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DE RUEHKO #5101/01 3082236
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O 042236Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9209
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 4177
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 6585
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 7844
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 4856
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RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL AADP
SUBJECT: DAS CHRISTENSEN'S OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH ASIAN 
AFFAIRS DDG KOHARA 
 
TOKYO 00005101  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Japan and China are both working hard to 
find common ground, MOFA's Asian Affairs Deputy Director 
General told EAP DAS Tom Christensen October 21.  Although 
many conflicts remain, including territorial disputes, the 
two countries are seeking to develop a "mutually beneficial 
relationship."  This warming of ties gives Japan a chance to 
address its concerns about the economic situation in China, 
including IPR protection, environmental issues, and aid 
transparency.  Japan's position on Taiwan remains unchanged, 
and Japan is unlikely to join the United States in publicly 
criticizing the DPP referendum on applying to join the UN 
under the name of Taiwan.  End Summary. 
 
--Japan's relations with China are warming-- 
 
¶2.  (C) Japan and China are working to establish a "mutually 
beneficial relationship based on common interests," Deputy 
Director General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Masahiro 
Kohara told Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Tom Christensen during a October 21 meeting. 
This stands in sharp contrast to relations during the Koizumi 
administration, which were at "an all time low" due to the 
former Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. 
 
¶3.  (C) Former Prime Minister Abe's visit to Beijing last 
year marked the beginning of what has been a steady 
improvement, centering on the exchange of high-level visits, 
Kohara continued.  Prime Minister Fukuda is tentatively 
scheduled to visit China this year, and if Chinese President 
Hu Jintao comes to Japan next spring as planned it will be 
the first time in ten years.  Discussions are also underway 
for an exchange of economic ministers. 
 
¶4.  (C) In addition to these high-level visits, 
people-to-people exchanges are more common than ever, Kohara 
said.  The two countries are coordinating a variety of sports 
exchanges, and Japan invites over two thousand young Chinese 
students to attend Japanese schools each year, both examples 
of programs that have made a dramatic improvement on the 
image of Japan among young Chinese people.  This year marks 
the 35-year anniversary of normalization between Japan and 
China, and next year will be the 30th anniversary of the 
Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Kohara observed. 
Although next year will also be the 70th anniversary of the 
Nanking Incident, Japan is hoping that the two countries can 
rely on these people-to-people exchanges to keep the focus on 
the more positive 30th anniversary. 
 
¶5.  (C) The United States welcomes the warming of Japan-China 
relations, DAS Christensen replied, including Abe's visit to 
Beijing as well as Japan's strategy for future relations. 
The U.S.-Japan alliance is solid, and U.S. officials are not 
worried about Japan developing closer ties to China. 
Likewise, Japanese officials should not see U.S. engagement 
with China as a threat to Japan's relationship with the 
United States: regional relationships are not a zero-sum 
game.  The U.S. purpose in engaging China is to "shape 
China's choices."  Kohara agreed that the U.S.-Japan 
relationship is strong, thanking DAS Christensen for U.S. 
support in addressing the DPRK abductions issue.  DAS 
Christensen assured Kohara that EAP A/S Hill takes the 
abductions issue "very seriously." 
 
--But territorial disputes remain-- 
 
¶6.  (C) Japan and China have agreed to "seek joint 
development" in the East China Sea, but differences over 
national boundaries remain difficult to overcome, Kohara 
explained.  The two countries completed their 10th 
consultation over border demarcation two weeks ago without 
any substantial developments.  China's adherence to the 
"natural prolongation" theory is the biggest obstacle to 
progress, and is not compliant with international law.  Japan 
is ready to bring the dispute before an international body, 
confident in its legal position that delimitation should be 
based on the median 200 nautical mile-entitlement.  The fact 
 
TOKYO 00005101  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
that China has resisted resolving the case through a 
third-party organization indicates their lack of confidence 
in their own position, Kohara opined. 
 
¶7. (C) Vietnam is also struggling with China over maritime 
borders, DAS Christensen replied.  Although there is 
tremendous potential for collaboration on energy and 
environmental issues in the region, these disputes render 
such cooperation difficult.  The Vietnamese are particularly 
concerned about China's expansive claims in the South China 
Sea, which draw maritime borders almost all the way up to the 
Japanese coast, as far south as Indonesia, and as far East as 
the Philippines.  The Vietnamese refer to this giant sweeping 
arc as "the Cow's Tongue." The United States has no official 
position on the sovereignty disputes, but does find the 
Chinese claims to be so expansive as to be hard to consider 
reasonable. 
 
