VZCZCXYZ0010
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSM #1352/01 3091637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD27786A MSI8194-623)
O 051637Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2886
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 001352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y  (GARBLED TEXT) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017 
TAGS: PARM IAEA AORC KNNP PREL PGOV IR IZ SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE'S MEETING WITH FM 
BILDT 
 
REF: A. STATE 149605 
     ¶B. STOCKHOLM 1319 
     ¶C. UNVIE VIENNA 647 
 
Classified By: CDA Robert Silverman, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (c) On October 30, Ambassador Schulte's and Ambassador 
Wood's 90-minute exchange with Bildt focused on the 
international response to Iran,s nuclear ambitions. 
Ambassador Schulte lunched with journalists and gave a speech 
hosted by two Swedish think tanks.  Ambassador Schulte's 
disarming and frank remarks were well received here and 
resulted in overall good press.  The Swedes did note, 
however, that Schulte was optimistic about sanctions' ability 
to to deter the Iranian nuclear program.  End Summary. 
 
The Iran Problem 
---------------- 
¶2.  (c) Bildt, who had invited Schulte to come to Stockholm, 
said he was concerned about nuclear proliferation in general 
and Iran in particular, listing three alternative versions of 
what Iran may be up to: 
 
-- First, Iran,s official line:  "nothing."  Iran is seeking 
a nuclear capability for peaceful civilian purposes; 
 
-- Second, Iran is building capabilities such as enrichment 
for which it is hard to make the case that they are 
exclusively for peaceful purposes, and which may be intended 
to keep the military option open; and 
 
-- Third, Iran has a full-scale weapons program underway that 
could be 2-5 years away from fruition. 
 
As if to reinforce scenario number two, Bildt noted that 
Sweden never decided to build the bomb, but decided in the 
1940s to build all the capabilities that would be required. 
He then reviewed the history and evidence of Iran,s nuclear 
program and asked "where is Iran?" 
 
¶3.  (c) Ambassador Schulte said that the debate in Vienna was 
now between the second and third options and that Iran is 
pursuing at least the capabilities necessary to build a 
nuclear weapon.  Evidence of this included the construction 
of a heavy water reactor, the "alleged studies" conducted by 
the Iranian government, ties of the military to the nuclear 
program, and tests involving high explosives. 
 
¶4.  (c) Schulte contrasted the Iranian case with Sweden,s, 
where, as Bildt noted, Sweden,s capabilities and intention 
had been different.  Sweden could have built nuclear weapons, 
but chose not to.  In Iran, the nuclear program had been 
started in 1985 with a military connection and in response to 
the Iran-Iraq War.  IAEA DG ElBaradei believes that Iran owes 
a "confession."  Yet ElBaradei undercuts his own message when 
he also says that there is no evidence that Iran currently is 
pursuing nuclear weapons.  ElBaradei,s problem, Schulte 
said, is that he feels he has outgrown his position and would 
rather be a nuclear negotiator than a watchdog, the role 
given an IAEA DG.  Bildt agreed that ElBaradei right now 
feels constrained by his technical job and probably would 
rather be a Foreign Minister. 
 
Diplomacy and Sanctions 
----------------------- 
¶5.  (c) Ambassador Schulte told Bildt the U.S. sought through 
diplomatic cooperation to pressure Iran to fully disclose its 
current and past activities and to comply with IAEA requests 
for transparency and UNSC requirements to suspend.  A 
"positive outcome" for November required a strategic decision 
on the part of Iran to change its relationship with the IAEA. 
 The use of sanctions was not a course to war, but a way of 
reinforcing diplomacy.  We were glad the EU was looking into 
the possibility of sanctions. 
 
¶6.  (c) Bildt said the EU has a role and can contribute.  He 
agreed that sanctions were part of the strategy, but noted 
that it was not clear what the effects would be.  Iran wants 
to be taken into account, he said.  It sees itself as the 
world,s second-oldest civilization, a populous, proud 
country occupying a large territory. 
 
¶7.  (c) Ambassador Schulte said the U.S. was concerned that 
ElBaradei would report "partial progress" to the UNSC in 
mid-November.  ElBaradei appeared ready to accept 
verification without an enrichment suspension.  Bildt said 
that a plausible argument for suspension could be made to 
Iran.  We need to reinforce to Tehran that suspension is not 
permanent.  A country did not have to "blow up" its 
 
facilities, just freeze their use.  Furthermore, Iran could 
still declare success if it suspends now that it has achieved 
its goal of 3000 centrifuges. 
 
The Iraq Connection 
------------------- 
¶8.  (c) Bildt said that when the Swedes meet with the 
Iranians (note:  Iranian FM Mottaki was in Stockholm May 7 
and DFM Araqchi Sept. 5), the Iranians are worried about 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Bildt noted the important role of 
Iraq,s neighbors, saying they have a historical and 
long-term perspective, and that "as long as they see 
Mesopotamia as the battleground," it will be hard to find a 
solution in Iraq.  Iran needed to be brought in as part of 
solutions in the region "including those concerning Iraq" and 
that it will be impossible to get regional solutions without 
an understanding with Iran.  This regional perspective, Bildt 
said, applied to the nuclear dialogue as well. 
 
