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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000716 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/9/2017 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PK
SUBJECT: NWFP: MILITANTS EXPANDING THEIR HOLD ON SWAT 
 
REF: PESHAWAR 705 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, Peshawar, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Swat's militants are expanding their hold, moving north 
and east in the district.  Security forces and local residents 
have been demoralized by militant gains.  Local officials 
acknowledge the task of re-establishing government control of 
the district is becoming increasingly difficult.  Whether that 
recognition is impacting the pace of security operations is 
unclear.  End Summary. 
 
Militants March North -- and Possibly East 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) NWFP Home Secretary Badshah Gul Wazir (strictly protect) 
confirmed to PO on November 8 that Swat militants had reached 
Madyan (approximately 45 km north of the district capital Saidu 
Sharif).  The militants, according to the Home Secretary, were 
also moving further into Swat's northern Kalam valley.  Mingora, 
just outside of Saidu Sharif, he said, was also at risk.  Mullah 
Faizullah announced on November 6 the appointment of "governors" 
over Swat sub-districts.  (Note: Government operations appear to 
have paused.  There have been no reports of any counter measures 
to check the movement of the militants.  Post understands that 
security forces are being grouped in larger numbers in fortified 
posts in southern parts of the district.  End Note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Echoing the concerns of officials in neighboring Mansehra 
district (Ref A), Wazir commented that areas to the east of Swat 
were vulnerable to the militants.  A northern-based contact told 
post separately on November 8 that militants had moved into Al 
Purai approximately 20 km west of the district border with 
Mansehra.  On November 9, Consulate local staff observed a 
pickup truck of armed men in Thakot (Battagram district near the 
Swat border).  The men were overheard in the bazaar claiming to 
be "taliban." 
 
¶4. (C) The government is considering, the Home Secretary said, a 
cordon operation with more robust air support (timeline NFI) to 
counter further militant movement.  (Comment: Given the 
expanding territory that must now be covered and Pakistani 
military capabilities, post is skeptical that a cordon operation 
will act as an effective check on the militants.  End Comment.) 
 
Police Demoralized and Retreating 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Home Secretary acknowledged that police were pulling 
out of their stations in northern Swat and scattering to avoid 
capture by militants.  Most of the police stations are manned, 
he explained, with only 15-20 personnel.  Militants, he 
continued, are well-armed and coming in numbers (NFI) capable of 
overrunning the stations.  The militants' capture and release of 
48 security personnel on November 2 (Ref A), the Home Secretary 
remarked, had demoralized the police.  The 48 had come under 
siege, Wazir said, and efforts to re-supply or rescue them with 
air support had failed.  Police still operating in northern 
Swat, he added, were determined to avoid getting caught in the 
same situation. 
 
Eroding Public Confidence 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The instances of police capture and retreat, the Home 
Secretary commented, were eroding public confidence in the 
 
SIPDIS 
government among Swatis who might otherwise have been prepared 
to take on the militants.  Local residents, he said, had 
observed the inability of the military to assist the 48 
personnel captured by the militants.  The only encouraging sign, 
he noted, was the resistance of a few elders in the Kalam area 
who have told militants to leave because their "assistance" was 
not needed. 
 
More Reports of Outside Help 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Wazir attributed the open challenge by Tehrik-i Nafaz-i 
 
Shariat-i Mohammad-i (TNSM - Movement for the Enforcement of the 
Prophet Mohammad's Sharia Law) in mid-October (Ref B) to an 
influx of "foreigners and outsiders" whose numbers had 
strengthened and emboldened TNSM's Mullah Faizullah.  A Peshawar 
contact with ties to the Waziristan area told PO on November 6 
of reports that militants had been moving out of North 
Waziristan and heading toward Swat in early/mid-October.  (Note: 
 In early/mid-October, the Pakistani army conducted a series of 
operations in North Waziristan's Mir Ali area.  End Note.) 
 
Militant Training Camp in Swat? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) In separate conversations in early November, local 
contacts told post of a training camp in a remote valley in 
southwestern Swat.  The camp is reportedly run by the "Pewchar 
Group."  One contact based in the Swat area commented, "everyone 
knows about this camp."  (Note:  Some local authorities believe 
that the Pewchar Group was responsible for the November 2006 
attack on the Dargai military training facility near Swat. 
Little is known about this group or its possible ties to TNSM or 
other militant groups operating in the vicinity.  End Note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (S) Peshawar observers are expressing deep alarm over the 
militants' increasing hold in Swat and possible ambitions 
elsewhere in the northern areas of the province.  Government 
officials admit that the longer the present situation in Swat 
continues, the harder it will be to dislodge the militants. 
Whether that recognition is impacting the planning and pace of a 
government response is unclear. 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was cleared with Embassy Islamabad. 
TRACY