VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0952 3052336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 012336Z NOV 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2956

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000952 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO - A/S SILVERBERG, DAS SINGH, GJREES, IO/RHS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 
TAGS: SOCI PHUM KFEM UNGA
SUBJECT: ANTI-RAPE RESOLUTION UPDATE 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GROVER JOSEPH REES for reasons 1.5(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Negotiations on the text of the U.S.-initiated 
anti-rape resolution are heading into the end-game.  Over 50 
countries, including the European Union and others from 
various regions, have signed on as co-sponsors of a 
compromise text that asks for action to eliminate rape 
generally, "including" when used to achieve political or 
military objectives.  Fundamental differences still exist, 
however, with several African delegations who are driving the 
Africa Group position, particularly regarding their desire to 
eviscerate the title and the final paragraph which directs 
the UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on the issue. 
This Africa Group position is supported by Russia, India, 
Cuba, and Venezuela.  Many Asian and Latin American countries 
appear to be waiting to see the ultimate reaction of the 
Africans to the final text before committing to co-sponsor or 
support our text. 
 
¶2. (C) The possibility of a split within the Africa Group 
exists, since Liberia, Burundi and DRC are co-sponsors, while 
Sudan, Egypt, South Africa and a few others remain suspicious 
of the resolution's aims. Egyptian Permrep Abdelaziz and his 
mission have been particularly active and unhelpful, both 
within the Africa Group and within the OIC, in their attempt 
to shield Sudan from any implied criticism and to block 
progress on our resolution.  Department may wish to consider 
demarching the GOE at a high level to get Abdelaziz to desist 
leading the opposition.  South Africa has been slightly less 
vocal than Egypt in playing the spoiler, but another 
high-level Department demarche may be helpful in Johannesburg 
as well. 
 
¶3. (C) If a vote is called, it is not yet clear how many 
Africans will abstain or vote against our resolution, nor how 
many sympathetic NAM votes they will be able to garner.  The 
addition of an explicit mention of foreign occupation will 
undercut some of the potential opposition to our text. If 
there is disagreement within the Africa Group, Cuba is likely 
to take advantage of this by putting forward several 
amendments targeted at embarrassing the U.S. and causing us 
to withdraw our own co-sponsorship.  These would aim to 
reaffirm international agreements we have been unable to 
ratify, such as the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action on women.  Since the vast majority of UN 
members, including other co-sponsors, could be able to 
support such language if presented, the EU is working to 
dissuade Cuba from formally presenting these amendments.  EU 
interlocutors have told USUN they expect Cuba will call a 
vote on the entire resolution, even if there is no opposition 
from Africa, in order to deny us a "consensus." 
 
Khalilzad