VZCZCXRO7336
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0929/01 3081233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041233Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2793
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3210

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000929 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU LY
SUBJECT: DARFUR TALKS STRUGGLE WITH POOR REBEL ATTENDANCE 
 
TRIPOLI 00000929  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  UN/AU-led Darfur mediation talks began as 
announced on October 27 in Sirte, Libya, even in the absence of 
major political and military leaders from the Darfur rebel 
movements.  The UN/AU leadership is slowly proceeding with a 
plan to dispatch teams to Juba and Darfur to encourage rebels 
not in attendance to sign a ceasefire agreement and move their 
internal consultations to Sirte.  Libyan leader Muammar 
Qadhafi's chilling comments that the international community 
should leave the Sudanese alone to resolve the Darfur crisis and 
affirming the GOS's "sovereign right" to use violence against 
the Darfurians have encouraged some rebel groups to stay away 
from Sirte.  While welcoming Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafie 
Ali Nafie's unilateral ceasefire declaration, international 
observers cautioned that a meaningful ceasefire agreement must 
include mechanisms to identify violations and delimit concrete 
penalties for parties that broach the ceasefire.  With the Sirte 
meeting looking increasingly precarious, international observers 
cautioned the UN/AU against boxing themselves in with 
unrealistic timetables or overly optimistic projections that the 
Sirte meeting will conclude with a final political settlement 
for Darfur.  End summary. 
 
KEY PLAYERS BOYCOTT SIRTE MEETING 
 
¶2.  (U)  Most key rebel leaders and military commanders, 
including SLM faction leader Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur and JEM 
leader Khalil Ibrahim, made good on their threats to boycott the 
Sirte meeting.  Factions in attendance included JEM/Collective 
led by Bahar Idriss Abu Gharba and Abdullah Banda and SLA/Khamis 
Abdullah (although Khamis himself is not in attendance).  An 
Arab faction led by Abu Sarra and Fur leader Ahmed Ibrahim 
Diraige also participated. 
 
¶3.  (U)  By contrast to the movements, representation from the 
Government of Sudan and the international community was strong. 
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi and MFA Secretary for Africa 
Affairs Ali Treiki hosted the meeting.  A large GOS delegation, 
headed by Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafi Ali Nafi and 
intelligence chief Salah Gosh, consisted entirely of top NCP 
officials and vowed to be the last delegation to leave the Sirte 
talks.  SLM/Minawi did not attend -- the GOS vowed to block his 
participation unless he came as part of Nafi's GNU/GOS 
delegation.  Special Envoys and top MFA officials from the U.S., 
U.K., France, China, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, the 
European Union and Japan also participated.  The three regional 
governments -- Egypt, Chad, and Eritrea -- were represented at 
the FM level.  Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa also 
participated.  Representatives from the SPLM's Taskforce on 
Darfur, Reverend Clement Janda and Edward Lino, were on hand in 
Sirte.  Thirteen tribal and civil society representatives 
attended as well, but the GOS prevented 15 from attending who 
had been invited by the UN/AU. 
 
NO CLEAR PLAN TO BOOST REBEL PARTICIPATION 
 
¶4.  (C)  Recognition that the absence of major rebel leaders 
threatened serious discussions on either a ceasefire or a 
political settlement was widespread in all but the UN/AU camps, 
with UN S/E Eliasson characterizing the conference both publicly 
and privately as "off to a good start" and "relatively on 
schedule".  The UN/AU leadership has been slow to entice key 
rebel figures into the Sirte meeting.  In a meeting October 29 
with international observers, UN S/E Eliasson announced, and 
international observers endorsed, plans to send mid-level teams 
to Juba and Darfur to encourage rebels to sign a draft ceasefire 
agreement as a confidence-building measure to facilitate forward 
movement of the political process.  SPLM criticized the 
proposal, and two JEM splinter groups currently in Sirte 
threatened to walk out if the UN/AU dispatched the teams.  By 
October 30, working level UN/AU staff conceded that UN/AU envoys 
were considering shifting the conference venue outside of Libya 
in the hope more rebels might attend if the conference were held 
at a less objectionable venue.  Sources, however, indicate that 
UN SYG Ban is firm on continuing to hold the talks in Libya. 
 
