VZCZCXRO5095
OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #5073/01 3050833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010833Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9131
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 4125
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 6533
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 7790
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 4810
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 005073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV JA CH
SUBJECT: DAS CHRISTENSEN, DIET MEMBERS DISCUSS 
U.S-JAPAN-CHINA TIES 
 
TOKYO 00005073  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4(b),(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Prospects for improved Japan-China ties 
under new Prime Minister Fukuda, the role of Japan against 
the backdrop of growing U.S-China cooperation, and 
contentious issues in Japan-China relations were the focus of 
EAP DAS Tom Christensen's discussions with senior lawmakers 
from Japan's main ruling and opposition parties October 22 
and 23.  Christensen met with ruling LDP General Affairs 
Council Chair Toshihiro Nikai, former LDP Secretary General 
Koichi Kato, and former leader of the main opposition DPJ 
Katsuya Okada.  The three maintain regular contacts with 
China's and Taiwan's leaders, and are regarded as among the 
most senior China experts in the Diet.  All three described a 
general improvement in ties between Japan and China, although 
they cited areas of continuing concern.  On balance, they 
view the United States as continuing to play an extremely 
important role in the region.  End summary. 
 
U.S.-Japan-China Ties on a (Mostly) Upward Arc 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) China's appointment of Wang Yi to serve as Ambassador 
to Japan from 2004 to 2007 was an important sign that China 
wanted to improve relations with Japan, ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) General Affairs Council Chair 
Toshihiro Nikai told EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Tom Christensen on October 22.  Nikai, who visits China 
frequently and is one of the LDP's top China hands, noted 
that when Prime Minister Fukuda served as former Prime 
Minister Koizumi's Chief Cabinet Secretary, China was given a 
certain amount of "consideration."  Once Fukuda left, 
however, Koizumi's "right wing tendencies" stood out, and 
efforts to improve bilateral ties were "set aside."  Former 
PM Abe made some improvements, but now that Fukuda is Prime 
Minister, "Japan and China can transform their relationship." 
 
 
¶3. (C) The attitude of the PM toward China is very different 
than his predecessor, former LDP Secretary General Koichi 
Kato noted in a meeting the same day.  Abe "paid lip service" 
to improving relations with China, but his real thinking was 
somewhat different.  China knew that Abe did not really like 
China," Kato asserted.  China is much more favorably disposed 
to Fukuda, and the two neighbors are "off to a good start" in 
their relations.  Both China and the United States have also 
done a good job of "respecting" Fukuda in his first six weeks 
in office, he added. 
 
¶4. (C) Former leader of the main opposition Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) Katsuya Okada described U.S.-Japan-China 
relations as "very complex," and expressed concern that Japan 
could grow "more distant" as the United States and China grow 
closer.  He said he had once told the Singaporean Prime 
Minister that in the event of an incident in the Taiwan 
Strait, China and the United States could probably repair 
their relationship in ten years.  If Japan were involved, 
however, "it could easily take 100 years."  On the security 
front, he admitted, Japan cannot disregard the threat posed 
by China, and its U.S. alliance is "unshakable."  Sometimes, 
however, U.S.-Japan security relations become so close that 
Japan has "a hard time breathing."  Outside of the security 
realm, the United States and Japan share an interest in 
helping to draw China further into the international 
community.  Japan also has its own interests to consider, 
Okada noted.  He cited the recent change in U.S. policy 
toward the DPRK as evidence that the two alliance partners do 
not always share the same interests. 
 
¶5. (C) DAS Christensen made clear to his interlocutors that 
there are two common misconceptions about U.S. attitudes 
towards Japan's relations with China.  The first is that we 
need tensions between Japan and China in order to have a 
strong U.S.-Japan relationship.  The second is that an 
improvement in U.S.-PRC relations will come at the expense of 
U.S.-Japan relations.  Our goal is not to contain China, but 
rather to shape its choices.  The U.S.-Japan alliance 
provides a foundation for the strategy of shaping China's 
choices, and also provides a foundation for fostering of 
greater U.S.-China cooperation.  By the same token, he said, 
 
TOKYO 00005073  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
the United States has no concern that closer Japan-China 
relations will weaken the bilateral alliance with Japan. 
 
