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DE RUEHC #9779 3272315
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P 232304Z NOV 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0000
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017 
TAGS: CR MARR PARM PL PREL RS
SUBJECT: U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION NONPAPER 
TRANSMITTAL 
 
REF: STATE 159179 
 
Classified By: Acting U/S John C. Rood 
 
¶1.  (U) Action requested paragraph 3. 
 
¶2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: The Non-Paper on the U.S. proposal to 
Russia of missile defense cooperation and transparency and 
confidence-building measures in paragraph 4 was delivered by 
Embassy Moscow to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
November 21 (Ref A).  In a telephone conversation between 
Acting U/S John Rood and Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Pojar 
on November 23, DFM Pojar requested a copy of the U.S. 
Non-paper, and U/S Rood agreed.  U/S Rood had previously 
discussed the U.S. proposals with Polish U/S Witold 
Waszczykowski on November 21. 
 
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Embassies Prague and Warsaw are 
requested to expeditiously deliver the U.S. Non-Paper 
contained in paragraph 4 to Czech MFA First Deputy Minister 
Tomas Pojar and Polish MFA Under Secretary of State Witold 
Waszczykowski. Embassies Warsaw and Prague are also requested 
to provide the list in paragraph 5 of possible transparency 
and confidence-building measures that Acting Under Secretary 
Rood will offer DFM Kislyak at their meeting on November 26 
in Washington, D.C. 
 
¶4. (C/REL Poland and the Czech Republic) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. 
NON-PAPER: 
 
U.S. Non-Paper 
November 20, 2007 
U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation 
 
The United States remains interested in pursuing missile 
defense cooperation with Russia.  Such cooperation could be 
an important element in a broader strategic partnership 
between the United States and Russia aimed at addressing the 
key security challenges facing both our nations in the 21st 
century.  This non-paper outlines and reaffirms our previous 
proposals, including the proposals discussed during the 
"2-plus-2" meeting in Moscow. 
 
On April 17, 2007, the United States provided a non-paper 
outlining a comprehensive proposal for bilateral cooperation 
across the full spectrum of missile defense activities at 
Strategic Security Dialogue talks in Moscow led by Acting 
Under Secretary of State John Rood and Deputy Foreign 
Minister Sergei Kislyak.  The next week, Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates also provided the U.S. proposal to Defense 
Minister Serdyukov in Moscow.  Our proposal is still on the 
table.  Such cooperation could include: 
 
--  Joint research, development, and testing of missile 
defense systems and components; 
--  Joint modeling and simulation of missile defense 
architectures; 
--  Sharing of early-warning data, including completion of 
the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow; 
--  Co-location of U.S. and Russian radars and the sharing of 
data from such sensors; and 
--  Development of the ability of U.S. and Russian forces to 
jointly operate missile defense systems in joint military 
operations, such as peacekeeping. 
 
During the U.S.-Russia experts meetings in September and 
October, the United States elaborated and expanded upon our 
April 17 offer for bilateral cooperation.  Specifically, we 
provided the following proposals: 
 
--  A joint sensor cooperation effort, which would include 
the Qabala radar in Azerbaijan, the Armavir radar in southern 
Russia, a U.S. X-band radar in the region, and perhaps other 
sensors to monitor the Iranian missile program.  Such 
cooperation would include the establishment of shared data 
centers in Moscow and at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.  This 
proposal would expand upon President Putin,s offer and could 
establish a foundation for deeper cooperation in the future. 
--  A joint cooperative regional missile defense 
architecture, which would include U.S., NATO, and Russian 
missile defense systems. 
 
The United States is interested in further exploring 
President Putin's June 7 proposal, as elaborated on July 2 at 
Kennebunkport, to jointly monitor the emerging ballistic 
missile threats from the Middle East using the Russian-leased 
early warning radar at Qabala, Azerbaijan, as well as the 
early warning radar currently under construction at Armavir 
in southern Russia.  The U.S. found the Russian-hosted visit 
to Qabala extremely useful in evaluating Qabala,s 
capabilities to monitor the threat from Iran and the Middle 
East generally.  We re-affirm our interest in further talks 
to explore the details of the Russian proposal and in 
conducting a similar visit to the Armavir radar to evaluate 
its potential contribution to a joint architecture.  The 
April 17 U.S. proposal, as well as the joint regional 
architecture proposal, raise the possibility of co-locating a 
forward-based X-band radar with a Russian early warning radar 
to provide supplementary data not capable of being collected 
by these two Russian radars. 
 
