VZCZCXRO6437
PP RUEHAG RUEHDT RUEHPB RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #6455/01 3182300
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 142240Z NOV 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 1018

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 156455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2022 
TAGS: PREL XB
SUBJECT: COASI: US-EU DISCUSSION ON EAST ASIA, OCTOBER 22, 
2007 
 
Classified By: Glyn T. Davies 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) European Union senior officials met with EAP 
counterparts for biannual consultations on Asia on October 
22, 2007, in Washington.  A/S Hill opened with an overview of 
the Six-Party Talks process, highlighting the roles of China, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea.  Both sides shared views on 
the current situations in Burma and Thailand, with the 
Europeans giving a preview of their upcoming November 23 
summit with ASEAN.  The EU will also have a November 28 
summit with China at which they hope to discuss human rights, 
anti-corruption, good governance, environmental protection 
and China,s rapid military build-up; but sense the PRC is 
most interested in EU affirmation of a &one-China Policy.8 
Discussions on relations with the Philippines and Indonesia 
and both nations, important position in combating terrorism 
rounded out the discussion on East Asia.  SCA Acting A/S 
James F. Moriarty joined for a broad discussion on Asian 
regional cooperation and integration, including the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
 
DPRK AND SIX-PARTY TALKS 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (S) A/S Christopher R. Hill provided an overview of recent 
progress in the Six-Party Talks.  The DPRK has committed to 
substantial disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and 
to providing a complete declaration of its nuclear programs, 
including clarification of the uranium enrichment issue by 
the end of the year, Hill explained.  In exchange, the Six 
Parties are providing the DPRK with energy assistance in the 
form of heavy fuel oil.  The United States has also made 
several bilateral commitments, Hill detailed, including with 
regard to the DPRK's designation as a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism and the application of the Trading with the Enemy 
Act with respect to the DPRK.  The terrorism list presents a 
sensitive issue for Japan, and the U.S. therefore will handle 
this issue very carefully.  The United States has also 
pressed the DPRK to make progress on this issue with the 
Japanese.  The United States is also seeking to improve 
atmospherics with the DPRK, including by increasing cultural 
exchanges, and Hill highlighted the possible New York 
Philharmonic performance in the DPRK. 
 
¶3. (S) Ambassador Pedro Moitinho de Almeida reported that the 
EU was pleased with progress in the Six-Party Talks, as well 
as developments with the inter-Korean summit.  Council 
Secretariat Asia Unit Head Tomasz Kozlowski explained that 
 
SIPDIS 
the EU's policy is to fully support the Six-Party process, 
but said the EU's relations with the DPRK is limited 
primarily to maintaining a communication channel.  The United 
States would welcome the EU's participation in energy or 
humanitarian aid to the DPRK, and would like to coordinate 
closely on any such assistance, Hill said.  Moitinho reported 
that the EU would discuss options for supporting the 
Six-Party process at a meeting in November, including 
possible humanitarian aid or a Troika visit to Pyongyang. 
Kozlowski said the EU has given a small amount of 
humanitarian aid to the DPRK, but is prepared to provide a 
significant amount upon resolution of the nuclear issue.  The 
EU wants to play a more active role, Kozlowski explained, and 
is working to determine how best to do that.  EU Commission 
Acting Director Geoffrey Barrett elaborated that the EU has 
contributed $350 million in humanitarian assistance to the 
DPRK over the last ten years.  The EU is currently working to 
develop a food security strategy to help the DPRK become more 
self-sufficient, Barrett said, and the EU will soon hold its 
third economic workshop in Pyongyang. 
 
¶4. (S) Hill explained that the United States is prepared to 
begin a peace process on the Korean Peninsula among the 
directly related parties following substantial disablement 
and the DPRK's provision of a complete declaration, likely 
early next year.  But, Hill emphasized, the United States 
cannot conclude peace treaty negotiations until the DPRK has 
denuclearized.  The United States also hopes to create a 
regional security architecture in Northeast Asia, which would 
begin with the Six Parties.  Moitinho reported that the 
Russians had provided a read-out of the NEAPSM process at the 
recent Troika meeting with them.  As a regional organization, 
Moitinho said the EU was encouraged by discussions of a 
possible Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, and 
 
STATE 00156455  002 OF 006 
 
 
would be prepared to discuss suitable models at the 
appropriate time.  Hill emphasized the important role of the 
Chinese in the Six-Party process, and the value of 
encouraging the Chinese to be more engaged in multilateral 
diplomacy.   Hill noted concerns about China's treatment of 
North Korean refugees, and requested that the EU work with 
the United States to press the Chinese and to help find 
durable solutions for this refugee population.  Moitinho said 
that the EU could approach the Chinese on this issue. 
 
