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Viewing cable 07ASHGABAT1306, TURKMENISTAN: EUROPEAN COMMISSION-FUNDED STUDY ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ASHGABAT1306 2007-12-01 08:43 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ashgabat
VZCZCXRO1038
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLH RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #1306/01 3350843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010843Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9810
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3064
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0879
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0753
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1329
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 001306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND EEB; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA DAN 
STEIN 
ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/THOMPSON 
COMMERCE FOR HUEPER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EPET ECON ENRG TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN:  EUROPEAN COMMISSION-FUNDED STUDY ON 
TRANS-CASPIAN GAS CORRIDOR CONCLUDES PROJECT WOULD BE 
FEASIBLE, WITH CAVEATS 
 
REF: A. ASHGABAT 1252 
     B. ASHGABAT 1297 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The European Commission has concluded 
from a just completed a study on establishing a gas transit 
corridor from Kazakhstan to the EU region that the project is 
feasible.  The 400-page feasibility study looked at a variety 
of options for transiting the Caspian Sea, as well as 
weighing the various costs of a northern gas corridor through 
the Black Sea and a southern corridor through Turkey.  It 
concluded that the most cost-effective option would be an 
all-pipeline option carrying 50 billion cubic meters (bcm) of 
gas per year from the Central Asia-Center pipelines at 
Beynau, Kazakhstan under the Caspian and Black Seas to 
European terminals, but caveated that judgment with the 
recommendation that resolution of the Caspian Sea's 
international legal status would help ensure the project's 
stability.  The study also looked at potential options 
involving movement of compressed natural gas, which were also 
judged feasible.  The November 26 decision between Gazprom 
and Turkmenistan increasing the price of gas by late 2008 to 
$150 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) could encourage a 
November 30 meeting of participants to closely look at these 
findings.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) On November 28, the EU-TACIS office in Ashgabat 
informally passed to the Embassy a copy of a feasibility 
study requested and funded by the European Commission, 
entitled "EU Feasibility Study of a Trans-Caspian Black Sea 
Gas Corridor."  The EC hired a joint Consortium -- Mott 
MacDonald Limited, KLC Law Firm, Kantor Management 
Consultants and Louis Berger -- to undertake the study to 
investigate and assess the feasibility of a gas transit 
corridor from Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea to 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, through the Black Sea region to the 
EU.  The beneficiaries of the study are Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Kazakhstan, though the study also considered the 
possibility of including Turkmenistan gas into the 
arrangement at a later date.  Embassy has e-mailed the entire 
document -- approximately 400 pages -- to the Turkmenistan 
desk officer in SCA/CEN. 
 
4.  (SBU) The objectives of the study, implemented under the 
framework of INOGATE ("Energy cooperation between the EU, the 
littoral states of the Black and Caspian Seas and their 
neighboring countries"), included: 
 
-- To examine non-pipeline options to transit the Caspian 
Sea, including compressed natural gas (CNG), liquified 
natural gas (LNG) and liquified petroleum gas (LPG); 
 
-- To consider the existing infrastructure from Azerbaijan 
through Georgia and to investigate whether upgrades or even 
complete replacement would be necessary; 
 
-- To review and analyze all options to transit the Black 
Sea, including a pipeline and CNG. 
 
In addition to an executive summary, the study contains 
economic and financial, legal and environmental sections.  As 
noted ref A, the EU expects to discuss the findings of the 
study in Brussels November 30. 
 
5.  (SBU) The study's key findings include: 
 
Technical 
--------- 
 
 
ASHGABAT 00001306  002 OF 006 
 
 
-- According to preliminary analysis, the most appropriate 
non-pipeline option is CNG.  LPG is inappropriate, since it 
can not be a substitute for methane except for very small 
localized volumes. 
 
-- After examining a wide range of onshore pipeline options, 
the study concludes that transportation of 30, 50 and 70 
billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas is feasible, including in 
both onshore and offshore options. 
 
-- There appear to be sufficient proven gas reserves in 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to meet the 30 and 50 
bcm -- but not the 70 bcm -- scenarios.  This analysis took 
into account existing and likely future export commitments to 
other countries, including Russia and China. 
 
-- A new transit pipeline route is required to deliver 30, 50 
and 70 bcm of gas to the European Market. 
 
-- New compression, pressure-control and gas purification 
facilities will be required for pipeline and non-pipeline 
options. 
 
-- The existing Central Asia-Center (CAC) pipelines in 
Kazakhstan can be used as tie-in points to deliver 15, 30 and 
45 bcm of gas across the Caspian Sea. 
 
-- Shipyards are available in the Caspian Sea region which 
could, with modifications, potentially construct CNG and LNG 
vessels. 
 
-- Two underground gas storage facilities in Azerbaijan 
(Garadag and Galmaz) can be used to store gas for the CNG 
option or as buffer storage for a pipeline.  Both storage 
facilities require upgrading. 
 
-- LNG, although proven technology, will be too costly in 
terms of both capital and operating costs to provide a viable 
alternative to a pipeline crossing. 
 
