VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3922/01 3370724
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030724Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4628

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003922 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OSD FOR SECRETARY GATES FROM CDA BUTENIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER ASEC OVIP IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY GATES' VISIT TO IRAQ 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 
1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Dear Mr. Secretary: Your visit to Iraq comes at a 
critical time.  Since the September testimony by the 
Ambassador and Gen. Petraeus, we have seen further progress 
on security: Anbar Province remains remarkably calm; the Sadr 
ceasefire continues -- in general -- to hold; the threat from 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been diminished; the CLC program 
continues to flourish, though with some GOI reservations; and 
the Turkey-PKK crisis appears to be contained for the moment, 
though we will need to continue to press for political 
dialogue which includes the KRG.  With GOI assistance, 
refugees are beginning to return to Iraq in increasing 
numbers, although their return may be due as much to economic 
necessity and dissatisfaction with their lot in neighboring 
Arab states as to improved security here in Iraq. On the 
political front, PM Maliki successfully weathered 
late-September attempts by the opposition to organize a 
no-confidence vote (although he may not be entirely out of 
those woods yet), and he has recently taken steps to fill the 
vacancies in his cabinet.  Notwithstanding these positive 
developments, there has been relatively little movement on 
key legislation, and the 3   1 power sharing mechanism 
enshrined in the August 26th leaders' communique is 
essentially defunct -- primarily because relations between 
Maliki and Vice President Hashimi are at a nadir.  Maliki 
remains a challenge for us as well: he did the right thing on 
the Strategic Partnership Declaration, the wrong thing on 
Annapolis, and is saying he will do the right thing -- not 
ask to open the resolution -- on UNSCR renewal while 
slow-rolling on the GOI letter.  Your trip follows recent 
visits by Deputy Secretary Negroponte, S/I Ambassador 
 
Satterfield and U/S Jeffrey, who, in tandem with Ambassador 
Crocker, have pressed the GOI leadership to take more 
meaningful steps on reconciliation.  While anything you can 
do to reinforce those efforts will be appreciated, you will 
probably want to focus your efforts on persuading Maliki to 
stick with what he told Deputy Secretary Negroponte on 
December 1 -- when he agreed to not insist on addressing 
bilateral issues in the operative paragraphs of the UNSCR. 
 
SECURITY 
-------- 
 
¶2. (S) A major factor in recent security gains has been the 
emergence of the "Concerned Local Citizens" (CLC) movement, 
now comprising roughly 65,000 personnel.  We are working to 
obtain complete GOI buy-in to the program, and to ensure that 
CLCs remain committed to a secure and united Iraq.  Since we 
forecast that only about 20 percent of CLC personnel will 
transition to permanent security-related careers in the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF), the Embassy and MNF-I are working to 
knit together various employment and training programs so 
that the other 80 percent can develop employment skills and 
have access to advanced technical training.  These programs 
currently include USAID's Community Stabilization Program 
(CSP), a pilot Community Service Corps (CSC) program (funded 
with CERP) and the DoD/GOI Joint Technical Education 
Reintegration Program, just getting off the ground.  Our goal 
is to help beneficiaries, including CLC's, move from 
dependence on our programs to longer term GOI-directed 
opportunities, and in many cases to private sector 
employment.  The GOI will be a major partner in this process, 
with the ultimate goal of GOI ownership and funding of these 
programs.  New funding sources for the interim stage are 
urgently needed, however.  The USAID CSP is currently funded 
only through September 2008; present burn rate projections 
indicate funds will be exhausted by mid-summer 2008.  Unless 
additional funds are received, programs will begin to ramp 
down by no later than June 2008.  At a ministerial level 
briefing on CLCs on December 1, MNF-I agreed to the Prime 
Minister's request not to develop CLCs in the southern 
provinces.  At the conclusion of the brief the Prime Minister 
appeared to accept that the program was making an important 
contribution to security and that effective supervision was 
in place to identify the "bad apples." 
 
¶3. (S) The Coalition is working closely with the GOI to 
establish and operate nation-wide programs to allow militia 
members to join the ISF or return to civilian life, but 
successful implementation remains localized and limited.  The 
Coalition and other interested international organizations 
(UNAMI and IOM) are helping Iraqi parties to draw on 
programmatic advice and implementation resources to help 
design and implement re-integration.  PM Maliki's recent 
announcement of re-hiring some former Ba'ath party cadres in 
recognition of their efforts to battle AQI and his reported 
pursuit of a general amnesty framework are both positive 
developments. 
¶4. (S) While there has been significant success in isolating 
AQI and other Sunni irreconcilable elements in Anbar and 
other areas, some in the Sunni community still lack 
confidence that the Shia-majority government will protect 
their interests; others fear attacks by Badr/JAM militias and 
government-affiliated death squads; and, in the north, many 
reject Kurdish expansionism.  As a result, some Sunnis 
continue to look to AQI and the insurgency for protection. 
Among the Shia, the combination of JAM's attacks on Karbala's 
Shia shrines, a reduced level of reciprocal sectarian 
killing, and the mafia-style tactics of some Sadrist elements 
have combined to diminish Jam's public prestige.  Moqtada 
al-Sadr's six-month "freeze" order has slowed but not stopped 
JAM violence.  Just as some Sunnis continue to look to AQI 
and other extremists for protection, some in the Shia 
community either seek or are obliged to seek the same from 
JAM, Badr, and local gangs rather than GOI security personnel 
who should be seen as the guarantors of public law and order, 
the bedrock of good governance. 
 
