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O 030524Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0739
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 001215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND AF/FO 
PARIS FOR D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CN
SUBJECT:  FORMER COMORAN PRESIDENT AZALI ON SAMBI'S MISCUES 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Former President Azali told the Ambassador the 
Union should negotiate with Anjouan's Colonel Bacar for the sole 
purpose of organizing elections on the island.  Azali said President 
Sambi and the African Union had miscalculated in dealing with Bacar, 
but thought a solution was still possible.  He believed Bacar was 
tired and looking for a way out.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  In the quiet setting of his wooded backyard in Moroni, 
former Comoran President Azali Assoumani spoke candidly on the 
Anjouan impasse with the Ambassador.  In a history of 19 successful 
and attempted coups d'etat, Azali is in a tiny club of Comoran 
presidents who survived to retirement.  Having taking power in a 
coup himself in 1999 following Anjouan's attempted secession two 
years earlier, Azali restored the Union and held fair elections in 
2002; where he was elected.  When he handed power to current 
President Ahmed Sambi in May 2006, it was the first peaceful and 
democratic transition since independence in 1975. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  The Ambassador commended Azali on his service to the 
Comoros, not only ceding power peacefully after the 2006 election, 
but also establishing the first university in the Comoros, 
maintaining stability, and improving security.  The Ambassador noted 
that we have not forgotten his expulsion of the el-Haramein islamist 
NGO which has ties to terrorist organizations.  Azali, still popular 
among Comorans for these successes (and his corrupt government 
forgotten), maintains a low profile.  Despite Azali's unique 
position as one-time reconciler, it appears the Sambi government has 
not sought his counsel. 
 
Anjouan Impasse:  Talks Needed 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The former president mentioned his credentials as unifier 
in the Comoros:  after his coup d'etat he negotiated a 
reconciliation agreement to return Anjouan to the Union; passed a 
new Constitution by referendum; and held fair elections.  With the 
exception of his coup, which he acknowledged several times neither 
apologetically nor defensively, Azali emphasized dialogue and 
compromise.  He said the Comoros will not develop without 
reconciliation; Sambi's grave error, he said, was to have assumed 
Anjouan was no longer a problem.  He agreed that Sambi, as an 
Anjouan native, initially was perceived to have an advantage dealing 
with the island and with Colonel Bacar.  Many were proved wrong as 
the 2007 island elections approached and Sambi failed to reach a 
deal with Bacar to hold elections in Anjouan.  In short, Sambi 
thought the reconciliation was "done", concentrated on development 
instead of reconciliation, and thus missed an opportunity to 
continue the healing process after his landslide victory in 2006, 
Azali lamented. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Moving to the problems of Comoros' federalist 
("competences") arrangements, Azali defended his decision near the 
end of his tenure not to promulgate a law on Union and island 
security forces.  Handing this hot potato to his successor, Azali 
said he advised Sambi to go back to parliament and ask for an 
improved law.  Sambi did not do so; rather he promulgated the law 
Azali saw as defective.  As a result, Anjouan still maintains a 
standing army which Colonel Bacar refuses to give up, posing a 
constant threat to any Union President.  Sambi also was unable to 
apply its provisions for division of powers between police and 
military.  The former president identified this to be Sambi's key 
early mistake, hoping for the best and demonstrating weakness. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Turning to the current impasse, Azali said it must be 
accepted that Colonel Bacar is the de facto authority in Anjouan. 
Azali said unequivocally that negotiations between the Union and 
Bacar must be held; solely for the purpose of organizing Anjouan's 
election.  He assessed Anjouan's population as not/not supporting 
separatism, unlike the 1997 secession crisis.  Azali further said 
Bacar was tired, fragile, and looking for an exit. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Given these circumstances, Azali hinted that the Union 
government had some leverage.  However, he said Sambi and the 
African Union made a "stupid mistake" by postponing only the Anjouan 
election last June, given that the constitution requires all Island 
elections to be held simultaneously; he said this error now allows 
Bacar to accuse Sambi of having acted unconstitutionally, and 
therefore to call for new elections on all three islands, not just 
Anjouan.  Azali's other sharp criticism against the AU was directed 
at the recent public suggestion by AU Negotiator Madeira that the 
mandate of the AU's MAES forces - 200 Tanzanian soldiers sent last 
June to oversee elections, who are still in Moroni - could be 
changed, as circumstances warrant, to include participation in an 
 
ANTANANARI 00001215  002 OF 002 
 
 
invasion force.  He said Madeira's comment significantly stirred up 
hopes among Comorans that the AU was prepared to resolve the current 
Anjouan problem by force.  Azali was categorical in denouncing any 
military action against Anjouan as "unnecessary, insufficient, and 
undesirable."  As a former soldier, he also said a military assault 
by sea would fail. 
 
Beyond Anjouan:  Mayotte 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Azali also raised the key nationalist issue for all 
Comorans, French Mayotte, declaring, "the Comoros will never be 
stable until Mayotte is returned to the country."  He noted the 
people of Anjouan live with insufficient land, no opportunity, on 
one dollar a day - a mere 30 KM from Mayotte's wealthy, if 
"artificial," economy.  Like most Comoran leaders, Azali emphasized 
the economic disparity between the Comoros and Mayotte and alleged 
France's authority over that island was unfair.  He said that 
Mayotte is the root cause of the current Anjouan crisis as it 
prevents Comorans from seeing themselves as one nation:  "if Mayotte 
is not necessarily Comoran, then what island is?"  He offered little 
on how the Comorans could negotiate Mayotte's return, or why France 
would ever consider it. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Comment:  While much of what Azali is saying now is 
interesting Monday morning quarterbacking, his comments were tinged 
throughout with genuine disappointment over the Sambi government's 
current difficulties.  Looking forward, his perception of remaining 
room for negotiation with Bacar over Anjouan is hopeful.  His 
outright dismissal of military action as a potential solution is 
perhaps indicative of what current military leadership also thinks - 
but of course cannot say - about popular demands to end the crisis 
by force.  End Comment. 
 
MARQUARDT