-- CNG or its derivative, adsorbed natural gas (ANG), are as 
yet unproven for gas transportation across a sea, but could 
offer a feasible alternative to pipeline gas transport across 
the Caspian Sea. 
 
-- Rail transportation of any form of natural gas requires 
too much in the way of logistics, space and investment to be 
a viable alternative to pipelines. 
 
-- For all the gas volumes examined, both the capital and 
operational costs to reach Europe via the Black Sea are lower 
than the onshore route through Turkey. 
 
Legal 
----- 
 
-- In legal terms, it has not yet been clearly and 
unambiguously agreed upon whether the Caspian Sea is a lake 
or sea.  The legal classification of the Caspian Sea depends 
greatly on geopolitical -- and not purely legal -- factors. 
And, although the Caspian Sea littoral states agreed to 
increase economic cooperation at the October 17, 2007 Caspian 
Summit in Tehran, no agreement was reached on delimitation 
and associated rights. 
 
-- In the Caspian Sea, each state has already unilaterally 
started exploration work within its "own" sector, and this 
could be considered, at least within the respective 12-mile 
zones, as having established a well-settled customary 
practice. 
 
ASHGABAT 00001306  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
-- Environmental considerations as a legal foundation for the 
view that all littoral states must agree on the creation of a 
pipeline -- either genuine or used as a pretext -- could 
seriously impact projects to construct off-shore pipelines in 
the Caspian Sea. 
 
-- Construction of a pipeline in the Caspian raises legal 
questions and is politically sensitive, thereby introducing a 
degree of uncertainty and advocating the exploration of 
alternate options, at least until the political and legal 
situation is further clarified. 
 
-- In the Black Sea, virtually all coastal states in the 
Black Sea have enacted legislation regarding the extent of 
their territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf.  It follows that an underwater 
pipeline could be laid within the territorial sea, contiguous 
zone and exclusive economic zone (and continental shelf) of 
any of these states. 
 
-- However, in the Black Sea, a number of sea boundaries 
remain unsettled.  Any pipeline across the Black Sea would 
need to be routed with due consideration for these boundaries 
and disputed areas. 
 
-- No national law or public international law considerations 
are believed to impact the laying, operation and maintenance 
of a submarine pipeline in the Black Sea. 
 
-- In the Bosphorus Straits, the legal regime of the Straits 
in principle allows the unimpeded transport of LNG-LPG by 
vessels through them, but poor weather conditions and 
increasing congestion cause delays resulting in economic loss. 
 
-- Given the likelihood of maritime accidents in the 
Bosphorus, delays and/or pollution can be expected. 
 
-- Turkey's attempts to gain absolute control over the 
Straits generate further operational uncertainty over 
transportation of LNG or LPG by vessels through the Straits. 
 
-- There appear to be no legal "project breakers" from the 
standpoint of domestic legislation of the states involved. 
 
-- A transportation project involving several states and 
various modes of transport requires an advanced degree of 
coordination between its various components and the actors 
involved.  An appropriate institutional platform exists under 
the INOGATE Umbrella Agreement, to which all the states 
involved in the project are signatories. 
 
-- Efficiency and effectiveness suggest that a common 
operator would be required for the envisioned project. 
 
Commercial 
---------- 
 
-- The study assumed a base cost to European consumers of 
$250 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) of gas. 
 
-- Between 45 and 65 bcm per year could be supplied by the 
three Caspian countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan) to European markets from 2015 onwards.  This 
should be sufficient to meet the 30 and 50 bcm, but not the 
70 bcm, scenarios. 
 
-- There will be a gas shortfall of between 40 and 80 bcm per 
year in the EU that could be met by the Caspian countries. 
 
 
ASHGABAT 00001306  004 OF 006 
 
 
-- The "delivery point" countries and other potential markets 
are likely to be able to absorb significant proportions of 
the 30 and 50 bcm scenarios (40% and 25% respectively) from 
the outset of the project.  The remainder of the gas could be 
consumed in other EU countries. 
 
-- For each gas corridor -- through either the Black Sea (the 
"north" corridor) or Turkey (the "south" corridor) -- 
pipelines throughout the gas transport corridor and the 
option of using CNG ships for the Caspian Sea segment and 
pipeline thereafter were the least expensive.  These were, 
therefore, selected for detailed financial analysis. 
 
-- The all-pipeline option always has more attractive netback 
prices than the CNG scenarios, as it is a cheaper solution 
and thus has lower tariffs for the same throughput levels. 
 
-- The southern (Turkey) corridor has lower netback prices 
than the northern (Black Sea) corridor for all comparable 
scenarios due to its higher investment costs. 
 
