VZCZCXRO8872
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3482/01 3451407
ZNY CCCAA ZZH
P 111407Z DEC 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNJ/USDAO NDJAMENA PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003482 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM (BTURNER), 
PRM/AFR(MMCKELVEY), AF/FO (JSWAN), AF/RSA (MBITTRICK) 
JOINT STAFF FOR ENP (MSHIELDS,JHIRST,JSEAMON), AF 
(ROSBOURN,SKELLY), WEB (KBRENTON) 
OSD FOR RFABRYCKY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 
TAGS: MOPS EUN CD CT PHUM
SUBJECT: EU CHAD MISSION ON RAZOR'S EDGE 
 
REF: A. PARIS 4661 B. BRUSSELS 03258 C. BRUSSELS 03018 
 
Classified By: USEU Joint Staff Liaison officer Major Maria Metcalf for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  The Director General of the EU Military 
Staff (DGEUMS), LtGen Leakey told U.S. Ambassador to Chad 
Nigro on December 5 that the 8EU is on a razor's edge 
regarding the military mission in Chad," clarifying that due 
to severe force generation shortfalls, EU credibility "may be 
at stake."  He said that French efforts to get EU Member 
States to agree to common funding for the mission are being 
blocked by the UK and Germany and seem likely to hold-up the 
force generation process.  DGEUMS added that the mission 
faces the significant challenges regarding national caveats, 
rules of engagement and detention.  Leakey opined that 
despite the problems, it is likely that the EU will find a 
way to deploy the military mission eventually, because most 
Member States recognize that the EU will appear militarily 
impotent if the mission falls through.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C/NF)  In a December 5 meeting, U.S. Ambassador to Chad 
Louis Nigro and the EU Director General of the EU Military 
Staff (DGEUMS), UK LtGen David Leakey, Ambassador Nigro asked 
Leakey for an update on the EU's planning for its military 
mission in Chad.   DGEUMS explained that "the EU is on a 
razor's edge regarding the military mission in Chad," due to 
severe force generation shortfalls.  LtGen Leakey specified 
that helicopters are the most critical force requirement yet 
to be filled by Member States.  The mission requires at least 
18 helos (11 transport, four reconnaissance and three 
casualty evacuation).  Currently no helicopters have been 
pledged by any Member State. 
 
------------------ 
Sharing the Burden 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C/NF)  According to Leakey, no one in the EU is sure 
what will become of the mission, but he believes that it will 
go ahead in the end - the question really is when - and that 
question depends on money.  Some EU Member States, the UK and 
Germany in particular, have an allergy to common funding. 
Leakey emphasized that the UK military is maxed out regarding 
critical assets in NATO and multi-national operations. 
Therefore the UK is against common funding because in this 
case it would only serve to offset the reality that most 
Member States do not spend enough on defense.  The real 
answer is for the others to carry their share of the burden, 
in NATO and in ESDP.  He noted that the UK currently has 
13,500 soldiers deployed (5,500 in Iraq and 8,000 in 
Afghanistan), with Afghanistan alone costing over $1 billion 
in additional costs every six months. 
 
---------------------- 
Significant Challenges 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C/NF)  According to LtGen Leaky, if/when the EUFOR Chad 
mission is launched there will be three significant 
challenges for the Member States to the mission's credibility 
and effectiveness: national caveats, rules of engagement and 
detention. 
 
¶5.  (C/NF)  National Caveats:  It is likely that many 
contributing countries will impose national caveats that will 
limit the effectiveness of the contributions.  Unfortunately, 
countries don't like to make these caveats known until 
immediately before or after deployment, which makes it 
difficult for planners to work around them.  However, DGEUMS 
speculated that it is possible that there is a growing 
resentment, both in the EU and NATO, regarding caveats. 
Perhaps, he speculated, this will lead to limited caveats. 
 
¶6.  (C/NF)  Rules of Engagement (RoE):  The RoE will not be 
written to cover every possible circumstance and it will be 
 
BRUSSELS 00003482  002 OF 003 
 
 
up to the Force Commander (French Brigadier General 
Jean-Phillippe Ganascia) to interpret them on the ground. 
The issue of RoE will be difficult because there is no "peace 
to keep," but rather a complicated political and military 
situation that EUFOR will have to navigate while maintaining 
neutrality and impartiality.  At what point would the use of 
force be authorized?  This challenge will require constant, 
fluid discussions up and down the chain of command 
on-the-ground.  (Comment.  This issue becomes even riskier, 
considering that there has been fighting 20 miles away from 
the EUFOR Force Headquarters in Chad for the past 10 days. 
Although LtGen Leakey emphasized that the on the ground 
assessments indicate EUFOR will not be a target for violence, 
it could be difficult to keep from being in the center of a 
violent situation if the fighting spreads. End comment.) 
 
¶7.  (C/NF)  Detention: Conditions in Chadian prisons and lack 
of capacity in the judicial system pose a unique problem for 
EUFOR.  If EU troops detain those caught in nefarious acts in 
the EU areas of authority, what will they do with them?  It 
would not be in accordance with European standards to 
hand-over the arrested to the local authorities.  Should they 
even arrest those caught in illegal acts, and if not, then 
what credibility will the EU have on the ground?, asked 
Leakey. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Meeting with ESDP Director for Defense Aspects of ESDP 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶8.  (C/NF)  In a separate meeting on the same day with 
Claude-France Arnould, Director for Defense Aspects of ESDP, 
Ambassador Nigro said the refugee and migration issues in 
Eastern Chad are the most compelling from the U.S. 
perspective.  The U.S. hopes that the EU Chad mission will 
affect the protection of refugees and change the 
political-military equation in the East.  The U.S. is also 
looking for ways to support the UN Mission in Chad and the 
Central African Republic (MINURCAT) and to work with other 
international players in N'Djamena. 
 
¶9.  (C/NF)  Arnould said that Chadian President Deby is 
sensitive regarding any U.S. participation in the EU mission. 
 She also mentioned that there are also still "some issues" 
with the exit strategy for the EU military mission, but did 
not specify what they are.  EUFOR Chad/CAR mission has 
encouraged regular meetings between the Council and the 
Commission to ensure coordination toward common objectives, 
to include development projects relevant to the short-term 
military mission and the long-term Commission goals. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Ambassador Nigro suggested to Arnould the idea of 
having regular video tele-conferences among the pertinent 
departments in Brussels, Washington and N'Djamena, to ensure 
the alignment of efforts of all involved.  Arnould welcomed 
the idea. 
 
--------- 
Relevance 
--------- 
 
¶11.  (C/NF)  The day following Ambassador Nigro's meetings, 
French media reported that Italy will contribute a small 
mobile medical facility.  A contact at the Italian Delegation 
expressed frustration at the way the French are  setting-up 
this mission, saying that the French pre-identified the 
medical unit before asking the Italians if they would be 
willing to contribute it, and then French newspapers 
published the contribution before Italy officially made its 
decision.  The Italian contact commented that it seemed 
likely that French intentionally leaked the possible Italian 
contribution to the press in order to increase the pressure 
on Italy to commit.  Several Member States have the 
impression that the French are pursuing every possibility 
with other Member States to ensure that this mission will go 
forward.  What is unclear is how much the French will damage 
 
BRUSSELS 00003482  003 OF 003 
 
 
their relationships with other Member States in the process, 
and to what degree this could limit the effectiveness of 
French leadership in pushing future EU military missions. 
 
¶12.  (U)  Ambassador Nigro has not had the opportunity to 
clear this message. 
 
Murray 
.