JAPAN 
----- 
 
¶5. (C) Hill observed that the new Japanese government is very 
pragmatic, and is interested in improving relations with its 
neighbors.  The United States wants to help the Fukuda 
government succeed in building more stable relationships in 
Northeast Asia.  Moitinho agreed with Hill's assessment, and 
said the EU has encouraged Japan to work toward progress on 
the abduction issue.  Japan Desk Director Jim Zumwalt said 
the United States currently faces two major issues with 
Japan: coordinating with Japan in the Six-Party process and 
maintaining Japanese support for Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Zumwalt explained Japan's important role in supplying tankers 
to refuel ships in the Indian Ocean, but said legislation 
reauthorizing Japan's support may not be passed until 
sometime next year.  Zumwalt requested EU countries' 
assistance in pressing Japan, as this is a multilateral 
issue.  Moitinho said that the EU Troika is meeting with 
Japan next week, and while this was an issue between EU 
member states and Japan, the Troika may also be able to make 
this point. (Note: An EU colleague subsequently requested 
talking points on the refueling issue, which EAP/J provided. 
End Note.) 
 
ROK 
--- 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to upcoming elections in the ROK, Hill said 
the United States wanted to be very careful to stay out of 
South Korean politics.  De Almedia hoped that the winner of 
the election would continue the current path of working 
closely with the Six-Party process. 
 
¶7. (C) On the KORUS FTA, A/S Hill said the U.S. might have a 
difficult time getting the agreement through Congress, but is 
committed to getting it approved.  Noting that the EU is 
currently negotiating an FTA with the ROK, Hill surmised that 
it is useful to hold countries to standards that do not come 
naturally to them.  Barrett said that the EU was still 
considering whether to include Kaesong in the EU-ROK FTA. 
Hill stressed that Kaesong was not included in the KORUS FTA. 
 
Burma 
----- 
 
¶8.  (C) Moitinho emphasized the EU's strong support for UN 
Special Envoy Gambari and his mission, and more broadly for a 
multilateral approach to addressing Burma.  He said the EU is 
looking to Gambari to make concrete proposals for the way 
forward, but is skeptical that the junta can be persuaded to 
make concessions absent more pressure from Burma's neighbors. 
 The EU is considering appointing a Special Envoy for Burma 
to work full time on coordinating member states' internal 
positions and as an informal partner for Gambari.  Moitinho 
stressed that the role of the Envoy would be limited, he 
would not travel to Burma, and there would be no overlap with 
Gambari's duties. 
 
¶9. (C) Moitinho and Kozlowski conveyed that the EU is 
undertaking a second round of demarches to China, India, and 
ASEAN governments.  Moitinho said the EU was gratified by 
Beijing's statement that Gambari's trip to Burma be more than 
a courtesy visit and by some Indian criticism of the regime. 
However, he noted that the EU expects more from India in 
particular given how often and loudly India touts its title 
as the world's largest democracy, and the EU is pressing 
India to be more forward-leaning.  The EU was pleased with 
ASEAN's September 27 statement on Burma, and in response to 
Southeast Asia DAS Scot Marciel,s query about participation 
of the Burmese (and at what level) at the upcoming EU-ASEAN 
summit to mark 30 years of ASEAN-EU relations, said it was 
using preparatory meetings October 23 with the Singaporeans 
for the November 22 summit to stress how important ASEAN's 
action on Burma is to the organization's credibility.  The EU 
does not want to hold its relations with ASEAN hostage to the 
Burma issue, but it is making clear to its ASEAN partners 
that it cannot accept business as usual.  Moitinho suggested 
that a small international contact group on Burma would be 
preferable to one of 20 or more countries, and the EU would 
support such a group if Gambari proposed one.  Moitinho also 
 
STATE 00156455  003 OF 006 
 
 
noted that the EU believed some engagement with the Burmese 
could be useful, and along these lines said that the troika 
is likely to meet with Burmese officials on the margins of 
the next ASEAN Regional Forum ARF as well as the upcoming 
ASEM meeting in Beijing. 
 
