VZCZCXRO5575
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3465/01 3401821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061821Z DEC 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017 
TAGS: PREL BK IR KV SR EP EUN
SUBJECT: FRIED AND EU POLDIR ON BOSNIA, KOSOVO, IRAN, OTHER 
ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
 
¶1.  (C) EUR A/S Dan Fried briefed EU Director General for 
External and Politico-Military Affairs Robert Cooper December 
6 on his talks with leaders in BiH, noting that we must 
continue to support HR Lajcak, and build on the recent 
progress (the Mostar Agreement and SAA initialing), but also 
prepare strategy, including more carrots and sticks, for 
addressing underlying problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). 
Fried stressed the need to move forward quickly on Kosovo, 
noting the need for unity in action rather than paralysis. 
Cooper noted that the Dutch are a "surprise problem" on 
Kosovo.  A/S Fried and Cooper also discussed Iran, Georgia, 
Ukraine, and the need to strategize on energy.  End summary. 
 
 
BiH:  Bought Time 
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¶2.  (C) A/S Fried briefed Cooper on his Dec. 4-5 talks in 
Sarajevo.  He noted improvement in the situation given 
Dodik's and Silajdzic's backing down, in part because of the 
threat of sanctions and the atmosphere of public panic. 
Simultaneous crises over BiH and Kosovo may have been 
averted, but fundamental problems in BiH remain and will 
resurface.  A/S Fried reported that Dodik committed to 
behave, including publicly stating that the RS would not 
secede.  He also undertook to tell Kosovo Serbs to remain in 
Kosovo and avoid provocations.  Cooper said Dodik's 
brinkmanship might have worked -- "there was not much we 
could have done about it and it would have paralyzed Bosnian 
institutions."  Fried reiterated that Dodik and Silajdzic had 
backed down in part because of the threat of sanctions and 
underscored the need for a strategy on BiH to address key 
problems that will resurface.  Cooper observed that the 
Commission, when finalizing negotiations over police reform 
and the initialing of the SAA, found the BiH leaders 
"palpably relieved" that a crisis had been averted.  He noted 
that Dodik should understand that the EU is an answer to his 
problem; A/S Fried called for the EU to specify what the EU 
accession process requires of Dodik and other leaders. 
Cooper also questioned the timing of Lacjak's initial 
decision in October. 
 
Kosovo:  Unity in Action, not Paralysis 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Turning to Kosovo, Cooper noted that PM Prodi and 
President Sarkozy had apparently agreed to shift the Kosovo 
timetable to take Serbia's presidential elections into 
account.  A/S Fried emphasized that the Troika process had 
provided a 120-day delay as requested by Europeans and that 
Kostunica would manipulate the electoral calendar for his own 
purposes.  While the U.S. might be able to consider the issue 
if the first-round truly were held on January 20 and the 
second-round two weeks thereafter, any subsequent calls for 
delay would risk splitting the U.S. and the EU. 
 
¶4.  (C) Cooper listed some of the usual suspects who remain 
unenthusiastic about recognition:  Romania (Cooper said the 
U.S. "could help us here with the Bucharest Summit coming"), 
Cyprus ("whose foreign policy is often made in Moscow"), 
Slovakia (given its parliamentary resolution), and "the 
surprise problem" -- The Netherlands (due to enlargement 
phobia, its history in the Balkans, and its legalistic 
tradition).  A/S Fried underlined that the U.S. has no more 
patience for further hand-wringing by the Europeans; Kosovo 
is not going to get better with time; rather, it will only 
get worse.  Pressed by A/S Fried if Solana would be helpful, 
Cooper replied yes, but at his own moment, and when the gap 
among member states has further narrowed, to preserve his 
credibility within the EU.  Fried noted that the EU will bear 
responsibility if Kosovo is not resolved quickly.  Cooper 
said no one in the EU is asking for more time for 
negotiations.  A/S Fried repeated that now is the time for 
unity in action, not unity in paralysis. 
 
¶5.  (C) Cooper said the U.S. and the EU should determine 
timing and procedures to appoint the International Civilian 
Representative (ICR) in Kosovo.  The ICR should be appointed 
within a day of a declaration of independence.  The ICR would 
need the backing of as much of the international community 
(IC) as possible.  Cooper said he viewed recognition of 
Kosovo independence as a prerequisite for possible Steering 
Board membership.  A/S Fried agreed to consult very soon on 
this. 
 
BRUSSELS 00003465  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Georgia:  Need to Isolate Russia on Abkhazia if Necessary 
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¶6.  (C) Asked about Georgia, A/S Fried noted the need to 
maintain pressure on Tbilisi to respect democratic norms.  A 
sharp IC reaction should Russia recognize Abkhazia as 
independent would help prevent Georgia from taking imprudent 
measures. 
 
Iran and NEI;  Solana felt "blindsided" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) Stressing that he was speaking "off the record," 
Cooper noted that HR Solana had felt "blindsided" by the 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, particularly 
given his talks November 30 with Jalili.  Cooper 
characterized the recent PSC discussion of the NIE "rather 
sensible," with several member states concluding that it 
reflected what the EU had believed.  He asked if the U.S. 
could share more of the NIE with the EU and noted that Iran 
has "suspended" weaponization, but not given up this goal. 
Solana's Non-Proliferation Envoy Giannella added it is key 
for the EU to understand where the Iranians had left off as 
well as what they had achieved.  A/S Fried said we would 
consider a briefing, either in Brussels or in Washington. 
 
Ukraine:  Remember its place in the world 
- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) On Ukraine, A/S Fried noted the free and fair 
elections and stressed the need to reach out to Ukrainian 
leaders and remember Kiev's potential place in the world. 
Cooper agreed, noting that the leadership needs to focus more 
on issues and less on making money. 
 
Need to Strategize on Energy 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) A/S Fried raised energy and the need for the U.S. and 
the EU to engage in strategic thinking, including on Caspian 
pipelines. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (C/NF) The main surprise in Cooper's remarks was his 
concern over the Dutch position on Kosovo.  While we look to 
the Quint's EU members to take the lead on moving the EU 
toward action, we should consider engaging The Hague 
bilaterally as well on this.  While our local contacts have 
noted that only the Cypriots remain the sole hold-out  (while 
the "usual suspects," including Romania, remain 
unenthusiastic but unwilling to block EU consensus), a 
problem from the Dutch will only encourage further wobbliness 
from key countries such as Italy.  Cooper's questioning of 
Lajcak's timing may indicate what another Council Secretariat 
source working on BiH has told us -- that Solana's confidence 
in Lajcak is a finite commodity.  End comment. 
 
¶11.  (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message. 
GRAY 
.