C O N F I D E N T I A L        ZAGREB 01027

SIPDIS
P 211507Z NOV 07

FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8353
RHMFISS/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001027 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT KEN MCCUNE 
CIA FOR NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2017 
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC DHLS HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA: RESPONSE FOR INFORMATION ON HOST 
GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, 
AND SHARING 
 
REF: STATE 133921 
 
Classified By: DCM Vivian S. Walker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Zagreb provides the following responses to 
reftel request for information regarding Croatia's policies 
toward and capabilities for collection of biographic and 
biometric data for terrorist screening purposes.  Responses 
are keyed to questions in reftel.  The information provided 
presents the current understanding of post's country team, 
supplemented with what information we have been able to 
obtain since receipt of reftel request.  Post's response does 
not answer every question contained in reftel, but presents 
the fullest information we have been able to obtain from our 
Croatian interlocutors. It should be noted that the 
information provided by the GoC officials sometimes presents 
a more optimistic representation of the country practices 
than Embassy officers have themselves noted. In such 
circumstances, post's response will note both perspectives. 
 
¶2. Watchlisting: 
 
-- (SBU ) Border officials have access to watchlists, 
maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which 
incorporate data from Interpol, Europol, Schengen and 
National Police indices, as well as names provided by other 
friendly governments.  The watchlists include both terrorist 
and criminal names.  The number of names included in these 
lists is not known, incorporating as they do other agencies' 
watchlists.  In theory, this watchlist is accessible at all 
border crossing points, but in practice is readily accessible 
only at the three primary POE's. 
 
¶2. Traveler Information Collection: 
 
-- (SBU) Host country policy is to collect traveler 
information from all foreigners arriving to Croatia.  In 
practice, computerized collection of traveler data is fully 
function only at two POE's (at the Zagreb airport and the 
Bajakovo crossing point with Serbia), with installation of 
computerized collection underway at nine additional POE's. 
Installation at 25 more border crossing points is planned and 
awaiting EU funds. GoC policy is that all non-Croatian 
passports are swiped and the traveler information collected 
at the two fully computerized crossing points. However, post 
personnel have witnessed, and local interlocutors 
acknowledged, that at most border crossing points, 
particularly at land borders, incoming foreigners are 
"profiled" and certain nationalities and types of passports 
are waived through without inspection. 
 
-- (C) Traveler information is also collected through 
mandatory registration of tourists with local police, a 
function most frequently performed by hotels and other places 
of accommodation. Police and/or places of accommodation will 
sometimes provide traveler information to Croatian security 
services, but not on a regular basis. 
 
-- (C) Croatian Border Police receive advance Passenger Name 
Records (PNR) on incoming commercial flights. Names are 
checked against watchlists. Post knows of no existing 
agreements to share PNR data. 
 
¶3. Border Control and Screening: 
 
-- (SBU) Computerized collection of traveler data is fully 
functional only at two POE's (at the Zagreb airport and the 
Bajakovo crossing point with Serbia), with installation of 
computerized collection underway at nine additional POE's. 
Installation at 25 more border crossing points is planned and 
awaiting EU funds. GoC policy is that all non-Croatian 
passports are swiped and the traveler information collected 
at the two fully computerized crossing points. However, post 
personnel have witnessed, and local interlocutors 
acknowledged, that at most border crossing points, 
particularly at land borders, incoming foreigners are 
"profiled" and certain nationalities and types of passports 
are waived through without inspection. Estimates of the total 
percentage of non-recorded crossings vary from negligible to 
20 percent, and will also vary widely between harder border 
crossings in the north to more porous crossings in the south. 
 
-- (SBU) In determining whom to allow into Croatia, border 
officials rely on the information in the combined databases. 
They may also detain persons for perceived document 
discrepancies. Such persons may be held only four hours. If 
in this time the person is found to be of security interest, 
he may be detained further. Otherwise, the person is 
permitted to enter, or, if the travel document is determined 
to be fraudulent, turned around at the border. 
 
-- (SBU) In theory, information, including terrorist-related 
information, is shared between government agencies and such 
agencies would work cooperatively on any issues. 
 
¶4. Biometric Collection: 
 
-- (SBU) Croatia has no biometric program at this time.  No 
biometric information is collected at any border crossing 
point. 
 
¶5. Passports: 
 
-- (SBU) Croatia does not issue a biometric passport. 
 
-- (SBU) Replacement passports are normal, full validity 
passports and bear no special notation indicating that the 
passport is a replacement for a lost or stolen travel 
document. Post knows of no special programs in place for 
dealing with "habitual" losers of passports. Post has not 
noted any increase in the number of "clean" passports used to 
apply for visas. 
 
¶6. Fraud Detection: 
 
-- (SBU) Border Police take fraud detection seriously and 
will open investigations. Intercepted fraudulent documents 
are taken out of circulation and submitted to the 
investigating court. However, embassy officials hear little 
of the results of such investigations or of prosecutions of 
those perpetrating the fraud. Local officials advise that 
persons bearing fraudulent documents are generally deported 
in lieu of prosecution. 
 
 
¶7. Privacy and Data Security: 
 
-- (SBU) Information relating to the questioning, detention, 
or removal of persons encountered at the border is included 
in the central database. 
 
-- (SBU) Restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive 
data are based on Croatian law, which is accessible to the 
public. Sharing of sensitive information is also governed by 
a restrictive law governing the protection of personal data, 
which prohibits transmission of any personal data, even basic 
biographic data, outside Croatia's borders, which also 
prohibits the sharing of such data with foreign government 
representatives inside Croatia outside of formal requests for 
mutual legal assistance. 
 
-- (SBU) Post does not know of a right for foreigners to sue 
the government to obtain personal data or information. 
 
BRADTKE