VZCZCXRO8121
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHVB #0994/01 3091444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051444Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8295
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3459
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 2597
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0823
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ZAGREB 000994 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR - P/DAS VOLKER, DAS DICARLO, EUR/RPM, 
EUR/SCE 
USNATO FOR AMB NULAND, UNDERWOOD, BAEZ, GLORIOSO 
NSC FOR BRADLEY 
OSD FOR NATO POLICY - DAS FATA 
JCS FOR SHIELDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAO MOPS MARR NATO HR DEFENSE REFORM
SUBJECT: NATO ROADSHOW '07 -- CROATIA SCENESETTER 
 
REF: A. STATE 147447 
     ¶B. USNATO 545 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The GoC feels confident 
approaching NATO's Bucharest Summit after repeated strong 
statements of support from President Bush and State 
Department officials (U/S Burns, A/S Fried) as well as 
positive feedback from Allies during presentation of their 
Annual National Program in September (ref B).  While PM Ivo 
Sanader and others will be waiting to hear the Road Show 
delegation repeat USG support, they will insist they have not 
allowed their optimism to slow their efforts to present the 
best possible candidacy in Bucharest.  As evidence, 
interlocutors will likely point to increasing public support 
for NATO membership, advances on key reforms, the success of 
Exercise Noble Midas, and increased contributions to ISAF, 
including Observation Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and 
support to three Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). 
 
¶2. (U) The Road Show will arrive in the middle of the 
campaign for Croatia's tightly-contested parliamentary 
elections on November 25, creating a public relations 
environment in which every statement could be misinterpreted. 
 Fortunately, neither NATO nor U.S. relations have become 
campaign topics -- the sole exception being the opposition's 
proposal for a public referendum on NATO accession.  We have 
been careful to consistently note that while NATO does not 
require a referendum, the decision on whether to hold one 
rests with Croatians.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
BOOSTING PUBLIC SUPPORT: RECRUITING NEW VOICES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (U) Since President Bush's Oval Office statement last year 
supporting an invitation to Croatia in 2008, the GoC has 
conducted a concerted campaign to educate the public on NATO 
membership.  The result has been a roughly 20 percent rise in 
public support for accession, from just above 30 percent in 
December 2006 to approximately 50 percent today according to 
various polls.  NATO public awareness efforts are largely on 
hold during the election period to avoid the risk of NATO 
aspirations becoming a campaign issue.  We have encouraged 
the GoC, however, to line up activities now to restart such 
activities as soon as possible following the November 25 
elections and have focused our efforts on attracting new, 
non-GoC voices to combat persistent myths and misinformation 
(i.e., NATO wants bases in Croatia, Croatia will have to send 
troops to Iraq). 
 
ACTING LIKE AN ALLY: CONTRIBUTING MORE ACROSS THE ALLIANCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Croatia has steadily increased its self-financed, 
caveat-free contribution to ISAF, entering its tenth 
deployment with 200 soldiers with a commitment to raise troop 
numbers to 300 in 2008.  During meetings in Zagreb, the 
delegation should acknowledge the breadth of Croatian troop 
deployments in Afghanistan, currently operating under the 
command of three different allies. 
- Kabul: 59-man contingent including military police platoon, 
command/staff/support elements, national intelligence cell, 
and joint A-3 medical team. 
- Mazar-e-Sharif OMLTs: 27-man OMLT embedded with the 3rd 
Kandak of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the first non-NATO 
member to accept the OMLT mission.  During 2006, this team 
temporarily deployed with the 3rd Kandak to Kandahar to 
support operations in Regional Command South.  Croatia also 
maintains a two-man OMLT element in the 209 ANA Corps 
Headquarters. 
- Mazar-e-Sharif RC North: 79-man contingent including 
infantry platoon task force, staff, and military police 
support to German-led Regional Command North. 
- Pol-e-Khomri PRT: five-man staff and military police team 
supporting Hungarian-led PRT. 
- Chagcharan PRT: 28-man contingent embedded in the 
Lithuanian-led PRT, including two Military Liaison and 
Observation Teams (MLOT), CIMIC staff officer, and PSYOPS 
element. 
 
 
ZAGREB 00000994  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶5. (U) In addition to military personnel, three civilian 
diplomats and police are assigned to the German-led PRT in 
Feyzabad.  In preparing expansion of Croatia's contribution 
for 2008, military planners are considering several different 
force packages, to include an additional infantry OMLT, a 
logistics OMLT, and/or increased infantry contributions to 
the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif.  The GoC is still examining the 
possibility of taking on its own PRT but appears intimidated 
by the reconstruction side of this mission, never before 
having worked on foreign development. 
 
