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FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PPD AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS 2007: PROFILE OF THE MAIN CHALLENGER -- 
THE OPPOSITION SDP 
 
REF: A. ZAGREB 1014 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. ZAGREB 1011 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 B/D 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This cable, part of our series (ref A) 
leading up Croatia's November 25 parliamentary elections, 
looks at the prospects for the opposition Social Democratic 
Party, the only serious challenger to the ruling HDZ.  Having 
entered the election season confident it would oust the HDZ, 
the SDP has watched its lead shrink to where the election is 
now very close.  The SDP's campaign has been based largely on 
negative portrayals of the HDZ record, and relatively little 
substance in terms of new policies.  The SDP's split 
leadership structure contrasts sharply with the 
Sanader-dominated HDZ, but has left many voters (and Post) 
somewhat confused about who would be making the decisions in 
an SDP-run government.  Foreign policy issues have been 
absent from the campaign, although the prospect that the HDZ 
might win re-election on the votes of the Bosnian Croat 
diaspora sparks keen resentment among SDP activists and much 
of the domestic Croatian electorate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SDP'S KEY MESSAGE:  THROW OUT THE HDZ 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) This summer the SDP enjoyed a 3 to 4 percentage point 
advantage over the HDZ. Interest in the party was boosted by 
sympathy in the wake of long-time party leader and former 
Prime Minister Ivica Racan's death and a subsequent 
leadership contest that saw the youthful Zoran Milanovic 
chosen as SDP President.  Since that peak, however, SDP's 
lead has narrowed, and with just five days to go to the vote, 
the election remains too close to call. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Both in private conversations with party leaders and 
in the SDP's public campaign three main ideas are driving the 
SDP's campaign: a sense that the HDZ is an arrogant and 
corrupt party that has failed to produce economic benefits to 
the broader population; a resentment of the influence of 
certain groups such as the diaspora or the Catholic church 
over Croatian politics and policies; and a conviction that 
the Croatian people are ready for a change. 
 
STRONG TEAM, BUT WHO IS IN CHARGE? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Complementing this essentially negative campaign about 
the HDZ, the SDP has been actively seeking to portray itself 
as "Team SDP": a party with a strong team of potential 
ministers who will work effectively together.  This is 
offered as an alternative to the existing model of a 
super-strong Prime Minister and party president in the figure 
of Ivo Sanader. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Many observers we have spoken with, however, have 
not been impressed by the SDP's campaign.  The very symbol of 
the SDP,s team idea -) the separation of leadership between 
party President Zoran Milanovic and prime-ministerial 
candidate Ljubo Jurcic ) may in fact be the party's greatest 
weakness.  The 41-year-old Milanovic does represent the new 
strength and energy in the SDP, although many voters feel he 
has appeared to shrill and aggressive in his campaign 
appearances.  Jurcic, an economist who only recently joined 
the party, has by contrast lacked the charisma and stature of 
a statesman during the campaign so far.  This contrast in 
styles has only sharpened voters' questions about who would 
really be making the decisions in an SDP government.  Prime 
Minister Sanader has sought to turn the SDP's leadership 
structure into one of his main campaign punch-lines, as "two 
helmsmen without a rudder." 
 
¶6. (C) A close advisor to President Mesic has told the 
Ambassador that Mesic is torn by the current election.  Mesic 
is generally more sympathetic to the SDP's policies and 
positions, and enjoyed the SDP's support in his presidential 
campaigns against HDZ-nominated opponents.  Yet our source 
said Mesic has gained a grudging respect for Sanader and his 
leadership style over the past four years, and might well 
prefer it to what the SDP has on offer.  Our sense is many 
Croatian voters share Mesic's split opinion. 
 
ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, EVEN FOREIGN POLITICS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) SDP attacks on alleged corruption within the HDZ and 
a sense that the HDZ's economic reforms (such as they are) 
have improved the living standards of only a thin layer of 
wealthier Croatians are tactics that have found some traction 
with the voting public.  What increasingly gets SDP activists 
 
ZAGREB 00001021  002 OF 002 
 
 
worked up, however, is not HDZ corruption, but the HDZ's 
virtual lock on the 2 to 6 seats the Croatian disapora will 
hold in the next Parliament.  (Septel will discuss the 
politics of the diaspora voting in more detail).  One of 
Milanovic's first announcements after becoming SDP President 
was that the SDP would seek to abolish these diaspora seats. 
The SDP presents this stance as a matter of principle, but it 
is also true the SDP had little chance of winning even one of 
these seats, and so had little to lose by alienating these 
voters.  The SDP subsequently announced it would not even 
bother to run a slate of candidates for those seats. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Other than objecting to the diaspora vote, the SDP 
campaign has been virtually devoid of any foreign policy 
content.  Little or nothing is said about Croatian policy 
toward B-H.  And in other areas of foreign policy, there is 
little to distinguish SDP and HDZ positions.  Both parties in 
government have told us they would support independence for 
Kosovo, and both actively support Croatian membership in NATO 
and the EU.  The SDP has called for Croatia's NATO accession 
to be put to a public referendum, but is confident it can win 
such a referendum easily (REF B).  The HDZ insists no such 
referendum is required or should be held, but the SDP has 
done little to highlight this distinction in the campaign. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) An SDP-led government would present us with some 
contrasts compared to the current government.  Like many 
Croatian voters, we are uncertain how policy-making would 
work in an SDP government, and suspect that Jurcic's term as 
Prime Minister might prove short-lived.  Milanovic, a former 
diplomat who speaks excellent English and spent three years 
at the Croatian Mission to NATO, may prove somewhat mercurial 
in his personality, but is unquestionably sincere in his 
desire to move Croatia further toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration and partnership.  Jurcic is perhaps a somewhat 
less known quantity.  But the overall cast of an SDP-led 
government, with a host of ministers returning from the SDP's 
2000-2003 term in office, provides ample assurance that we 
could work smoothly with the new government should the SDP 
win.  The bottom line is that both the HDZ and SDP are 
pro-Western, pro-NATO, and moderately pro-reform parties that 
would be good partners for the U.S. 
BRADTKE