Many Areas for Cooperation... 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In general, the United States and Japan should 
cooperate in addressing China issues, Nikai said, whether in 
official terms or at the "private level."  The history issue 
may be one in which the three countries could have 
discussions.  Another area for trilateral cooperation is the 
creation of an Asian version of the OECD, in which Japan 
would initially play a large financial role, Nikai said. 
Energy conservation and environmental protection are two 
other areas in which Japan and China can cooperate, Nikai 
continued.  In particular, China's environmental problems 
also affect its neighbors, and China cannot by itself handle 
this matter.  During a meeting with Wen Jiabao, Nikai urged 
China to improve its environmental policies, and Wen agreed, 
Nikai said.  Although the United States and Japan have 
different political systems from China, we should nonetheless 
not "make an enemy of the PRC," but rather show a "more 
generous attitude" and cooperate with China in areas that we 
can.  Protecting intellectual property rights is another area 
in which Japan and China can cooperate, and the United States 
can partner with Japan to address this important issue, Nikai 
said.  Energy and the environment are important issues in 
which the United States, Japan, and China share interests, 
Christensen agreed, and China's creation of the five-party 
energy ministerial conference is a significant sign that they 
take these matters seriously and understand the common 
interests shared by all net consumers of energy. 
 
¶7. (C) The Six-Party Talks are probably the most important 
area for Japan-China cooperation at this point, Kato 
observed, and they are working well together, despite Japan's 
"stubbornness" on abductions.  China views Japan's attitude 
toward the DPRK abductions issue as overly emotional and 
unrealistic.  Kato raised the example of the remains returned 
to Japan by the DPRK, noting that while China believes that 
the remains belong to abductee Megumi Yokota, Japan does not. 
 Many Japanese believe Megumi Yokota is still alive, he 
asserted, and some even maintain that she is being held as a 
mistress to Kim Jong-Il.  To bolster its case, Japan points 
to the forensic analysis of the remains, which some argue was 
"inconclusive."  Kato disputed this assertion, however, 
noting that the person who performed the analysis had never 
said definitively that the remains did not belong to Megumi 
Yokota.  He had said only that he had found DNA other than 
hers, had cited the general difficulty of determining 
identity from cremated remains.  Under the circumstances, 
Kato said, DPRK anger toward Japan could be seen as "not 
unreasonable."  The Six-Party Talks offer another opportunity 
for reconciliation between historical foes, Christensen 
offered, and the United States is hopeful that Japan and the 
DPRK can resolve some of their historical differences through 
the Six Party Talk process. 
 
...But Problems Remain 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) One particular problem with China, Kato continued, is 
its sharp increase in defense spending.  He said he found PRC 
explanations "unconvincing.  He was particularly suspicious 
of a recent statement by Chinese Politburo member Li 
Chang-chun linking the issue of China's transparency entirely 
to the Taiwan issue. The East China Sea territorial dispute 
has also been an issue since normalization 35 years ago, and 
Nikai said that PM Fukuda should "make efforts" to resolve 
this.  Regardless of how he goes about this, U.S.-Japan 
cooperation will be a key factor in Japan's ability to 
approach China on these issues with confidence. 
 
¶9. (C) China has moved far from communism, Kato observed, as 
evidenced by rampant corruption, a growing gap between rich 
and poor, and the ability of officials to run roughshod over 
the people.  In that sense, he said, China is in need of a 
"new communist revolution" to overcome the "serious disorder" 
in society.  He pointed out that China had chosen to 
liberalize its economy first, while Russia had been smart to 
 
TOKYO 00005073  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
put political change ahead of economic liberalization.  China 
is now reaping the results of that "mistaken policy" and 
needs to find a way to restore order and regain control over 
society.  It is difficult to balance reform and the desires 
of the people, he recognized, but it will also be difficult 
for people to "control themselves" as they experience ever 
greater prosperity.  Christensen posited that the current 
political structure is too "simple" to manage the complex 
economic structure that has emerged in reformist China. 
However, rather than reconsolidating CCP power, China should 
open up its political system in order to foster stability 
over the long run, Christensen argued. 
 
¶10. (C) Christensen echoed Kato's concerns on transparency 
and cited China's unwillingness to engage on the recent ASAT 
test as another issue of concern.  He listed the Taiwan 
Strait, Iran, Sudan, Burma, trade, human rights/religious 
freedom, intellectual property rights, and the environment as 
other contentious issues between the United States and China. 
 China had recently been much more helpful on Sudan, somewhat 
more helpful than before on Iran,  but not really helpful at 
all on Iran.  On Burma, Christensen noted, ASEAN may have 
served as an impetus for China to push the regime to let UN 
Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari visit.  China does not like to 
be too far from ASEAN on such regional issues.  Christensen 
said he was somewhat encouraged by the fact that China has 
said some of the right things about Burma, such as calling 
for reconciliation between the government and the opposition, 
something that would not have been possible ten years ago. 
China is moved primarily by concerns over stability, but is 
also worried about drug flows on their southern border. 
Emphasizing China's massive influence in Northern Burma, Kato 
recounted a trip to the border area with Khin Nyunt, where 
all of the residents spoke in Mandarin Chinese and all of the 
signs were written in Chinese characters.  He laughed that he 
had been called on to translate from Chinese to English by 
his Burmese government hosts. 
 