¶10.  (C) Moitinho highlighted new EU "smart sanctions" 
(targeted at the regime vice the broader economy): a ban on 
imports from Burma's mining and logging sectors, and a ban on 
exports to Burma of machinery for and investment in those 
same industries.  Visa bans for junta leaders and their 
families also remain in effect.  However, Moitinho opined 
that EU sanctions are unlikely to be effective and serve 
mostly to show political support for the democracy cause. 
Burma-EU trade amounts to only 260 million euros per year and 
most of that is comprised of textile imports, which will be 
unaffected by sanctions.  DAS Marciel raised pressure from 
NGOs for more financial sanctions on the regime by the U.S. 
and EU that would freeze assets and accounts of regime 
leaders and block dollar and euro denominated transactions. 
Marciel suggested that the U.S. and EU should have technical 
level talks to explore such action; the EU was amenable. 
 
¶11.  (C) DAS Marciel emphasized the importance of using 
public diplomacy to sustain public attention to the situation 
in Burma, especially in countries in the region.  He affirmed 
strong U.S. support for Gambari and agreed with Moitinho 
about the importance of pressing ASEAN governments to address 
Burma with ASEAN's credibility in mind.  DAS Marciel also 
flagged the importance of a unified message from the 
international community pressing for genuine dialogue between 
the regime and the opposition. 
 
Thailand 
-------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The EU viewed the August constitutional referendum 
as a positive step toward the restoration of elected 
government in Thailand, but is concerned about national 
elections in the wake of the Thai Government's rejection of 
the EU's proposal for a formal, memorandum of 
understanding-based EU election monitoring mission. 
Kozlowksy said the 2006 coup cannot be compared with previous 
ones, since the continued vitality of political activity in 
northern Thailand has prevented "Bangkok elites" from 
restoring their political dominance since the coup.  Barrett 
added that European investors are concerned about the state 
of Thailand's economy.  Moitinho conveyed that EU delegations 
to the region on Burma business would be exempt from 
restrictions on contact with Thai interim government leaders, 
and that the EU continues to press the Thais to lift martial 
law before the elections. 
 
¶13.  (C) Barrett asked if the U.S. had plans to send election 
monitors to Thailand.  DAS Marciel responded that there may 
be congressional delegations and that our embassy will 
certainly observe the polls, but said that the Administration 
is more focused on providing support for Thai monitoring 
efforts.  Barrett also asked for our take on the southern 
insurgency.  DAS Marciel noted that increased security sweeps 
have not yet made a lasting difference in the level of 
violence, and emphasized that while the U.S. pays close 
attention to the insurgency, we avoid actual involvement for 
fear of inflaming the conflict. 
 
China 
----- 
 
¶14.  (C) The EU representatives said they were encouraged by 
China,s increased engagement in international affairs, but 
they added that the EU continued to feel the need to raise 
topics such as human rights, anti-corruption, good 
governance, environmental protection and China,s rapid 
military build-up as part of the bilateral agenda.  As the EU 
and PRC worked out respective policy papers containing goals 
for bilateral dialogue, the PRC seemed most interested in 
eliciting a statement from the EU that Europe accepted the 
PRC,s &one China principle.8 
 
¶15.  (C) The EU representatives previewed the November 28 
EU-China summit.  They noted China,s recent positive 
contributions in the international sphere, including as 
facilitator of the Six-Party Talks.  They described an effort 
to establish dialogue on Africa, related to development, aid 
and debt forgiveness.  Davies asked how the EU perceived 
China,s involvement in the matter of Iran,s nuclear 
program; the EU reps said they believed that Beijing had not 
acted sufficiently in concert with the rest of the 
international community in expressing concern over Tehran,s 
ambitions.  Davies asked whether the EU planned to end its 
arms embargo on China.  The EU reps explained that the 
 
STATE 00156455  004 OF 006 
 
 
membership had not reached a consensus, and that China had 
ceased to demand that the embargo be lifted, in part because 
Beijing seemed to have determined that pressure was futile, 
and in part because its current focus was on convincing the 
EU to issue a joint statement with the PRC on the one China 
principle. 
 
¶16.  (C) The EU representatives described plans to open an EU 
Centre focused on commerce in Hong Kong, which they said had 
met with resistance from Beijing, whose officials seemed to 
feel that it called into question China,s &one country, two 
systems8 approach to Hong Kong. 
 
