VZCZCXRO2485
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #2009/01 3651619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311619Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0612
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2068
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: NEW YEAR'S EVE "YEAR IN REVIEW" WITH PM 
SINIORA 
 
REF: BEIRUT 2008 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
SUMMARY 
------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Prime Minister Siniora conducted an informal "Year in 
Review" session with the Ambassador during a meeting on 
December 31, repeating some previously reported points about 
the threat to Lebanon's sovereignty in recent months.  The 
Prime Minister also expressed surprising optimism about the 
January 6 Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting in Cairo 
being organized by the Saudi and Egyptian governments to 
discuss the current Lebanese political crisis, saying he had 
been given assurances that the outcome would indeed benefit 
Lebanon.  Looking forward, he recommended that Lebanon's 
allies closely study the requests for financial assistance 
(reftel), support the statements that emerge from the January 
6th meeting in Cairo, re-engage European interlocutors, 
particularly parliamentarians, and unite behind a strong 
message condemning Syria's interference in Lebanese internal 
affairs.  And just to end the year on an odd note typical for 
Lebanese politics, he confirmed that the specter of a Jean 
Obeid presidency was faintly visible in the background should 
what Siniora believes are Syrian efforts to derail the 
candidacy of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel 
Sleiman succeed.  End Summary. 
 
The Year in Review 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C)  The Prime Minister was in a relaxed mood during this 
meeting, which also included Siniora's Advisors Mohamad 
Chatah and Rola Noureddine, DCM Bill Grant and Special 
Assistant.  Siniora was pleased about the recent marriage of 
his son.  The Siniora family broke with the Lebanese 
tradition of an elaborate formal wedding and instead chose to 
go with an intimate family affairs for a "mere" 250 people 
(vice the 2,500 people, say, invited to the 2006 wedding of 
the son of the aforementioned Jean Obeid).  On a pessimistic 
note, he observed that his own wedding 31 years before had 
been marked by a "sky full of bombs," which prevented his 
parents from traveling from Sidon to Beirut for the ceremony. 
 He mourned the fact that, a generation later, security 
concerns still impacted Siniora family weddings. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by saying that, in 
fact, Lebanon was in better shape than it had been a few 
short months ago.  A consensus candidate has been chosen, the 
Patriarch was fully engaged and publicly issuing helpful 
messages about the need for a rapid election, the LAF is 
stable even in the face of the political turmoil, and the 
U.S. focus has been strong and public, as evidenced by the 
recent visits of NEA Assistant Secretary Welch and Deputy 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
Elliot Abrams.  Moreover, France seems to have learned its 
lesson about Syrian intentions. 
 
¶4. (C) Siniora admitted that the above was all true, but that 
Lebanon was still being "held hostage" by outside forces who 
are intent on dismantling Lebanon's institutions and 
sovereignty.  As evidence, he referred to the fact that the 
Lebanese parliament was "hijacked" 14 months ago, the 
presidency is empty, LAF senior leadership has been directly 
targeted in an attack, and that the Lebanese constitution was 
being openly questioned rather than obeyed.  He said, "I have 
to be frank.  This is a war and Lebanon has become the 
battleground in a larger conflict between Europe and the U.S. 
and some elements in the Middle East.  We are caught in the 
middle.  I want you to remember - I've never asked you for 
anything unreasonable, like sending in a naval fleet.  I just 
want all international partners to put the appropriate 
pressure on Syria to halt their interference.  And I am not 
looking to replace a Syrian presence with a French presence, 
an American one, or any other.  This has never been our 
goal." 
 
Cairo: Sarkozy (aka "The Prodigal Son") Returns 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Turing his attention to other international players, 
Siniora acknowledged the positive dialogue recently held in 
Cairo between French President Sarkozy and Egyptian President 
Mubarak.  Commenting on the French, Siniora called Sarkozy 
 
BEIRUT 00002009  002 OF 003 
 
 
his "prodigal son."  Sarkozy had caused a great deal of 
mischief by negotiating with Syria and offering them deals 
before even consulting with the Lebanese.  According to 
Siniora, the prodigal son has now seen the error of his ways 
and is trying to return to the fold. 
 
¶6. (C) Siniora, who had spoken with Mubarak for a debrief on 
December 30, said that the French and Egyptians were in 
agreement that the current crisis in Lebanon could be 
directly blamed on Syria.  Siniora expressed some concern 
about public statements that came from the meeting. 
According to Siniora, Mubarak may have indicated in his 
remarks that Syria should be called on to "interfere in 
Lebanon in a positive manner" to resolve the presidential 
crisis.  This message made both Siniora and Chattah very 
nervous, who said this should have been stated privately. 
Syria should never be given any leeway to interfere in 
Lebanon - period. 
 