SPD/UNSCR/SOFA 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (S) With the signing of the Strategic Partnership 
Declaration (SPD) on November 26, we must now concentrate on 
the renewal of the UNSCR to continue Coalition Forces 
operating authorities.  We expect negotiations with the GOI 
to be intense, though we do not expect them to go down the 
wire to the December 31 deadline.  The GOI has been adamant 
that there not be another Chapter VII resolution after 2008. 
We have underscored to our interlocutors that the next UNSCR 
must grant essentially the same authorities as the present 
resolution to permit Coalition Forces to continue operations 
crucial to security in Iraq.  Underlying the negotiating 
process will be the need to allay deep GOI anxieties about 
the UNSCR undermining Iraqi sovereignty. PM Maliki,s closest 
security advisors, particularly National Security Advisor 
Muwafaq Rubaie, see themselves as the standard bearers for 
sovereignty, and they have been empowered by the PM to 
negotiate in this vein.  Of deep concern to us now is 
Maliki,s desire to reopen the operative paragraphs for 
negotiation.  By the time of your arrival, we hope to have 
persuaded the PM that what is needed is a simple rollover; 
bilateral issues should be negotiated bilaterally.  You 
should urge PM Maliki to conclude negotiations on UNSCR 
renewal as quickly as possible, to enable both sides to 
concentrate on the real work to be done, the negotiation of a 
SOFA in the first half of 2008.  A negotiating team is 
tentatively scheduled to arrive in Baghdad in January to 
begin this long process. 
 
IRAN TRILATERAL 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Iran trilateral talks which we agreed to take part in 
o/a November 24 did not take place, and the GOI continues to 
seek alternative dates from Tehran.  We hope that these talks 
will take place sometime in the next few weeks, allowing us 
to raise directly with the Iranians our concerns about 
Iranian-provided lethal aid to illegal armed groups in Iraq. 
Recent interrogations of detained JAM Special Groups members 
have clearly established that the IRGC Qods Force has 
continued to provide weapons training in Iran for Iraqi 
militants since the purported promise by the Iranian 
leadership to PM Maliki to cut lethal aid flowing into Iraq. 
MNF-I released nine Iranians from detention in mid-November 
(including two members of the IRGC-QF from the Irbil Five) in 
an effort to create a more positive atmosphere in which the 
talks could occur. 
 
FOREIGN TERRORISTS & FACILITATORS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) The flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq continues to 
be of great concern, underscored by the treasure trove of 
Objective Massey documents obtained from the principal AQI 
facilitator of foreign terrorist flow from Syria, Abu 
Muthana, killed by Coalition Forces in mid-September.  This 
information details the identities of some 800 foreign 
terrorists who entered Iraq in a 13-month period.  Of note 
was the number of individuals from Libya and North Africa, 
particularly Tunisia, who had entered Iraq, which comprised 
approximately 40% of all foreign terrorists rather than 20% 
as previously estimated.  PM Maliki is scheduled to be 
briefed December 3 on intelligence derived from Objective 
Massey, which has already been shared with services within 
Iraq and throughout the region.  Iraq has been engaging Syria 
on this and other issues bilaterally and we are seeking to 
facilitate regional cooperation through the Border Security 
Working Group, part of the Neighbors Process.  You may wish 
to query Interior Minister Bulani on his views of Syrian and 
source country efforts to stem the flow of foreign 
terrorists; he traveled to Damascus and to a regional 
 
interior ministers meeting in Kuwait in October. 
 
TURKEY/PKK/KGK 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Your Iraqi counterpart,s recent trip to Ankara and 
the subsequent trilateral meeting in Istanbul succeeded in 
demonstrating to the Turks that both the GOI and USG are 
serious in tackling the problem of the PKK/KGK presence in 
Iraq.  Continued PKK violence is fueling Turkish frustration 
and generating pressure for kinetic action.  Our ability to 
convince them to continue to exercise restraint is 
diminishing, although it does appear that any Turkish cross 
border operation would be limited in scope and would not 
destabilize the KRG. 
 
¶9. (S) Your trip is a prime opportunity to express USG 
appreciation for measures and actions by the authorities in 
the north and in Baghdad to curtail PKK/KGK activities. 
These measures are a good start, but our interlocutors need 
to hear that these actions must be sustained and augmented. 
While Turkey has said it is not interested in a PKK/KGK 
ceasefire, every attack by the terrorists increases the 
likelihood of the Turks taking action on their own.  The 
PKK/KGK needs to lay down their arms.  PKK/KGK leaders should 
be arrested, but to detain and release these individuals 
would only make matters worse.  Those detained should either 
stand trial in Iraq or be sent back to Turkey.  We are 
working on ideas to prevent financial flows to the PKK/KGK in 
Iraq, and considering requests to train airport personnel to 
prevent the transit of PKK/KGK personnel through Irbil 
airport. 
 