¶11. (C) Kato was also interested in U.S. views on the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  DAS Christensen 
assured Kato that the United States pays attention to the 
activities of the SCO, but is not overly concerned, although 
China may think otherwise.  For the United States, it is 
important that the SCO countries seem to have dropped the 
demand contained in their 2005 declaration in Astana that all 
non-members should remove forces from the region.  In 
response to Kato's concern over large-scale joint exercises, 
Christensen noted that the SCO is not a military alliance, 
and that those exercises were part of the counter-terrorism 
component that served as a basis for the partnership.  Kato 
also expressed interest in the issue of F-22 sales to Japan, 
noting that the Ministry of Defense continues to think the 
sale is possible, despite the Obey Amendment, but that China 
and Korea would undoubtedly have a negative response. 
 
Taiwan Strait:  Maintain the Status Quo 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Maintaining the status quo is the best approach for 
managing the situation in the Taiwan Strait, Kato said, but 
the ongoing electoral campaign has forced candidates to offer 
other formulations.  Chen Shui-bian is "not a mature 
political leader," he asserted, and predicted that Ma 
Ying-jeou would be a better leader as the next President. 
DAS Christensen emphasized the importance of Japan's 
expressing publicly its opposition to Chen's proposed 
referendum.  Japan's private statements would have little 
effect on Chen, he conceded, but a public statement might 
possibly have some influence Taiwan's people.  Christensen 
encouraged Japan's Diet members to continue to build and 
maintain strong contacts with Taiwan's leaders, even if such 
contacts were inappropriate at the government-to-government 
level. In conversations with Nikai, Christensen also 
encouraged Japan to state publicly that Chen's provocative 
statements and actions are not viewed as constructive.  Nikai 
agreed, noting the time is limited now to discuss the issue 
without causing any misunderstanding.  Japan's favoring 
Taiwan too much is not good for Taiwan, he added.  He urged 
the United States to keep in mind that some people of 
influence in Taiwan are in contact with the Chinese 
 
TOKYO 00005073  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
government.  When thinking about Taiwan and China, he urged, 
it is important to not think about them separately.  "After 
all," he said, "China and Taiwan share the same roots." 
 
¶13. (C) The DPJ's Okada echoed Kato's assertion that the only 
way to manage Cross-Strait relations right now is to maintain 
the status quo.  Okada mentioned that he had met with 
President Chen in Taiwan in 2006, and told him not to believe 
Japanese politicians who say that Japan will come to the 
defense of Taiwan if it is attacked by the mainland.  They 
would never say that in Japan, he told Chen, and Japan "would 
never come to Taiwan's defense."  Okada appreciated the 
public message that the United States is sending to Taiwan on 
this issue, and thought Japan should do the same.  He was 
glad that the United States serves "in some ways as a 
restraint on Japan's pro-Taiwan Diet members."  It is 
important to ensure that Taiwan's nationalism does not become 
extreme.  He agreed that it is important for the United 
States and Japan to work together closely to manage 
cross-strait relations in a time of some instability, and to 
ensure that China has a "soft landing." 
 
¶14. (C) DAS Christensen noted to Okada that we need to take 
Taiwan's defensive security needs very seriously, even as we 
discourage provocative behavior by Taiwan leaders.  The 
United States supports Taiwan's security and its efforts to 
play a larger role in international fora, but is concerned 
about Chen Shui-bian's efforts to hold a referendum on 
applying to join the UN under the name Taiwan.  It is 
important for the United States and Japan to work closely to 
ensure stability across the Taiwan Strait both in terms of 
deterring mainland coercion and restraining Taiwan.  This 
mission is very important because it will help determine the 
future of China. If cross-strait relations are handled well, 
he told Okada, it will have a positive impact on how China 
emerges.  If things go poorly, it could prove disastrous for 
China's long-term political development.  Things could go 
wrong, if:  either side is overly provocative; China tries to 
bully Taiwan, especially if that bullying is successful; or 
Taiwan gratuitously provokes Chinese nationalism by moving 
toward legal independence, he added. 
 
¶15. (U) DAS Christensen has cleared this message. 
SCHIEFFER