VZCZCXYZ0028
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0705/01 3251541
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211541Z NOV 07
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7176
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017 
TAGS: KNPP IAEA AORC IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 DIVERGE AS RUSSIA AND CHINA SEE 
POSITIVE MOMENTUM 
 
REF: UNVIE 694 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b, d, h 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  P5 1 Ambassadors could not come to agreement 
in a November 20 meeting on any common approach in the 
November Board on Iran.  The EU3 and the U.S. downplayed the 
work plan as a tool and focused concerns on the Agency's 
diminishing knowledge of the current Iranian nuclear program 
and the concomitant increase in Iran's enrichment capacity. 
Russia and China underlined the work plan's "positive 
momentum", though they acknowledged that Iran should suspend 
enrichment and implement the AP, as the DG report had urged. 
In China's view, Iran had provided "sufficient" cooperation 
to the Agency and P1 and P2 issues were basically solved. 
Tang further questioned the urgency for another UNSCR and the 
sincerity of U.S. diplomatic efforts in a separate meeting 
with Ambassador Schulte.  China and Russia also did not 
support any Board resolution at this time, and declined to 
consider a joint P5 1 press statement.  End Summary. 
 
Glass Half-Empty 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) German Ambassador Gottwald invited P5 1 Ambassadors to 
share their assessment of the DG's report on Iran.  He 
commented on the desirability of returning to a consensus 
Board resolution but acknowledged that this was not 
realistic, though French Ambassador Deniau still did not rule 
out the possibility.  He noted the EU and EU-3 statements 
were not yet completed.  Gottwald believed the Board should 
reconfirm its decisions urging Iran to take decisive steps. 
He underlined that the work plan was only one step and only 
part if the overall issue. 
 
¶3. (C) UK Ambassador Smith agreed with this assessment and 
noted that the September Board had made the work plan too 
much of the issue.  The key question was not our satisfaction 
with the work of the Secretariat but with Iran's cooperation. 
 He acknowledged that the work plan had brought one or two 
new elements to light and that Iran had provided some 
information and access, but cooperation remained grudging and 
unsatisfactory.  Given the modest results, work plan 
implementation was far from positive.  Smith also underlined 
the DG's conclusion that knowledge of Iran's nuclear program 
was diminishing.  He too remained open to a resolution but 
energetically so. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Schulte highlighted the DG report's 
assessments that the Secretariat was not in a position to 
draw conclusions as to the original nature and scope of the 
Iranian nuclear program; that Iran had provided reactive 
rather than proactive cooperation not having made a strategic 
decision to change its relations with the IAEA; and that 
knowledge of the current nuclear program had diminished, even 
if some light was shed on the 1980s and 1990s.  He also cited 
the fact that since the last DG report in August, Iran had 
increased the number of centrifuges by 50% to 3000 and was 
feeding 80% more uranium hexafluoride.  All in all, Schulte 
concluded, this was not a positive report, and the Board 
should recall its past decisions on suspension and the need 
for full cooperation.  He noted that for the first time, the 
DG urged Iran to implement the AP and confidence building 
measures, including suspension. 
 
 
¶5. (C) French Ambassador Deniau argued that the dual track 
was effective because international pressure was working to 
an extent.  He underlined the fact that the work plan was 
only a tool, and only "part of a part" of the problem, and 
that we should not lose sight of the big picture, including 
suspension, and implementation of the AP and Code 3.1. to 
assess present and future issues.  In a nutshell, the report 
demonstrated that enrichment had increased while the Agency's 
knowledge had diminished.  The work plan had not been much of 
a success.  Only the plutonium issue had been closed, and 
despite the DG's expectations in September, no other 
questions had been closed/resolved.  Deniau argued that the 
process cannot be allowed to drag on but must be brought to a 
conclusion sooner rather than later.  Ambassador Schulte 
agreed that the work plan was a tool, which Iran had 
unfortunately used to negotiate and limit its cooperation 
with the IAEA.  Iran had failed the DG's litmus test, and had 
not met the DG or the Board's demands.  The dual track could 
only be effective, Ambassador Schulte noted, if fully 
implemented.  In that regard, a third UNSCR was long overdue 
even as the IAEA process continues.  The 60-day timeframe 
envisioned in UNSCR 1747 had expired in May. 
 
Glass Half Full 
 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky recalled how eager the 
Board had been to extract something positive from Iran last 
February-March. He assessed important positive momentum in 
the implementation of the work plan, despite some weak 
points, and noted the Iran was following up on its 
commitments ahead of schedule.  At the same time, Russia 
shared the DG's view on the need for implementation of the AP 
and confidence building measures.  Zmeyevsky concluded that 
we should encourage positive momentum on the work plan, while 
sending a "clear signal" on Iran's other obligations.  He 
continued to favor an incremental approach.  Russia agreed 
that this was not the best time for a Board resolution, which 
could "wreck havoc" on any Vienna consensus. 
 
