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RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #1627/01 3440638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100638Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1850
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001627 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR KV BK
SUBJECT:  The Sandzak: Ugljanin's Fiefdom 
 
REF:  BELGRADE 1394 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Sandzak is one of the last vestiges of Milosevic-era rule 
in Serbia where a local politician holds on to his power base 
through manipulation, coercion, and intimidation.  However, this 
Muslim-populated area appears primed for a political opening, as 
Novi Pazar Mayor Ugljanin's tactics are beginning to show their 
wear, and local political, religious, and civic leaders are 
beginning to find their unified voice.  Mirroring this political 
shift is the pending resolution of an intra-religious feud between 
feuding muftis, which could further weaken Ugljanin's influence.  If 
the leaders can act in a unified manner, Sandzak has the potential 
to shake from its authoritarian past and could serve as a bridge 
providing economic growth and stability in southwest Serbia, and the 
border regions with Montenegro, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  But there is 
little indication that Ugljanin will relinquish his power either 
quietly or honestly.  End Summary. 
 
Mayor Ugljanin: Sandzak's Solution or Sandzak's Milosevic 
-------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Mayor Sulejman Ugljanin told DCM, on her December 3-4 
visit to Novi Pazar, that Sandzak was confronted by difficult 
problems requiring international assistance.  He claimed that he was 
not the cause of those problems, but instead, part of the solution. 
Ugljanin blamed the United States for the recent split in the local 
Islamic community (reftel), and accused the United States of 
supporting "that murderer" Mufti Muamer Zukorlic.  He blamed 
Zukorlic for the lack of rule of law in Novi Pazar and accused him 
of supporting criminal and fundamentalist elements.  Ugljanin 
repeated the accusation floating around in Belgrade's Islamic 
circles that Zukorlic was running a shooting range in the basement 
of his private Islamic university.  When questioned about the 
lackluster performance of the local police under his control during 
the November 16 mosque shootings, Ugljanin responded disingenuously 
that he was committed to improving the rule of law, the judiciary, 
and working with the United States.  He asked for U.S. and OSCE 
assistance in these efforts.  Following the meeting, Ugljanin called 
in his local press and reported he had had a productive talk with 
the DCM highlighting "the need for reform of the police force, 
judiciary and public prosecutor's office."  DCM stressed the need 
for calm and rule of law. 
 
Opposition Parties and NGOs Seeking Common Cause 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3.  Local opposition leaders and NGOs in the Sandzak described their 
strong concern over about Ugljanin's repressive rule over Novi Pazar 
tactics but emphasized they wanted to cooperate in an effort to 
bring about political change in the Sandzak.  Aida Corovic of local 
NGO Urban In told the DCM that Uglanjin, whom she called "Sandzak's 
Milosevic," maintained power through voter intimidation and 
restricting control of the local media.  Ugljanin, she and other NGO 
representatives said, employed local "thugs," separate from the 
police, to bully local citizens into submission and apathy.  In a 
separate meeting, a local judge who is part of a Serbia-wide 
movement to establish an independent judiciary supported these 
statements, noting that he had received death threats and directly 
fingered Ugljanin and his "shock troops" as the culprits.  In 
response to DCM's question, the judge said Ugljanin's mechanism for 
sustaining his unpopular control was by liberal use of these shock 
troops.  They would tell people how to vote, which mosque to go to 
and when to show up for Ugljanin rallies.  The judge said the shock 
troops led the demonstration in front of the Zukorlic-controlled 
mosque, shoving their way through those waiting to go to prayer and 
trying to start fights.  The judge described these shock troops as 
"buzz-cut body builder mercenaries with extensive rap sheets." 
 
¶4.  Representatives of the opposition Sandzak Democratic Party (SDP, 
led by Labor and Social Policy Minister Rasim Ljajic) said they were 
considering new local alliances in order to defeat Ugljanin at the 
polls at upcoming municipal elections, most likely to be held in the 
spring of 2008.  SDP Spokesperson Mirosad Jusufovic said, SDP, which 
is already partnered with the Democratic Party (DS), was already 
talking to the local Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) branch about 
combining for a single candidates' list, since the LDP could help 
attract Serb voters in this predominantly Muslim region.  Hajram 
Djekic, Director of the local LDP office, left open the possibility 
of a coalition and said the LDP was focusing its campaign efforts on 
winning the support of the youth, who were heavily disenfranchised 
in this region of high unemployment and few opportunities. 
Representatives of both the LDP and SDP complained of the difficulty 
of getting their messages out on the street due to Ugljanin's 
control over local media.  NGO representatives had also complained 
bitterly about lack of independent media.  Jusufovic of SDP said 
well trained poll observers would be extremely important in the 
upcoming municipal elections and asked for U.S. assistance in 
training local election monitors. 
 