¶6. (U) The GoC has also supported the ANA with equipment 
donations, recently shipping 1,000 AK-47 assault rifles and 
300,000 rounds of ammunition with Canadian assistance. 
Slovenian Armed Forces also provided logistical assistance 
with Croatia's latest troop rotation, providing a three-man 
load planning team and palletization material and paving the 
way for greater regional logistical cooperation in the future. 
 
FOCUS ON HOST NATION SUPPORT AND INTEROPERABILITY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. (U) The GoC also deserves acknowledgement for 
demonstrating its host nation support capabilities during 
2007, successfully hosting the "IDASSA" civilian disaster 
response exercise in May and the "NOBLE MIDAS" NATO Reaction 
Force exercise in October, which Croatian military leaders 
saw as their "final exam" before a NATO invitation.  Both 
IDASSA and NOBLE MIDAS were the largest NATO exercises of 
their kind held in a non-member country.  Croatia has also 
offered to accept Iraqi soldiers in a variety of military 
training courses in Croatia through the NATO Training Mission 
in Iraq. 
 
¶8. (U) The Croatian military is clearly serious about drawing 
from their Afghanistan experience to increase their 
interoperability and develop lessons-learned for future 
NATO-led stability operations.  The Military Police Company 
is NATO-certified, while Croatia has declared an engineer 
platoon (horizontal construction) and special operations 
platoon into the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) Pool 
of Forces.  An NBC platoon and air-MEDEVAC team are scheduled 
for self-evaluation.  A NATO level 1 evaluation of a 
helicopter and crew was scheduled during the Noble Midas NATO 
exercise in October, though we are not aware of the results. 
 
¶9. (U) The GoC appears to be on track to reach 2 percent of 
GDP target for defense spending in 2010, assuming normal 
economic growth.  Lowering personnel costs is an ongoing and 
long-term challenge.  On hardware acquisitions, the GoC is 
unlikely to back away from plans to buy 12 fighter jets 
despite Allied concerns about the sustainability of this 
investment.  The USG has begun a process of educating the MOD 
on the true costs of this acquisition. 
 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT IN ADRIATIC CHARTER AND ACROSS REGION 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The delegation should note the GoC's continued active 
partnership in the Adriatic Charter and its initiative as 
current A-3 chair to host a successful A-3/B-3 meeting for 
foreign and defense ministers in Split in October.  The GoC 
also organized an A-3 foreign ministers meeting on the 
margins of the UNGA in September.  Croatia has played a 
positive role in engaging the three new Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) members in the region, including them in the A-3/B-3 
gathering and participating in such events as the October 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) seminar in Sarajevo designed to 
share accession lessons learned among A-3 and PfP-3 
countries.  GoC officials still seem hesitant to formally 
accept the PfP-3 into the A-3 until Croatia receives a 
membership invitation and Serbia sorts out the post-Kosovo 
relationship it wants with NATO. 
 
¶11. (U) The GoC maintains vigorous and positive bilateral 
relations with every country in the region.  In May, Croatia 
concluded its successful chairmanship of the South East 
European Cooperation Process with the formation of a 
permanent Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the successor 
 
ZAGREB 00000994  003 OF 004 
 
 
to the Stability Pact initiative.  In July, the GoC hosted a 
Summit for European leaders on the future of Southeast 
Europe.  Government and parliamentary leaders have made 
regular efforts to contribute to stability both in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in Kosovo, with the GoC supporting the 
Ahtisaari plan and now Troika negotiations.  Croatia is in 
the process of opening a diplomatic office in Pristina, and 
maintains broad contacts in Kosovo, including GOC-support for 
efforts by a Croatian Serb parliamentarian to encourage 
Kosovo Serbs to engage directly with Kosovar institutions in 
Pristina.  Croatia's recent election to the UN Security 
Council will likely enhance their ability to play a 
leadership role in the region. 
 
