exclusive club. On the contrary, the PSI's strength lies 
in its diversity and inclusiveness. It provides an 
 
 
opportunity for countries to work together to take practical 
measures against the threat of WMD proliferation. PSI 
countries agree to take steps, consistent with national and 
international law, either alone or with others, to impede the 
transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems and 
related material to and from states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern. There are now almost 90 PSI supporting 
countries world-wide. Fourteen of those countries are right 
here in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
The PSI is not illegal or somehow inconsistent with 
international law. PSI supporters abide by their own domestic 
and international legal obligations. No state is asked to do 
anything it believes is contrary to the law. Indeed, PSI 
activities have helped states to develop a better 
understanding of where they can take action and were they 
cannot. 
 
Australia will only take action that is consistent with the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and this 
means, for example, that rights like that of innocent passage 
through territorial seas are taken into account. 
 
The reality is that most of our PSI work is not about 
dramatic interdictions at sea - it is the every day work of 
good intelligence, export controls, and law enforcement 
efforts - all of which means that most of our work takes 
place in port. 
 
The PSI is also not about the forfeiture of national 
sovereignty. Recognising the threats posed by proliferation, 
states have chosen to work together to respond. We do this in 
full recognition of our rights as sovereign states, but also 
with an understanding that where issues extend beyond the 
boundaries of anyone country, and an issue cannot be managed 
or resolved by anyone country acting alone, then cooperation 
may provide a solution. In the region, we have seen the 
benefits of such cooperation in, for example, disaster relief 
efforts and tackling transnational crime including drug 
trafficking and illegal fishing. Likewise, concerned states 
have looked for ways to 
enhance their ability to counter the threat of proliferation. 
 
That then brings me to the question of what the PSI is. For 
Australia, it represents the sort of new strategic thinking 
and flexibility which we had already embraced through our own 
counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. PSI 
fitted perfectly with our approach and the broad-based, 
whole-of-government framework that we base our counter- and 
non-proliferation activities on. Australia has also worked to 
streamline our domestic coordination measures and approaches, 
both across agencies and across jurisdictions. Agencies meet 
regularly, share information and work together. We know the 
Australian public - after the horrors of 9/11 and the Bali 
bombings - would expect nothing less. 
 
The PSI is practical, flexible and non-bureaucratic. There is 
no formal organisation and no secretariat - it doesn't need 
these. PSI gets its continuity and coordination through 
regular meetings of PSI operational experts. PSI converts 
political support for non-proliferation goals into an 
operational capacity to respond professionally and 
Qoperational capacity to respond professionally and 
expeditiously to a proliferation alert. PSI participants form 
partnerships of states ready to work together, as necessary, 
to disrupt the illicit trade in WMD-related materials. PSI 
countries train together, their defence and law enforcement 
authorities share information and they perform actual 
maritime and air interdictions. 
 
In the event of a proliferation alert PSI supporters, 
Australia included, assess the legal, practical and political 
issues on a case by case basis, and decide what action if any 
they are prepared to take in response to credible and 
reliable information. Flag state consent is one example. 
Under the PSI, supporting countries may be asked to authorise 
an interdiction if one of their state flagged vessels is 
suspected of illicitly transporting WMD. Australia has 
developed national flag state consent procedures to respond 
to PSI cases. But our consent is not automatic - we remain in 
control of the decision-making process and, where relevant, 
 
 
would take this up to the highest levels of government. We 
have defined the conditions on which we would give our 
consent, should we be asked for it. 
 
In short, Australia will consider flag state consent requests 
on a case-by-case basis. And that effectively is the approach 
taken by PSI countries as a whole. Quite simply, we maintain 
our national sovereignty when it comes to deciding our 
response to PSI cases. It's a serious issue for us. 
Australia like Indonesia is a coastal state, and almost 90% 
of our international trade is transported by sea. We are not 
interested in putting arrangements in place which would cause 
unnecessary delays for the shipping industry. So it was 
important for us to get the flag state consent procedures 
right. 
 
As I mentioned at the outset, the proliferation of WMD is a 
threat to international security.  Unfortunately, that threat 
conceals itself within one of the greatest achievements and 
advantages we have in ensuring our continued development and 
prosperity this century: the free flow of trade, knowledge 
and people on which our global economy is based. These 
freedoms can facilitate the availability of dangerous new 
capabilities and opportunities to states of concern or to 
terrorists. 
 