¶7. (C) Chinese Ambassador Tang was even more forward leaning 
in his assessment of the "positive progress" on work plan 
implementation.  He observed that Iran had provided 
"sufficient" cooperation to the Agency and that P1 and P2 
issues were basically solved.  Iran's cooperation was 
sincere, in China's view, though not enough.  Tang agreed 
with the Russian stance on sustaining the positive momentum 
and allowing the Agency to finish the work plan.  China also 
shared concerns in the DG report that Iran had not suspended 
enrichment and construction of Arak.  In response to Board 
and UNSC demands, Iran should show some flexibility on 
suspension, he noted.  At the same time, Tang cautioned, 
"other parties" must create favorable conditions for 
cooperation and take no actions to escalate the standoff. 
China continued to support the dual track approach, and saw 
the results of the work plan as effective.  China also did 
not support a Board resolution at this time. 
 
¶8. (S) Tang had provided Ambassador Schulte much the same 
assessment in a November 19 meeting.  He stressed that China 
sought a diplomatic, not a military solution, and cautioned 
that if the United States denies progress by Iran and the 
IAEA, to a certain extent this denies the U.S.'s diplomatic 
efforts.  Tang acknowledged the need for diplomatic pressure 
on two fronts, in Vienna and in the Solana-Iran talks. 
Ambassador Schulte assured him of our support for a 
diplomatic solution, explaining that the United States viewed 
sanctions as a "third front" to pressure Iran to abandon its 
nuclear aspirations.  Tang questioned whether the sense of 
urgency for a third UNSCR was warranted given, he claimed, 
U.S. intelligence estimates that it would take Iran ten years 
to produce sufficient material for a nuclear weapon.  He also 
noted that the P5 1 Ministers agreed not to proceed with a 
resolution until both the DG and Solana's reports were 
issued.  Tang assured the Ambassador that China had always 
worked to enforce UNSCRs, and emphasized our common 
objective.  China's position was that Iran should 1) 
cooperate fully with the IAEA and make substantial progress; 
2) show flexibility on suspension of uranium enrichment and 
give serious consideration of freeze proposals; and 3) 
conduct negotiations with EU as soon as possible to solve the 
uranium enrichment issue. 
 
Room for Common Ground? 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C)  Gottwald observed several common points among P5 1 
members,  including the fact that that progress had not been 
sufficient; that the work plan should not be the sole focus; 
and that Iran must respond to Board and UNSC demands and 
implement the AP, failure of which had led to the Agency's 
diminishing knowledge.  By underlining common principles, the 
P5 1 could press Iran to negotiate.  He cited Ahmadinejad's 
recent flip-flop on the Saudi proposal as proof that Iranian 
positions were fluid, and noted that the June 2006 offer was 
not well know in Iran.  Gottwald expressed some optimism 
that, if so motivated, Iran could provide additional pieces 
of the work plan "puzzle" in the next few weeks.  The P5 1 
must send the right message to induce cooperation on both of 
the dual tracks.  The New York process is also indispensable, 
he said, arguing that Iran should be prepared to shut down 
Natanz and "hand over the keys to the Swiss" now it has made 
its point on enrichment. 
 
¶10. (C) Deniau suggested a common statement on fundamentals 
or a press statement, as an expression of unity among the 
P5 1 Missions.  Gottwald believed that a common denominator 
existed and supported such an effort to mark a common sense 
of purpose in Vienna.  Russia was reluctant and China argued 
that Missions should rely on the September P5 1 Ministers 
statement, which Gottwald assured continued to be the 
guideline.  The UK cautioned that a P5 1 statement could not 
set too low a common denominator and must de minimus convey 
shared dissatisfaction with Iran's non-compliance with Board 
 
and UNSC resolutions and concern over the Agency's 
diminishing knowledge, points which he  believed should also 
be reflected in national statements to the Board.  Upon 
hearing this, Zmeyevsky doubted that a common statement could 
be agreed upon, given "nuances" regarding positive and 
negative aspects.  Russia clearly intended to emphasize the 
positive.  The DG's report, he concluded, would have to serve 
as the common denominato 
r. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) We expect that P5 1 national statements in the Board 
will underline core principles, in particular, the DG's 
urging that Iran implement the AP and confidence building 
measures in compliance with UNSC resolutions.  However, 
Russia and China will clearly give the DG's report a positive 
spin in the hopes of delaying immediate UNSC action. 
SCHULTE