ELECTION DRIVES REFERENDUM ISSUE, POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The delegation will likely find most interlocutors 
focused on the intense campaign for the November 25 
parliamentary elections.  Polls show a dead heat between the 
ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and its primary 
opposition, the Social Democratic Party (SDP).  Either party 
will almost certainly need smaller parties to form a 
governing coalition, meaning even an HDZ victory will include 
a government reshuffle.  The foreign, defense, justice, and 
interior ministers are all likely to be replaced or move on 
to other positions.  Given the on-going campaign, the Road 
Show delegation should be mindful that its public statements 
will be read carefully to look for signs of USG support for 
one side or the other in this race.  Fortunately, neither 
Croatia's aspiration to join NATO nor U.S. bilateral 
relations have become electoral issues, as all major parties 
support Croatia's membership. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The only distinction between the parties is the 
SDP's proposal for a public referendum on NATO membership. 
The SDP argues that securing such public support would make 
Croatia a more effective and reliable ally.  SDP leaders, 
including party president Zoran Milanovic (who earlier in his 
career worked at Croatia's Mission to NATO), dismiss the risk 
that a referendum could turn on extraneous events and express 
great confidence that they will win such a referendum. 
Nonetheless, there is speculation that the SDP will not 
actually follow through on this proposal if they win in 
November.  While a referendum scenario presents many 
complications, we have been careful to avoid commenting on 
the issue, noting that any referendum decision rests with 
Croatians. 
 
KEY POLITICAL REFORMS: SOME PROGRESS, SOME PATIENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶14. (U) While corruption and organized crime remain key areas 
for reform, Croatia made progress with the arrest of six 
employees of the Croatian Privatization Fund earlier this 
year on corruption charges, formation of police and 
prosecutor task forces to combat organized crime, and the 
first-time freezing of assets in a narcotics case.  Border 
security is improving with assistance from our EXBS program 
and other donor nations; Customs seizures of contraband are 
up and Croatia's non-proliferation regime is becoming 
increasingly effective.  In combating trafficking in persons, 
the GoC continues to improve its cooperation with NGOs to 
identify and assist victims of trafficking and has increased 
its efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, 
though we are still waiting to see convictions. 
 
¶15. (U) Judicial reform remains another key area of concern, 
though we have noted some progress.  The judicial backlog is 
steadily shrinking.  Serious weaknesses in court 
administration, including the GoC's witness support system, 
persist, and have caused problems in cases such as the war 
crimes prosecution of Generals Ademi and Norac that was 
transferred from the ICTY.  But politically it is notable 
that such high profile war crimes cases against ethnic 
Croatians are proceeding without significant public protest 
or resistance. 
 
¶16. (U) On refugee returns, the picture is mixed.  The GoC 
 
ZAGREB 00000994  004 OF 004 
 
 
has essentially resolved most major issues, including 
reconstruction of homes destroyed in the war, repair of basic 
infrastructure, and repossession of properties occupied by 
other refugees (mostly ethnic Croats who had fled fighting in 
Bosnia).  The GoC is now focused on providing housing to 
those returning refugees who did not own property but held 
Occupancy Tenancy Rights (OTR) under the Yugoslav government. 
 For 2007, the GoC has agreed with the international 
community on two targets for 2007, to purchase or construct 
for Serb returnees 1000 apartments within "Areas of Special 
State Concern" (ASSCs -- those areas most directly affected 
by the war) and 400 apartments outside of ASSCs.  As of 
November 3, the GoC reported that it had approved 732 
apartments within ASSCs and was on track to provide an 
estimated 185 additional units by the end of the year, for a 
total of 917 residences.  The GoC plans to purchase a further 
100 units in January 2008.  Outside of ASSCs, the GoC said it 
had purchased 236 apartments and plans to purchase 160 more 
by December 31 for a total of 396.  UNHCR and OSCE monitors 
have not yet been able to verify these claims; field checks 
are currently underway. 
 
¶17. (U) WWII and Communist-era property restitution claims 
remain a key bilateral issue for the US as well as for Italy 
and Austria, which both are home to far greater numbers of 
claimants.  While bilateral agreements with the Yugoslav 
Government in the 1950s and 60s addressed most foreign claims 
and Croatian citizens' claims were addressed in the 1990s, 
individuals who were not citizens of a signatory country in 
Yugoslav days and who never became Croatian citizens were 
never eligible to make a claim.  The GoC has drafted 
amendments to current law to put foreign citizens on an equal 
footing with Croatians, but these amendments have not been 
enacted.  We have raised this at the highest levels and 
organized numerous advocacy visits for the Department's 
Office of Holocaust Issues, but it is clear progress will not 
be possible until after parliamentary elections. 
 
PROTECTING NATO CLASSIFIED - WORK IN PROGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶18. (U) The protection of NATO classified information remains 
another area where the GoC has unfinished homework. 
According to an October NATO International Staff security 
assessment visit, GoC legislation on security vetting passed 
this summer appears to fall short of NATO standards, lacking 
specific criteria for approving or denying a security 
clearance.  We understand that NATO IS is pursuing a quick 
resolution to this issue directly with Croatia's Council for 
National Security. 
BRADTKE