 
BELGRADE 00001627  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5.  SDP had begun the meeting saying local television already was 
carrying Ugljanin's photo op with the DCM and expressing their 
concerns that Ugljanin was manipulating DCM's visit to somehow show 
that the United States supported him.  This was transparently 
hypocritical, they said, because Ugljanin repeatedly appeared on 
television blaming the United States for all of Novi Pazar's 
problems, including instigating the mufti feud.  SDP then arranged a 
joint press statement with Hajrudin Hajrovic, President of SDP's 
Novi Pazar chapter, and DCM emphasizing SDP's long-term cooperation 
with the United States and our joint desire for democratic and 
economic reform and stability for the Sandzak. 
 
Mufti Dispute Dissipating 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During DCM's conversations with the two claimants to 
Serbia's Supreme Mufti status, it became clear that the Ugljanin 
(and DSS) engineered putsch was losing steam.  Though Zukorlic began 
his meeting saying he was "angry" with the DCM for meeting 
Ugljanin-annointed Adem Zilkic, he was visibly more confident and in 
control than he was during the November 13 meeting in Belgrade 
immediately before the shootings.  Appearing statesmanlike in his 
ornate office compound and surrounded by local supporting imams, 
Zukorlic noted positively the increased attention by the diplomatic 
community in the Sandzak over the past several months.  He told DCM 
he was encouraged that he had successfully organized several 
thousand people in the streets of Novi Pazar on December 1 in 
support of the upcoming Hadj to Mecca.  Ugljanan and Zilkic had 
attempted to promote a counter-event, but were only able to muster 
50 supporters.  In response to Zukorlic's "anger," DCM reiterated 
that diplomats were not politicians and meetings with various 
interlocutors could not and should not be interpreted as shows of 
support.  Zukorlic repeated the SDP's apprehension that the local 
community was not sophisticated enough to understand diplomatic 
nuances and would view any meeting with a U.S. diplomat as an 
indication of U.S. support. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In a separate meeting, a clearly unhinged Zilkic, 
appearing alone in a simple storefront office, told the DCM that the 
he still hoped to resolve the religious dispute between him and 
Zukorlic peacefully, and hoped he could get Ugljanin and Lajic to 
meet in order to help resolve the situation.  Sounding desperate and 
defeated, he once again pitched the need for a Belgrade-based Reis 
for Serbia, saying that without its own Reis the Muslim community in 
Serbia would be further fractured and split.  Zilkic said he was 
concerned that with the probable pending loss of Kosovo, Serbia's 
Muslims would further lose their influence in Serbian political and 
social life.  As DCM was attempting to leave, Zilkic practically 
prostrated himself asking if DCM thought what he had done was wrong 
and begging for the United States to "help." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Ugljanin is a fascinating by-product of Milosevic's brutal 
rein.  Originally a founding member of former Bosnian President 
Alija Izetbegovic's Democratic Action Party (SDA), Ugljanin actively 
began arming Sandzak to secede from Serbia in the early 1990's. 
When his co-conspirators were arrested in 1993, Ugljanin managed to 
escape to Turkey.  Though he visited Sarajevo every year during the 
war (DCM first me him in Sarajevo in 1994), flying in via Turkey, he 
remained wanted until he arrived in Belgrade in 1996, on a regularly 
scheduled Jugoslav Airlines Flight and was escorted by police escort 
back to Novi Pazar.  Though still the subject of considerable 
speculation, it is clear that Milosevic allowed him to return and 
would not have done so without Ugljanin's support.  Ugljanin's SDP 
party subsequently dropped its ties to the Bosnian branch and went 
into coalition with Prime Minister Kostunica's Democratic Party of 
Serbia (DSS) following Milosevic's ouster.  Ugljanin is now closely 
associated with Kostunica and Kostunica's policies.  Kostunica is 
widely believed to have engineered the Mufti feud through his cat's 
paw in the Sandzak, Ugljanin, in order both to keep Serbia in a 
constant state of chaos and also to position himself and Ugljanin as 
major beneficiaries of restitution of Islamic lands to the Islamic 
community when the restitution law is implemented in 2008. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Ugljanin increasingly has used more brutal tactics to stay 
in power, including stealing the last local elections in 2006, when 
his shock troops were widely deployed to intimidate voters and stuff 
ballot boxes.  Though his influence over the local political 
culture, media and judiciary still permeates the Sandzak, and he 
still has a sizable populist base, there appears to be a new 
emboldened current of opposition.  With the recent reaffirmation of 
Zukorlic's religious authority and a developing commitment among 
previously fractured NGO's and political parties to work 
cooperatively towards upcoming municipal elections, Ugljanin's grasp 
on political control is vulnerable.  Given his history, he is 
unlikely to relinquish this control easily or honestly and will 
certainly employ his supporters and his muscle on the street to 
counteract any electoral challenge.  Post will continue to provide 
assistance to Sandzak's democratic parties and will be increasingly 
present in the Sandzak both to show Ugljanin we are watching and to 
 
BELGRADE 00001627  003 OF 003 
 
 
further bolster democratic forces.   End Comment. 
 
MUNTER