RETURN OF REFUGEES 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (S) A mixed batch of approximately 450 Sunni and Shia 
refugees returned to Baghdad from Syria on November 28. 
Iraqi ministers were on hand to greet the refugees upon 
arrival, and the GOI provided each family with one million 
dinars (approximately USD $800).  USAID will follow up with 
the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration to assess 
and monitor the needs of the returnees.  Meanwhile, the 
Iraqis are assimilating lessons learned from the return of 
this first tranche of refugees, in preparation for future 
refugee returns. 
 
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
------------------------ 
 
¶11. (S) Of the 36 cabinet seats within the Maliki government, 
a healthy chunk remain empty due to walk-outs by the Sunni 
Tawafuq bloc, the Sadrist bloc, the Iraqiya bloc, and 
Fadilah.  Their complaints vary but all remain deeply 
suspicious of Maliki and his backers, complaining that their 
ability to affect change or deliver services to their 
constituencies was severely hampered by the Prime Minister. 
Talks have just started with Tawafuq to return to government, 
and a group of technocratic nominees may be sent to the 
Parliament soon to replace the other parties.  With the Shia 
and Kurdish alliance keeping the government afloat, Maliki 
has had little incentive to be flexible or conciliatory.  In 
the wake of the security surge, however, political conditions 
have altered just enough to perhaps allow for a new coalition 
of parties and ministers led by Maliki, pursuing a less 
sectarian agenda.  The litmus test, of course, will be this 
coalition's ability to achieve passage of benchmark 
legislation and meaningful reconciliation.  Meanwhile, local 
developments in the provinces continue to outpace the central 
government's ability to define the national political agenda. 
 
 
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (S) De-Baathification: A second reading of the 
De-Baathification Law took place December 1.  Our next task 
will be to get the law to a third and final reading/vote 
before the Council of Representatives is unable to muster a 
quorum due to the hajj, which begins at the end of the first 
full week of December. 
 
¶13. (S) Elections Law: The PM's office (PMO) has prepared a 
partial working draft, but feels little urgency to complete 
its work -- in large part because neither Da'wa nor its 
principal allies (ISCI and the Kurds) stand to gain by 
holding early provincial elections. 
 
¶14. (S) Provincial Powers Law: At least two drafts of the law 
are reportedly with the Shura Council for legal review.  The 
drafts have apparently stalled there due largely to 
opposition from PM Maliki, who believes the current drafts 
concede too much power to the provinces. 
 
¶15. (S) CPA 17:  The Council of Ministers approved a draft 
law rescinding CPA 17 but it has not yet been submitted to 
the CoR.  Given widespread public support for asserting Iraqi 
sovereignty over private security firms, once the law is 
submitted it could move quickly through the normally 
hidebound CoR procedures.  We recommend that you reinforce 
with GOI officials USG concerns about the law and press them 
against sending it to the CoR.  We also must continue to 
stress our concerns with Maliki and ask that the law be held 
in the PM,s Office pending further bilateral discussion with 
the USG. 
 
¶16. (S) Hydrocarbons: Hydrocarbons framework legislation 
remains stalled.  PM Maliki, who repeatedly assured us that 
he had the votes for passage, now asserts the GOI should 
build a stronger consensus on the hydrocarbons package before 
proceeding.  Left unchecked, Maliki's position will lead to 
further delays.  Key decision-makers need to hear that it is 
time to stop quibbling about details, since every day that 
passes delays much-needed investment opportunities that would 
raise revenue in absolute terms for all of Iraq. 
 
¶17. (S) The situation has not been helped by the KRG's 
passage of its own hydrocarbons law, nor by a raft of 
non-transparent, unilateral deals.  The KRG obtained a 
favorable arrangement in the February draft 2007 hydrocarbon 
law, and KRG PM Barzani is in need of a firm message to stop 
the stalling and finalize the deal agreed to in February, 
both to maximize potential economic returns to Iraq and to 
reinforce national unity.  Finally, the national government 
and Oil Minister Shahristani, in particular, need to stop 
sniping at the KRG and Barzani, and to stop trying to walk 
back the February compromise (by putting into question the 
ability of regions to conclude PSAs). 
 
 
BEYOND THE GREEEN ZONE 
---------------------- 
 
¶18. (S) Coalition capacity building efforts in the central 
and local government continues, focusing on supporting 
government activities that contribute to improved delivery of 
essential services and political reconciliation.  A 
particular priority is ensuring that Sunni and 
mixed-population provinces no longer feel discriminated 
against by the central government.  Governance issues 
contributing to poor service delivery include a weak and 
highly-centralized bureaucracy with poor coordination between 
Baghdad ministries and their provincial representatives.  The 
Coalition, particularly through our PRTs, has facilitated 
better coordination, particularly in helping provincial 
officials better register their concerns and lobby the 
central government for release of funds and services. 
 
¶19. (U) I look forward to welcoming you to Baghdad.  Warm 
regards. 
BUTENIS