--Next Steps for Economic Relations-- 
 
¶8.  (C) Japan intends to discuss four major issues with China 
during high-level economic dialogue this December, Kohara 
noted.  In addition to conveying Japanese concerns about a 
possible bubble economy in China, the Japanese representative 
will request that China take action to improve its business 
environment.  Specifically, Japan would like to see more 
stringent enforcement of intellectual property rights 
protection at the local level.  Japan will also address 
environmental issues with China, attempting to draw it into 
the post-Kyoto Protocol framework.  Finally, Japan will raise 
development assistance transparency, probably at the Director 
General level.  The United States is also closely monitoring 
China's aid strategy in the developing world, replied DAS 
Christensen, noting that the Chinese Foreign Ministry has a 
surprisingly small role in China's aid policy. 
 
--Developments in the Chinese Leadership-- 
 
¶9.  (C) Japanese officials will be "closely watching" the new 
Chinese leadership announced during the first plenum of the 
17th Communist Party of China Central Committee, Kohara told 
DAS Christensen.  Kohara noted in particular the rapid 
ascendancy of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang who had both "jumped 
rank" to join the Political Bureau Standing Committee.  These 
two newcomers to the Standing Committee might be frontrunners 
to succeed Hu Jintao as president when his term expires in 
five years, Kohara predicted.  In the meantime, the official 
adoption of Hu Jintao's "Scientific Outlook on Development" 
policies will significantly boost his authority and prestige 
during the rest of his administration.  Regardless of who is 
in power, Chinese leaders will continue to wrestle with the 
dilemma of trying to suppress dissent while still being 
responsive to the needs of the people.  Government crackdowns 
on the media are still common, and restiveness in China's 
provincial areas remains a problem. 
 
--Taiwan-- 
 
¶10.  (C) Japan adheres to the position established in the 
1972 Japan-China Joint Communique regarding Taiwan, and will 
not support Taiwan's membership in the United Nations, 
affirmed Kohara.  Japan has conveyed its position that 
unilateral attempts to resolve the issue are unacceptable. 
The international community "should take note" that President 
Hu Jintao did not mention the use of force towards Taiwan in 
his statement before the 17th Congress, which indicates the 
current Chinese government's relatively moderate position. 
Japan will continue to "encourage a calm attitude" with both 
sides, pushing them to achieve a peaceful resolution through 
direct dialogue, Kohara said. 
 
¶11.  (C) The United States has publicly criticized the DPP 
referendum on applying to join the UN under the name of 
Taiwan, and hopes Japan will do the same, DAS Christensen 
stated.  U.S. officials appreciate Japan's position, but 
would like to see Japan join the United States in explaining 
to the people of Taiwan why these types of provocative 
political initiatives are not in Taiwan's long-term interest. 
 The United States does not expect this to change Taiwan 
 
TOKYO 00005101  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
President Chen Shui-bian's stance, but rather intends the 
public statement to convince Taiwan's public that passage of 
such a referendum would make Taiwan's foreign relations more 
difficult.  The statement is also intended to reduce concerns 
on the mainland about the potential for U.S. backing of 
Chen's initiatives.  This policy approach will likely be more 
effective than trying to directly influence President Chen 
Shui-bian.  A statement from Japan to the same effect would 
be "very helpful," because many of Taiwan's citizens take 
Japan-Taiwan relations very seriously. 
 
¶12.  (C) It is important to maintain contact with Taiwan's 
leaders, Kohara replied, and the referendum is merely a 
political tool.  Because the referendum does not have legal 
implications, it does not matter, China and Mongolian Affairs 
Director Takeo Akiba added.  Japan must save its political 
capital for "more important issues," Akiba continued. 
Calling for the Taiwanese public to reject the referendum is 
tantamount to interfering in domestic politics.  Preventing 
the referendum from passing is not critical to maintaining 
the peace, and "runs the risk of pushing President Chen 
Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party into a corner," 
Akiba finished. 
 
¶13.  (C) President Chen Shui-bian is quick to interpret 
silence as support for Taiwan's independence, replied DAS 
Christensen.  For example, President Chen claimed that when 
President Bush did not mention Taiwan's bid for UN membership 
in his speech at APEC, he was demonstrating his support. 
Japan's public silence gives President Chen ammunition to 
announce that the United States is isolated in opposing his 
pro-independence activities. 
 
¶14.  (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Christensen. 
SCHIEFFER