VZCZCXRO1397
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3913/01 3361701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021701Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4613
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003913 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI BLASTS MALIKI BUT IS OPTIMISTIC ON 
SECURITY AND KEY LEGISLATION 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4(b) 
 and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte, S/I Satterfield, and CDA 
Butenis met November 30 with Iraqi President Talabani. 
Talabani endorsed Washington,s efforts to renew the UNSCR 
resolution authorizing the presence of U.S. and other 
Coalition forces and expressed serious impatience with Prime 
Minister Maliki.  Talabani noted that the Kurdish Alliance 
could bring down the Maliki government at any time, and would 
consider doing so unless Maliki improves his cooperation with 
others in the GOI.  He professed optimism, however, about the 
passage of key legislation, improving Iraqi attitudes toward 
the U.S. presence, and greater willingness among most Sunni 
Arab countries to engage in Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
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MALIKI'S DEMANDS REASONABLE BUT UNSCR MUST BE RENEWED 
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¶2.  (C) The Deputy addressed Maliki,s suggested revisions to 
this year,s UNSCR, including granting the GOI full authority 
over all detentions and final authorization of any security 
operation.  While acknowledging these issues were suitable 
for discussion next year as part of a long-term security 
deal, the Deputy called them impossible limitations under 
present conditions.  Talabani argued that the U.S. should 
accept some of Maliki,s argument for vesting greater control 
in GOI hands, noting that after five years of independence 
the GOI still cannot unilaterally move a battalion from one 
location to another; that the U.S. had "unilaterally" created 
the Concerned Local Citizen groups; and that the U.S. was not 
responsive to Iraqi FMS needs; that the U.S. had 
"unilaterally" created the Concerned Local Citizen groups; 
and that the U.S. was not responsive to Iraqi FMS needs.  He 
also expressed concern that CG Petraeus does not consult 
closely enough with Maliki, arguing coordination between the 
two could ease bilateral security negotiations.  Talabani 
ultimately agreed, however, that most of Maliki,s changes 
were best left to long-term negotiations following a prompt 
UNSCR renewal. 
 
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KURDS IMPATIENT WITH MALIKI'S REFUSAL TO COMPROMISE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Talabani condemned Maliki,s perceived failure to 
compromise and his dependence on a dictatorial, sectarian 
cadre of advisors.  He decried Maliki,s tendency to bypass 
his own cabinet, instead consulting only close allies like 
Muwaffaq al-Rubaie, Sami al-Askari, or Bassima al-Jaidri. 
These Maliki advisors, whom Talabani repeatedly identified as 
the "dishdasha government," in the Iraqi President,s view 
have no interest in achieving consensus and represent the 
largest current obstacle to effective governance. 
 
¶4.  (C) Talabani noted that the Maliki government would fall 
if the Kurdish Alliance withdrew its support.  He said he had 
threatened to withdraw Kurdish ministers from the cabinet 
when he perceived Maliki to be stonewalling Strategic 
Partnership Declaration negotiations, and said that option 
remains on the table if Maliki continues to rule 
unilaterally.  Talabani also noted that while the Kurdish 
Alliance would have little difficulty accumulating the votes 
in the COR for a no-confidence vote in Maliki, it would only 
consider such action if a replacement PM were already 
identified and after coordinating with the USG. 
 
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BRIGHTER OUTLOOK ON KEY LEGISLATION, PERCEPTIONS OF US 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Talabani professed optimism on key legislation, 
predicting the COR would pass the de-Ba,athification, 
hydrocarbons, and provincial powers laws and urging active US 
engagement in the process.  On de-Ba,athification, Talabani 
acknowledged procedural obstacles over the last few days and 
a potential delay due to the Hajj, but predicted passage 
before the end of 2007 because all blocs except the Sadrists 
agree on the draft.  On hydrocarbons, he said substantive 
disagreements between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
and the GOI could be resolved if Maliki would meet with 
Nechirvan Barzani directly, instead of allowing Oil Minister 
Shahristani to attack the KRG in the press; Talabani pledged 
his willingness to participate in such a meeting.  Talabani 
called both the GOI and KRG Oil Ministers poor appointments 
who publicly air their personal rivalry and who should be 
excluded from negotiations on the hydrocarbon 
 
BAGHDAD 00003913  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
law. 
 
¶6.  (C) Talabani raised this week,s Kurdish Alliance walkout 
from the COR, noting key legislation could not pass unless 
MPs can reach the COR unobstructed and seconding MPs, 
complaints about poor treatment at MNF/CF checkpoints into 
the International Zone.  He acknowledged the difficulties and 
stresses of maintaining security around these entry points, 
but demanded greater courtesy by U.S. personnel and suggested 
vehicle passes so MPs could enter the green zone with less 
difficulty. 
 
¶7.  (C) Turning to the broader situation in Iraq, the Deputy 
suggested a key step in consolidating recent security gains 
would be to publicize events suggesting a return to normalcy 
in both the U.S. and Iraqi press.  He offered Iraqi weddings 
or the recent reopening of the Baghdad museum as examples. 
Talabani agreed, adding that press coverage of stability in 
the Kurdish region also would improve popular perceptions of 
Iraq,s security environment.  He argued that Iraqi public 
opinion as a whole is turning toward the U.S.: Sunnis who 
turned against al-Qaida and even the Sunni political elite 
had acknowledged the value of a continuing U.S. presence, the 
Kurds had always been pro-U.S., and non-Sadrist Shia broadly 
accept Ayatollah Sistani,s implicit acceptance of U.S. 
efforts. 
 
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IRAQI TIES TO SUNNI ARAB STATES IMPROVING 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Talabani provided greater detail on his recent visits 
to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  Both the Egyptian and Kuwaiti 
governments are preparing to send ambassadors to Baghdad. 
Cairo is drafting a "strategic alliance" with Iraq which will 
establish committees to manage bilateral relations in 
security, trade, culture, and other areas.  On the other 
hand, Talabani said he does not expect Riyadh to send an 
ambassador to Iraq despite its public pledges to do so. 
Saudi officials told him repeatedly they would not deal with 
the Maliki government despite Talabani,s entreaties. 
Talabani ascribed this mistrust to a deep Wahhabi antipathy 
to all things Shia and the Saudi perception that Maliki had 
failed to deliver on pledges made to the Saudi government. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (C) Talabani was unusually blunt in his criticism of 
Maliki, and his threat to withdraw support for Maliki might 
prove to be an important lever in negotiations over the UNSCR 
renewal.  However, we doubt that the Kurds are truly prepared 
to dispense with Maliki, particularly because they hope to 
use his dependency on Kurdish support as leverage during any 
future debates on Article 140 and hydrocarbons.  End comment. 
 
¶10. (U) The Deputy Secretary's party has cleared this cable. 
BUTENIS