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P 171222Z DEC 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003513 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL EUN ESDP KV
SUBJECT: EU SUMMIT AUTHORIZES ESDP MISSION FOR KOSOVO 
 
Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) The European Council (summit) in Brussels December 14 
endorsed an ESDP Mission for Kosovo, overcoming Dutch and 
Cypriot reservations.   The summit mandated Solana to prepare 
the mission "in discussion with the responsible authorities 
in Kosovo and the United Nations."  Some contacts see the 
summit's conclusions as providing UN SYG Ban a basis to 
"welcome" the EU's decision.  The Romanian and Italian 
missions noted the united EU political decision will provide 
needed political cover to deflect domestic criticism on 
moving forward on Kosovo.  The four EU members of the Quint, 
assisted by the Portuguese Presidency and Solana, sought the 
strong forward-leaning language.  END SUMMARY 
 
POLITICAL DECISION TO LAUNCH ESDP MISSION 
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¶2.  (C) Contacts from several missions confirmed that the 
European Council conclusions mark a strong political decision 
to launch the ESDP Mission in Kosovo.  The timing and exact 
modalities, including specifying its legal basis, will be 
determined by FMs, likely at their January 28 GAERC.  The 
Portuguese Mission Balkans expert told us that it would be 
highly unlikely for any member state, including The 
Netherlands and Cyprus, to backtrack from this agreement 
reached by PMs.  The German Mission Balkans expert told us 
that Chancellor Merkel had pushed for strong language on the 
ESDP Mission and is reportedly pleased with the result. 
While technically the mission can be formally launched only 
after the adoption of a joint action by the Commission and 
the Council, the German Mission here believes the joint 
action will proceed smoothly.  Those wanting a clearer legal 
basis may get a statement from the UNSYG.  If one is not 
forthcoming by late January, they will have to live with the 
political decision of PMs, our German contact concluded. 
 
POLITICAL COVER FOR THE RETICENT 
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¶3.  (C) The Romanian PSC Ambassador and the Italian COWEB 
expert told us separately December 17 that the conclusions 
provide their respective governments the broad "EU" cover 
needed to fend off domestic political attacks on Kosovo.  The 
Romanian observed that his PM was "pleased" with the summit's 
results.  The political cover, coupled with the understanding 
from Pristina that any declaration of independence will be 
coordinated with, inter alia, Brussels, eliminates the issue 
of Kosovo as a precedent as far as Bucharest is concerned. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Italian Mission COWEB expert told us that the 
Dutch PM was vocal in the summit about the need for a clear 
legal basis but agreed to the text, given that the 
"modalities" for the mission would be determined by FMs. 
According to the Italians and Germans, the Dutch found it 
easier to agree to the ESDP language given that the language 
encouraging "Serbia to meet the necessary conditions (full 
cooperation with ICTY) to allow its SAA rapidly to be signed 
...."  was maintained.  The Romanians also noted positively 
that the term "candidate status" also survived the PMs' 
discussion and redrafting.   Dutch PSC Ambassador Milders 
told Pol M/C that his government was "not particularly 
pleased" by the "too thin" mandate upon which the ESDP 
Mission now appears to be based.  The Hague was, however, 
reasonably satisfied with the compromise language adopted on 
Serbia.  The Dutch believe that if the EU does not use its 
leverage now to secure Mladic's arrest, he will never be 
captured and extradited.  In any case, he added, Kostunica's 
harsh reaction to the Council conclusions, including his 
retort that Serbia cannot be bought off by potential EU 
membership, demonstrates that accelerated candidate status 
will not produce the desired results. 
 
MANDATING SOLANA TO PREPARE THE MISSION 
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¶5.  (C) Several of our contacts noted that PMs inserted an 
additional sentence to the draft conclusions:  "The Secretary 
General/High Representative is requested to prepare the 
mission in discussion with the responsible authorities in 
Kosovo and the United Nations."  The Portuguese COWEB expert 
noted that this formalizes what has already been taking place 
for months, but the Portuguese PSC Ambassador told Pol M/C 
that Solana himself had orchestrated this addition.  The 
Italian Mission said this addition was meant to address 
Swedish (and others') concerns that the EU -- and not just 
the EU members of the Quint -- take the lead on Kosovo. 
 
GIVING UN SYG BAN A BASIS 
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BRUSSELS 00003513  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Two of our contacts told us they viewed the addition 
of the sentence mandating Solana to prepare the mission as 
providing UN SYG Ban "something" to which he could respond. 
Should Ban "welcome" the Council conclusions, the EU could, 
in turn, stretch Ban's statement into providing the UN cover 
the Dutch crave. 
 
COMMENT 
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¶7.  (C) Finally, the Quint European Union members 
(characterized to us by several missions as quite active at 
the summit), with support from the Portuguese Presidency and 
Solana, pushed the European Council to action on Kosovo.  The 
Dutch voiced their dissatisfaction with the legal arguments 
but ultimately signed on, given that a blank check on 
accelerated candidate status for Serbia was not formalized. 
The Cypriots used the summit to note, once again, that they 
would "never" recognize Kosovo and, according to the 
Portuguese, pocketed an IOU for future use, probably 
regarding Turkish accession (although the French told us they 
believed Cyprus will simply look for a few additional plumb 
slots in the EU bureaucracy as its payback).   In any case, 
while the question remains of when, officially, to launch the 
mission, the political green light has been given, and even 
the Dutch and the Cypriots are not expected to cry foul in 
the weeks to come. 
MURRAY 
.