Bringing Pressure 
----------------- 
¶10.  (c) Bildt suggested that we need to use all available 
"vessels" to reach Tehran, including the Russians, Indians, 
Chinese, and Turks, who all have an interest in a more 
forthcoming Iran.  He noted that Russia was "basically 
helpful" even if they are not on board with further sanctions 
and noted that he has been pushing the need for pressure with 
Moscow for some time.  He then argued that India was probably 
the most useful channel.  Ambassador Schulte noted that we 
needed to send the same message through all channels because 
Iran seeks to divide these states.  Iran was looking for 
gaps, and had approached Italy and Switzerland seeking to 
have them take a mediating role.   Iran would like this to 
appear to be a U.S.-Iran issue.  We sought to make clear that 
this was a problem the world had with Iran. 
 
¶11.  (c) Bildt noted that it was good that Javier Solana was 
taking the lead on behalf of the EU.  When the EU met with 
Iranians, it gave them a hard time on the nuclear issue, and 
emphasized the regional approach to Iran.  On a bilateral 
basis, Sweden had a good Ambassador in Iran, but it was 
becoming harder to get access to officials in Iran.  It was 
also unclear how relevant ministries such as the MFA were. 
Ministries, Bildt said, did not run Iran, adding that this 
was also the case in Sweden. 
 
Sanctions and Sweden 
-------------------- 
¶12.  (c) Ambassador Wood asked Bildt,s views of recently 
announced U.S. sanctions against Iran (refs A and B).  Bildt 
said that while he did not think the sanctions would have a 
large effect on Sweden,s dealings with Iran, there were 
concerns in the financial sector regarding the sanctions in 
Iranian banks, objections had been voiced to the 
extraterritoriality of the sanctions, and exporters did not 
like the sanctions.  Sweden was reviewing the potential 
effects, with Volvo trucks and Scania busses appearing to be 
those most affected. 
 
¶13.  (c) Sweden had, Bildt said, turned aside some years 
earlier, around 2002-3, requests from Iran to buy centrifuges 
from Sweden. 
 
India 
----- 
¶14.  (c) Schulte said the nuclear deal with India would be 
good for the U.S. and Europe, in terms building a new 
relationship with India, commerce, and reducing environmental 
risk.  Bildt said there was need for an agreement with India, 
but underscored the debate there about India,s relationship 
with the U.S.  He said that India would be a good place for 
Europe to work together under the CFSP framework. 
 
North Korea 
----------- 
¶15.  (c) Bildt said Ambassador Chris Hill was doing well on 
North Korea.   The weapons program had been stopped (unless, 
of course they have a uranium program hidden somewhere).  He 
noted that the Chinese have been acting "much more sensible" 
and that their new Foreign Minister sounds like he is from a 
think tank in Washington.  Schulte said it was not clear 
North Korea would disable its facilities, leading to the 
possibility of reconstituting its capabilities, and was also 
a problem of accountability.  Schulte agreed that China had 
played a helpful role. 
 
GNEP 
---- 
¶16.  (c) Schulte urged Bildt to have Sweden to become a 
partner of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.  Sweden had 
attended the September 16 ministerial as an observer.  Bildt 
 
did not respond directly to this request and averted the 
question by saying that Sweden "has a strange policy on 
nuclear energy." 
 
SIPRI Speech 
------------ 
¶17.  (c) Ambassador Schulte,s speech at SIPRI, "Setting the 
Standard for Iran,s Cooperation: Full Disclosure of Past and 
Present Nuclear Ambitions" was well-attended and generally 
well received.  During the Q and A following the speech, 
Iranian, Syrian and Egyptian Ambassadors to Sweden heavily 
criticized the U.S. stance on the Iranian nuclear program. 
The Iranian Ambassador said that Iran wanted a Middle East 
free from WMDs and quoted ElBaradei,s and Heinonen,s recent 
comments citing that there is "no evidence" of diversion from 
Iran,s "peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear weapons." He 
compared U.S. accusations of Iran,s nuclear intent to the 
flawed accusations against Iraq. The Syrian Ambassador echoed 
the sentiment that the comparison to Iraq was valid and 
argued that Israel posed the greatest nuclear threat in the 
Middle East. The Ambassador to Egypt agreed that the U.S. has 
a double standard in its stance on the Israeli and Iranian 
nuclear programs and noted that in contrast to the run-up to 
the Iraq conflict when the U.S. disregarded the 
recommendations of Hans Blix, the U.S. praises the IAEA today 
because it fits our foreign policy agenda. He said that the 
introduction to Schulte,s speech sounded like a declaration 
of war and attested to the pressure and difficulties of being 
a U.S. ally given U.S. foreign policy in the region. 
 
¶18.  (c) In Schulte,s response, he made clear that ElBaradei 
and Heinonen actually said there is no evidence that 
"declared" material had been diverted for military use and 
said that numerous questions about the nature and scope of 
Iran,s nuclear program remain.  He said the IAEA Board of 
Governors reported Iran to the UNSC in the past due to its 
uncooperative approach and noted that the sanctions had been 
imposed unanimously by the UNSC ,including a diverse group of 
nations.  Iranian explanations for its uranium enrichment 
goals for Natanz and a heavy water reactor at Arak were 
illogical and insufficient.  He concluded by categorizing his 
speech as a declaration of concern and saying that no one, 
with the possible exception of President Ahmadinejad, is 
interested in war at this time. 
 
¶19.  (u) UNVIE Vienna has cleared this cable. 
SILVERMAN