The U.S. delegation's presentation in Moscow on October 10 -- 
entitled "Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture" -- 
outlines steps for integrating U.S., NATO, and Russian 
missile defense interceptors, sensors, and for the first 
time, command and control functions.  It constitutes an 
integral part of our proposal for cooperation. 
 
The joint missile defense architectures that we are proposing 
are based on a "building block" approach for different levels 
of participation by Russia in a regional system that the U.S. 
and Russia would design together with Europe.  Our goal in 
making this proposal is to maximize the defense of NATO, the 
United States, and Russia against ballistic missiles from 
Iran or other dangerous regimes which may acquire such 
weapons in the future, and to do so in a real strategic 
partnership.  Through bilateral missile defense cooperation, 
Russian officials and experts would gain an in-depth 
understanding of the U.S. missile defense system, including 
its capabilities as well as its direction and pace. 
Furthermore, as the United States and Russia move forward in 
our efforts to develop a joint architecture, it would become 
clear that such capabilities could not possibly threaten 
Russian security. 
 
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures 
 
We have stressed that the greatest confidence-building 
measure we could offer Russia is a partnership with the 
United States and NATO Allies to develop and operate a joint 
regional missile defense architecture.  Such a strategic 
partnership would provide Russia with insight into U.S. 
missile defense efforts and influence over the future 
direction of our joint missile defense efforts. 
 
In addition, at the 12-13 October "2-plus-2" meeting, the 
U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense indicated the 
willingness of the United States to pursue measures 
associated with such cooperation to build confidence and 
promote transparency.  Thus, within the context of agreement 
to pursue a joint regional missile defense architecture, the 
United States would be willing to put in place new 
transparency and confidence-building measures to provide 
greater confidence to Russia that the limited U.S. missile 
defense capabilities deployed in Europe are not directed at 
Russia and will not undermine its security.  At the 
"2-plus-2" meeting, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense 
discussed measures such as: 
 
--  Offering assurances that U.S. European-based assets are 
not directed against Russia; 
--  Exchanging radar data and providing situational awareness 
about the status of U.S. -- and Russian -- missile defense 
capabilities and operations; and 
--  Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at 
missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia, 
and potential visits to missile defense sites in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, subject to the consent of, and 
consistent with the conditions established by, each of those 
nations.  In the event that host countries refuse such 
visits, we could work on some form of technical monitoring. 
 
Additionally, at the "2-plus-2" Ministerial in Moscow, the 
U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense discussed another 
possible confidence-building measure which would take into 
account developments in the Iranian longer-range ballistic 
missile threat in decision-making about bringing the 
interceptor site in Poland and the radar site in the Czech 
Republic to full operational/on-alert status.  We believe 
that this addresses key Russian concerns regarding our 
missile defense site and we would be happy to further discuss 
specifics during our next experts-level meeting.  At that 
time, the U.S. delegation would also welcome receiving 
Russia,s ideas or proposals including for transparency and 
confidence-building measures. 
 
END TEXT OF U.S. NON-PAPER. 
 
¶5. (C/REL Poland and the Czech Republic) BEGIN TEXT OF LIST: 
 
The United States is prepared to offer the following 
transparency and confidence-building measures, if the Russian 
Federation participates with us in a joint regional missile 
defense architecture: 
 
-- Regular exchanges of information on MD policy, program, 
technical, funding, threat assessments in a U.S.-Russia 
Transparency Working Group. 
-- U.S. Assurance not to construct in Europe more than 10 
silo-launchers for 10 long-range GBIs without prior 
notification and discussions. 
-- U.S. Assurance of no major modifications of interceptor 
silo-launchers without prior discussions. 
-- U.S. Assurance to take into account developments in 
Iranian missile programs in decisionmaking to bring the 
interceptor site in Poland and the radar in Czech Republic to 
full operational status. 
-- U.S. Assurance not to conduct interceptor flight-tests 
from silo-launchers in Poland. 
-- Sharing of "real-time" radar tracking data via centers in 
Moscow and Brussels. 
-- Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at 
missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia. 
-- Potential visits to MD facilities in Poland and/or the 
Czech Republic (subject to each Host Nation's agreement and 
conditions). Reciprocal visits to Russia by NATO personnel 
could also be conducted. 
-- U.S. to provide Russia with rapid alerts via the 
Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link ("Hotline") of 
any long-range ground-based missile defense interceptor 
launches. 
 
END TEXT OF LIST. 
RICE