¶17.  (C) On the recently-adjourned Communist Party Congress, 
the representatives said that they thought President Hu,s 
moderate tone on Taiwan was a positive development, but they 
made clear that they recognized that this was by design, with 
audiences in the international community and the Taiwan 
electorate, as well as presidential candidates, in mind. 
They said they believed there were too many near-term 
obstacles and distractions, including the Taiwan elections 
and Beijing Olympics, for the prospect of China-Taiwan 
dialogue to be realistic for the time being. 
 
Taiwan 
------ 
 
¶18.  (C) On cross-Strait issues, the EU representatives said 
they wanted to coordinate policy with the U.S.  They informed 
Davies that they intended to release a statement expressing 
concern about the ruling DPP,s referendum on UN membership 
for &Taiwan.8  They said they planned to issue the 
statement on October 24, the day President Chen had declared 
&Taiwan-UN Day.8  They noted that the PRC had been annoyed 
at the EU,s slowness to voice concern over the DPP 
referendum.  They described private demarches to both Taiwan 
and the PRC, in the former case to warn against provocations 
and in the latter to ask that Beijing temper its reactions to 
domestic politicking on Taiwan in an election year. 
 
¶19.  (C) With regard to Taiwan,s participation in 
international organizations, the representatives said they 
wanted to work with the U.S. to find ways to standardize 
Taiwan,s involvement in organizations not requiring 
statehood.  They said that they would probably want to wait 
to launch an initiative until after Taiwan elections, so as 
not to appear to reward Chen Shui-bian.  They noted that they 
were especially concerned about Taiwan,s lack of access to 
the WHO and international health-related processes. 
 
Philippines 
----------- 
 
¶20. (C) DAS Marciel observed that the U.S. saw the 
Philippines as a long-time ally and friend, which was making 
a tremendous effort in its battle with terrorism.  While the 
Philippines was enjoying an economic upturn, it struggles 
with serious problems in governance, infrastructure, and 
economic reform.  The U.S. also has particular concerns 
regarding the issue of extra-judicial killings (EJKs).  DAS 
Marciel said it was important to continue to push the 
Philippines government to make progress on this issue, as 
well as to offer it technical assistance in addressing it. 
Amb. Moitinho said the EU had the same assessment, and that 
an EU mission to the Philippines had just presented its 
report to the member states.  RELEX Head of Unit Kozlowski 
said the EU was not going to engage in investigating EJKs, 
but would offer forensic assistance to the Philippines 
government. 
 
Indonesia 
---------- 
 
¶21.  (C) Amb. Moitinho noted that the EU was pleased with 
developments in Indonesia and wanted to be fully supportive 
of efforts to improve good governance and rule of law.  The 
EU, he said, wanted Indonesia to be a moderating influence on 
other Muslim majority countries and the regional Muslim 
movement.  Reporting that the EU was developing a strong 
relationship with Indonesia, Moitinho said that there would 
be a Political Director,s meeting in Jakarta on November 8, 
and that the EU and Indonesia were close to entering into a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).  The PCA, the 
EU,s first such agreement in the region, would include 
clauses on nonproliferation, human rights, and other key 
issues.  Relex H Acting Director Geoffrey Barrett added that 
Indonesia had threatened to scrap the Agreement over a recent 
EU recommendation to restrict Indonesian air travel due to 
safety concerns. 
 
¶22.  (C) DAS Marciel agreed that Indonesia has developed in a 
 
STATE 00156455  005 OF 006 
 
 
positive way and has made extraordinary gains in civil 
society and democracy; however, the country still faces 
tremendous governance challenges.  DAS Marciel said that 
although the USG was following closely the role of Islam in 
Indonesian society, it was reluctant to become involved in 
domestic debates over religion.  Indonesia continued to make 
progress in fighting terrorists, noting that the USG was 
providing police training and other support. 
 
Regional Architecture 
--------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) At lunch hosted by A/S Hill and SCA Acting A/S James 
¶F. Moriarty, both sides offered their views on the various 
regional organizations in East and South Asia.  A/S Hill 
observed that the U.S. supports APEC as a forum for 
discussion, but is aware of its limitations.  He noted our 
support for ASEAN, and said that Burma had given the 
organization a real issue to address.  In addition to our 
support for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), we are also 
&keeping an open mind8 with regard to the East Asia Summit 
(EAS).  EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall said that the U.S. sees a 
difference between pan-Asian integration and Transpacific 
linkages.  In Washington, APEC is considered the premier 
Transpacific organization, and the President participates in 
the annual summits.  However, APEC is not necessarily seen in 
Asian capitals as a vehicle for regional integration. The EAS 
lacks a clear purpose, and we are continuing to study it from 
the outside.  The U.S. goal is to see both become more 
action-oriented.  There is presently no consensus within the 
USG concerning possible U.S. accession to the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC); a pre-requisite to our joining the EAS. 
 