U.S. ENCOURAGES FLEXIBILITY IN THE SIRTE PROCESS 
 
¶5.  (C) S/E Natsios embraced the proposal to send out teams, 
encouraging the UN/AU to pursue the Darfur peace process in the 
field rather that at the 4,000-seat Sirte convention center if 
necessary.  S/E Natsios encouraged the UN/AU to clearly define 
the endgame of the current meeting and suggested an enforceable 
ceasefire might be a more realistic short-term goal necessary to 
 
TRIPOLI 00000929  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
build confidence among the rebel movements before real political 
dialogue could begin.  He cautioned the UN/AU not to box 
themselves in with an inflexible process and unmovable dates. 
Detailed written reports on progress every 2-3 weeks would help 
sustain support for UN/AU process in national capitals. 
 
¶6.  (U)  In addition, in public remarks at the October 27 
plenary session, S/E Natsios told delegates that a meaningful 
peace in Darfur requires both a robust peacekeeping force and an 
inclusive political settlement.  Peacekeeping and the political 
track are mutually re-enforcing and should be pursued 
simultaneously.  S/E Natsios stressed that preconditions for 
negotiations are illogical -- if everything has already been 
agreed upon, what would be the point of negotiations?  There are 
five significant issues for discussion: security, disarmament, 
compensation, reconstruction / development, and land rights.  A 
meaningful discussion on these issues requires participation by 
parties with significant military and political strength in 
Darfur.  According to S/E Natsios, the Sirte meeting is the 
beginning of a process that will eventually lead to a political 
settlement.  A cessation of hostilities would be a welcome first 
step. 
 
QADHAFI HARANGUES INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESS 
 
¶7.  (C)  In a rambling, 45-minute speech delivered in a monotone 
at the October 27 plenary session, Qadhafi told assembled rebel 
movements, Sudanese officials, international envoys, and a large 
press contingent that the absence of key rebel leaders in Sirte 
confirms that the international community, including Libya, 
should let the Sudanese and Darfurians resolve this conflict for 
themselves.  He singled out Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur and 
Khalil Ibrahim as the "essential" leaders without whom "we 
cannot conclude a peace."  Expressing disappointment that more 
rebel movements opted not to attend the Sirte talks, Qadhafi -- 
speaking several feet from UN S/E Eliasson -- said he had hoped 
"to salvage the prestige of the United Nations and the UN's 
efforts" to further the Darfur peace process. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Qadhafi also referenced traditional Fur tribal 
hierarchies, claiming that "had the international community not 
gotten involved, the people of Darfur would have resolved the 
conflict already".  Reiterating his view that the Darfur 
conflict is strictly tribal, the Libyan leader said the crisis 
has no implications for regional or international security and 
does not/not fall within the purview of a UN Chapter 7 
intervention.  In addition, Qadhafi gave an impassioned defense 
of the GOS's "sovereign right" to use violence against the 
Sudanese people, referring to a state's use of violence to quell 
perceived insurgency as "legal and legitimate".  Qadhafi 
reietered his familiar refrain that the world faces "graver 
threats" than the Darfur crisis. 
 