¶7. (C) Despite all the disappointments of past Arab League 
diplomacy, Siniora has high hopes for the January 6th Arab 
League Foreign Ministers meeting in Cairo, which he hopes 
will unify Arab public opinion against Syria.  He is asking 
the Arab participants to support the immediate and 
unconditional election of Michel Sleiman, to demand that 
Syria cease their policy of interference, and to support the 
sitting GOL until an election can take place.  Asked who 
would represent Lebanon at this meeting, Siniora replied that 
he will give Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh, who resigned 
with other opposition ministers in November 2006, an 
invitation, wait for him to refuse as usual, and then send 
Acting FM Tariq Mitri to represent the GOL. 
 
¶8. (C) Chattah did not share Siniora's optimism.  He would 
rather see a strong, clear bilateral document from the Saudis 
and Egyptians alone than an Arab League effort that is 
watered down to "satisfy the concerns of countries like Oman 
and Yemen." 
 
After Cairo: Focus on Europe 
----------- 
 
¶9. (C) In Siniora's opinion, it may be time for another UN 
Security Council resolution if Arab public opinion unites 
against Syria in Cairo.  Then, he said, it is time to start 
working on the Europeans again.  He was pleased to report 
that German Foreign Minister Steinmeier had taken his advice 
and postponed a visit invitation to Syrian Foreign Minister 
Mu'allim.  Siniora wants Lebanese MP's to begin engaging 
directly with their European counterparts to highlight the 
fact the Speaker Berri refuses to let the Lebanese Parliament 
fulfill its constitutional duties.  Siniora also mentioned 
that he may have to take one week in the near future to 
personally visit his European counterparts in their home 
capitals.  (Note:  In a private pull-aside with the 
Ambassador at the end of the meeting, Siniora mentioned 
likely being out of Beirut during the week of January 8.  End 
note.) 
 
The President's Upcoming Travels 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) When asked what message he would wish the President 
to covey during his upcoming trip to the region, Siniora 
reiterated the importance of a united Arab diplomatic and 
public position on the Lebanon crisis.  He also said that the 
French should support what the Arabs decide upon.  Finally, 
he said that he is told time and time again that stability in 
Lebanon and the region is tied closely to progress on the 
Middle East Peace Process. 
 
Staying with Sleiman - No More Compromises 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Looking forward, Siniora said that March 14 had gone 
as far as they could with compromises and now the time has 
come to stand firm.  March 14 has abandoned the idea of using 
their strength in parliament to elect a president using the 
"50 1" simple majority voting option, which could be viewed 
by many as a divisive move.  Siniora also said that the 
nomination of General Sleiman represented a major concession 
by March 14.  Though Sleiman himself is a respected figure, 
Siniora had reservations about electing a military man to 
this high public office and amending the constitution to do 
so.  Now Siniora fully supports the Sleiman candidacy. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00002009  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶12. (C) Sleiman was once favored by the March 8th opposition, 
but all that came to an end when he became March 14th's 
official candidate.  The PM said the current stalemate is 
intended to exhaust Sleiman, the recent assassination of 
General al-Haj was meant to intimidate Sleiman, and now -- 
with rumors that the LAF would be called in to diffuse 
Hizballah protesters in the streets, if events take a violent 
turn -- the unity of Sleiman's beloved LAF could be placed in 
jeopardy, as well.  Prime Minister Siniora said he had 
recently met with the General to encourage him to stand firm 
and remain "cool and above the political fray," which can 
quickly turn nasty in Lebanon. 
 
¶13. (C) In Siniora's opinion, the March 8 opposition 
coalition was "becoming tense."  He had heard that Syria was 
directly pressuring Speaker Berri to play a "destructive" 
role.  Why?  Perhaps some Syrian nationalists may feel that 
Hizballah is not doing enough to cause internal conflict. 
 
The Ghost of Candidates Past (and Future?): Jean Obeid 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) The Ambassador mentioned that, on December 30, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr raised -- with 
suitable alarm -- the question of a Jean Obeid presidency 
should the Sleiman presidency be derailed by the methods 
outlined above.  Murr said that he believes Obeid (who was 
always Nabih Berri's preference) is now the real Syrian 
candidate.  The Prime Minister confirmed this rumor and said 
he had heard it from Obeid himself, who declared that the 
Sleiman candidacy "was over."  In a side-bar conversation 
discouraging to all, meeting participants debated the merits 
of Michel Edde vs. Jean Obeid as a back-up candidate. 
Siniora said that "Edde is a very good liar, but one can find 
a way to get through to Obeid in the end.  Of the two, Obeid 
is the least worst option."  Asked why Sleiman, once thought 
to be Syria's candidate, is now apparently being blocked by 
Damascus, Siniora explained that it is because Sleiman is 
"entering through the March 14 gate" rather than via 
Damascus.  By contrast, Obeid would come to the presidency 
via Damascus. 
 
FELTMAN