¶24. (C) Concerning integration of South and Central Asia, SCA 
AA/S Moriarty said said Afghanistan could serve as a bridge 
between the two regions.  India is moving towards a global 
presence, though the main obstacle it encounters is the pace 
of its internal reforms.  SCA/PDAS Mann said that Central 
Asia,s dependence on Russian infrastructure for its energy 
exports allowed Moscow to assert control over the region. The 
U.S. supported alternate pipelines as a means to bolster the 
sovereignty and options of Central Asian countries. 
 
¶25. (C) Amb. Moitinho suggested that perhaps the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization could evolve into something useful. 
RELEX Head of Unit Kozlowski said ASEAN was in transition, 
and that the Burma issue will either strengthen it or do it 
grave harm.  Concerning the EAS versus the ASEAN plus three 
(China, Japan, Korea) mechanism, he said it is not clear how 
things will proceed, and that he believes that the Asians are 
waiting for the U.S. to make a move.  Kozlowski noted that 
The EU-ASEAN meeting in Nuremburg during the German EU 
Presidency earlier this year was the first time that there 
was a real political discussion on all issues between the two 
sides. 
 
¶26. (C) With regard to using a possible North East Asia 
sub-security architecture as the basis for an expanded 
regional organization, A/S Hill said the U.S. was only 
looking at the countries within the region owing to the lack 
of other institutions.  He thought that development of a 
North East Asian political and security identity would take 
considerable time.  As for wider regional integration with 
ASEAN &in the driver,s seat,8 Burma will reveal ASEAN,s 
limitations.  RELEX Director Barrett said that the ARF 
Friends of the Chair might be useful, and that it was 
essential that ARF discussed proliferation issues. 
 
¶27. (C) On South Asia RELEX Head of Unit Helen Campbell said 
the EU was working to build customs capacity through the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
SCA/RSA Director Spilsbury said the U.S. viewed trade 
facilitation as a critical component of the regional economic 
integration initiative.  Campbell also noted that the EU was 
interested in coordinating efforts with the U.S. in the lead 
up to the next Regional Economic Cooperation Conference 
(RECC) on Afghanistan.  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
continues to evolve; notably, the organization,s Bishkek 
summit did not repeat the Astana declaration, which called 
for a timetable for the withdrawal of coalition forces from 
the region.  EAP/RSP Director Hall said that the U.S. was 
encouraged that a human rights body would be established by 
the ASEAN Charter, although the crucial terms of reference 
for it have yet to be settled.  The ARF Friends of the Chair 
might be useful on Burma, but it might also prove too 
difficult. 
 
¶28. (U) European Participants 
PRESIDENCY (Portugal) 
Ambassador Pedro Moitinho de Almeida, Special Representative 
of the Presidency for the Political Dialogue with Third 
 
STATE 00156455  006 OF 006 
 
 
Countries 
Mr. Luis Brito e Camara, Head of Division, Asia and Oceania 
Directorate 
Mr. Francisco Saraiva, First Secretary (Asia, Human Rights) 
and Head of the Consular Section, Embassy of Portugal in 
Washington 
 
INCOMING PRESIDENCY (Slovenia) 
Ms. Miriam Teresa Mozgan, Minister Counselor, Deputy Chief of 
Mission, Embassy of Slovenia in Washington 
Mr. Tadej Furlan, Second Secretary, Embassy of Slovenia in 
Washington 
 
COUNCIL SECRETARIAT 
Mr. Tomasz Kozlowski, Head of Unit of the Asia Task Force in 
the General Secretariat,s Policy Unit 
Mr. Tim Eestermans, Asia Task Force 
 
COMMISSION 
Mr. Geoffrey Barrett, Acting Director Relex H 
Ms. Helen Campbell, Head of Unit, Relex H4 (Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives) 
Mr. Franz Jessen, Head of Unit, Relex H2 (China, Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, Mongolia) 
Dr. Laszlo Deak   Political Counselor in the Delegation of 
the EU Commission to the USA 
RICE