NICE CEASEFIRE -- IF THEY CAN KEEP IT 
 
¶9.  (C)  Sudanese Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi 
announced (to polite applause) October 27 that the GOS declared 
a unilateral ceasefire in Darfur.  "The Government of Sudan will 
not be the first to fire arms in Darfur", said Nafi.  (Note: In 
an meeting October 30 reported septel, CEN-SAD Secretary-General 
Mohammad al-Madani told S/E Natsios that Nafi had agreed in 
consultations with the GOL to offer a longer list of 
concessions, only to revert to "the one thing (a ceasefire) they 
agreed on before he left Khartoum".  End note.)  Nafi reiterated 
that a sustainable peace in Darfur requires tackling poverty and 
underdevelopment in the region, calling on international 
observers to increase reconstruction assistance grants for 
Darfur.  Nafi identified three obstacles to peace:  the 
impossibility of consulting with the rebel movements, limited 
international commitments to reconstruction, and the lack of 
clear punishments for individuals or movements who step outside 
the UN/AU peace process. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Virtually all attendees in Sirte agreed that for a 
ceasefire to be credible, it must include a mechanism to 
identify and punish violators.  In a private meeting on October 
27, Treiki told S/E Natsios that Libya would consider a regional 
travel ban on rebel movements and individuals that signed a 
ceasefire and reneged.  Treiki praised U.S. unilateral sanctions 
on JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, but conceded U.S. sanctions are 
strictly symbolic and incapable of raising the political costs 
of violating the ceasefire.  Though Treki offered to broach the 
subject with Chad and Eritrea, the Eritrean FM spoke publicly 
against the proposal later that day. 
 
NON-MILITARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROPOSAL 
 
¶11.  (C)  S/E Natsios proposed a non-military logistical support 
 
TRIPOLI 00000929  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
package, involving both food and medical supplies, financed by 
international donations and aimed at those rebel groups and 
militias that signed and respected a cessation of hostilities, 
including SLM/Minawi.  The U.K., the Netherlands, the European 
Union, and Norway endorsed the plan in principle and agreed to 
investigate logistics and funding options should the UN/AU 
choose to pursue the plan in the future.  After international 
observers presented the plan to the UN/AU on October 29, UN S/E 
Eliasson asked for more time for internal UN deliberations about 
the non-military logistical support plan.  The Italian 
delegation leader offered generous funding for the idea in a 
private conversation with S/E Natsios. 
 
DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY TO EXPEL ABDULWAHID FROM FRANCE 
 
¶12.  (C)  Treiki told S/E Natsios on October 27 that French FM 
Bernard Kouchner said France is prepared to expel SLM faction 
leader Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur in December when his French 
residency permit expires.  According to Treiki, Senegalese 
President Abdallah Wade is ready to accept Abdulwahid if France 
expels him.  In a separate meeting October 30, CEN-SAD SYG 
al-Madani told S/E Natsios that both the French government and 
President Wade have spoken with Abdulwahid about relocating him 
to Senegal, but Abdulwahid refused.  Al-Madani said it was 
"preferable to convince Abdulwahid to bless the peace or attend 
the talks" than to expel him from France, but acknowledged 
expulsion was a viable option.  He recounted a meeting between 
Chadian President Idriss Deby and Abdulwahid in Paris in July in 
which Abdulwahid promised that he would attend the final UN/AU 
negotiations. 
 
AN EMBARASSMENT FOR LIBYA 
 
¶13.  (C)  Libya's failure to deliver major rebel leaders -- 
despite repeated promises to the UN and AU that "everyone except 
Abdulwahid" would come -- is a clear embarassment to the 
conference's hosts.  A/S Treiki was conspicuously silent 
throughout the plenary sessions, often sitting in the audience 
alongside other international observers but refraining from any 
public comments throughout the Sirte meeting.  In a private 
meeting with S/E Natsios, Treiki was clearly embarassed by 
Qadhafi's comments that the international community had no role 
in the resolution of the Darfur conflict and cautioned that 
Qadhafi's harsh message was "not what brother leader intended". 
The GOL's low profile throughout the conference suggests that, 
were the conference to collapse, Libya -- like the rest of the 
international community -- would lay the blame squarely at the 
UN/AU's doorstep. 
 
¶14.  (U)  S/E Natsios cleared this message. 
MILAM