The challenge for governments and regulators is to keep pace 
with the phenomenal growth in world trade, which demands ever 
faster customs clearances and transport, and the activities 
of determined proliferators who would seek to use legitimate 
trade for illicit WMD trafficking.  Several measures have 
been introduced to address this problem, including the US 
Container Security Initiative and the more recent Secure 
Freight Initiative. However, the consequences of WMD 
materials slipping through despite these measures are 
frightening indeed. The PSI was  brilliantly conceived to 
address such a possibility. 
 
As you well know, the Asia-Pacific is strategically 
important to the global economy.  It has some of the world's 
busiest ports, airports and trans-shipment centres and these 
assets can be used by those who seek to move WMD materials 
around the world. 
 
Through outreach to our region on counter-proliferation and 
PSI, Australia seeks to work with our neighbours to counter 
WMD proliferation - a threat that threatens us all. We stress 
that no country would be immune to the consequences of a WMD 
attack, no matter how far away this occurred. The economic 
and trade effects alone of such an attack would hit every 
economy. Australia is prepared to assist regional countries 
to improve their WMD-related export controls and expand 
regional support for the PSI. With other Australian agencies 
and key PSI partner countries (for example, the United States 
and Japan), we have coordinated the delivery of practical 
technical assistance to several important supplier and 
trans-shipping countries, and have expanded our dialogue on 
counter-proliferation issues. 
 
What we have found from our discussion with regional partners 
is that some countries which are otherwise willing to take 
steps to stop WMD proliferation, hesitate to support the PSI 
because of uncertainty about its exact nature, including what 
Qbecause of uncertainty about its exact nature, including what 
participation in the PSI would require of them. While 
intimate knowledge of PSI modalities might be scarce in some 
cases, overall we have seen a welcome desire from 
interlocutors to learn more about the initiative itself. As 
we strive to de-mystify the PSI and tackle the knowledge gaps 
and misconceptions about the initiative and its activities, 
hesitant countries will, in time, open-up to the initiative. 
Our priority is to continue efforts to provide solid 
information about what the initiative is and what it is not. 
Participation in the PSI, including endorsement of its 
Statement of Interdiction 
Principles (SIP), sends a strong message to would-be 
proliferators of the political commitment by countries to 
taking legal, cooperative and practical action to stop the 
spread of WMD. 
 
In our experience one of the best ways for non-PSI countries 
 
 
to understand the PSI is to attend a PSI exercise. We engaged 
regional countries on the PSI through our PSI "Pacific 
Protector 06" exercise in April last year and since the 
exercise, and following further engagement on the PSI, 
several of those observer countries have publicly expressed 
their support for the PSI. Similarly, Japan's recent PSI 
exercise Pacific Shield 07 contributed to further 
understanding the PSI for those regional observer countries 
that attended. On another level, Australia has adapted the 
successful PSI Tabletop Exercise from Japan's ASTOP meeting 
earlier this year as a discussion tool. 
 
Australia offers to host a Tabletop Exercise in regional 
countries as the basis for a multi-agency discussion of how 
to respond to a real proliferation threat. The Tabletop 
Exercise draws out key issues of both interest and concern, 
and also demonstrates the value and importance of 
inter-agency coordination and cooperation. 
 
The PSI has been in existence for almost five years. In 
fact, next year marks the PSI's fifth anniversary. It is a 
tribute to supporting states that the PSI continues to 
develop and evolve. 
 
In the future, key challenges will be to continue to expand 
the membership of PSI, widen its coverage in particular 
regions, and enlist the direct support and related efforts of 
major countries still outside the PSI. 
 
Increased international support remains key to expanding the 
PSI's operational reach, strengthening capacity, and 
responding to disruption opportunities. The more countries 
that participate in the PSI, the stronger the defence, and 
the fewer opportunities for proliferators to exploit gaps in 
the coverage of the PSI. 
 
In conclusion, I'd like to reiterate that the multilateral 
arms control and non-proliferation treaties serve us well in 
defending us against the spread of WMD, as do effectively 
implemented export controls. But as we seek to strengthen 
those systems to prevent dangerous technologies, know-how and 
WMD falling into the wrong hands, proliferation can still 
prosper where treaty obligations are evaded and export 
controls and their enforcement are weak, or where procurement 
is forced underground. The PSI exists in an attempt to cover 
these weaknesses. The PSI acts, if you like, as a safety net. 
 
Thank you again for the opportunity to address this seminar 
today. 
 
End text. 
 
¶5. (U) Embassy regrets the delayed response to reftel, which 
was not received by the action office until December 11 owing 
to a server outage. 
 
MCCALLUM