-- The most "competitive" tranport routes (from most to least 
competitive) are: 
 
o  All-pipeline option, 50 bcm, northern corridor (netback 
price=$162/tcm of gas) 
o  All-pipeline option, 50 bcm, southern corridor (netback 
price=$150/tcm) 
o  CNG case, 50 bcm, northern corridor (netback 
price=$144/tcm) 
o  All-pipeline option, 30 bcm, northern corridor (netback 
price=$139/tcm) 
o  CNG case, 50 bcm, southern corridor (neback price=$135/tcm) 
o  All-pipeline option, 30 bcm, southern corridor (netback 
price=$117/tcm) 
o  CNG case, 30 bcm, northern corridor (netback 
price=$112/tcm) 
 
-- The CNG 30 bcm scenario for the southern gas corridor 
appears to be uncompetitive. 
 
LPG 
--- 
 
-- The main destination markets for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
are likely to be those of Turkey, Central/Eastern Europe and 
possibly the south Asian markets.  Turkmenistan is likely to 
continue exporting mainly to markets in its region (primarily 
Iran and Afghanistan) but is also likely to seek other export 
outlets. 
 
-- With an FOB Black Sea price of $450/ton, Kazakh and 
Turkmen LPG producers can achieve a netback price of 
$337/ton.  The netback price for Azeri producers is $395/ton. 
 
Environmental 
------------- 
 
-- Given the size and nature of the potential developments, 
environmental and social impacts are inevitable.  Both 
onshore and offshore routes will present significant 
environmental challenges, which may be manageable.  The cost 
implications of appropriate mitigations may impact the 
overall economic feasibility of the project. 
 
-- Given the environmental sensitivity of the area and public 
concerns about energy installations, the highest 
environmental, social and safety standards will have to be 
met or bettered. 
 
 
ASHGABAT 00001306  005 OF 006 
 
 
-- Gas transmission will require large amounts of energy with 
a high cost and carbon footprint.  A sensitivity analysis on 
the 50 bcm case gave a fuel cost range from $100-200 
million/year, and a shadow carbon values range from $47-235 
million/year. 
 
-- Using offshore single point moorings (SPMs) instead of 
jetties allow shipping to be segregated, which is safer and 
prevents unacceptable crowding of shipping or marine 
infrastructure.  If future work shows that SPMs are not 
viable, there is plenty of land available on both shores for 
alternative sites, but few sheltered marine locations. 
 
-- On the Black Sea coast in Georgia and Romania, there is 
less land and much more tourist activity, so suitable sites 
for plant and pipeline landfalls are scarcer, but there may 
be suitable locations near Supsa and to the south of 
Constanta. 
 
-- Further work is required to determine the extent of water 
as a limiting factor on large LNG regasification plants, 
because of the environmental impacts of thermal pollution and 
possible damage to plankton, fish larvae and juvenile fish. 
This work should also look at turning these threats into 
opportunities by filtering the plankton biomass and using it 
as a feedstock -- perhaps for aquaculture.  Likewise, it may 
be possible to use heat loss from regasification as a colling 
medium for freezer plant. 
 
-- Air cooling has been specified for intermediate pipeline 
compressor stations.  Further work is required to see if sea 
water cooling may be used for plants with access to large 
quantities of water. 
 
-- From a scientific perspective, there are no apparent 
environmental or safety barriers that should prevent the 
construction of offshore gas pipelines in the Black Sea or 
the Caspian Sea. 
 
6.  (SBU) Although the consortium laid out a number of risks 
and recommended that resolving the Caspian Sea's 
international legal status would help cut the risks to laying 
a subsea pipeline, it nonetheless concluded that the concept 
of a gas corridor is feasible.  Key next steps include: 
 
-- Resolution, if possible, of the legal/political impasse 
over the status of the Caspian Sea, as a pipeline crossing 
remains the most cost-effective solution for transporting 
natural gas. 
 
-- Detailed study of the underlying cost estimates and the 
feasibility of the use of CNG ships for transporting large 
volumes of gas. 
 
-- Coordination of efforts and sharing of information with 
other parties that are considering the feasibility of 
supplying Europe with Caspian gas (NOTE:  i.e., the United 
States.  END NOTE.). 
 
-- The commitment of the various project stakeholders and the 
establishment of an operational framework and procedures to 
progress to a detailed feasibility study. 
 
-- Clarification of the business concept and the roles, 
contributions and undertakings of the various parties. 
 
-- The development of the commercial and legal arrangements 
to ensure that the project can attract financing from 
international financial institutions and other financiers. 
 
 
ASHGABAT 00001306  006 OF 006 
 
 
7.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Promising as this evidence is that the EU 
is finally beginning to focus on a viable energy policy, it 
still has a long way to go if it is to bring this project 
from this first step to fruition.  As the European Commission 
moves ahead with efforts to gain EU buy-in to the proposal, 
time will remain of the essence.  Indeed, the November 26 
news that Gazprom and Turkmenistan have agreed to raise gas 
prices to $150/tcm by the end of 2008 (and that Gazprom is 
planning on passing on the higher cost to consumers, rather 
than decrease its own profit margin) undermines somewhat the 
study's basic assumptions -- that any price over $100/tcm is 
competitive, and that a pipeline will enable Europeans to 
keep the base price they pay as consumers to $250/tcm. 
CURRAN