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DE RUEHFR #4439/01 3111508
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P 071508Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1043
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004439 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO AZ FR SR GG RU BM IN IR
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS DISCUSSES KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, GEORGIA, 
BURMA, INDIA AND IRAN WITH FRENCH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR 
ARAUD 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  In an October 30 working dinner with MFA 
Political Director Gerard Araud, U/S Burns urged the European 
community to respect the "firm" deadline of December 10 to 
conclude final status negotiations on Kosovo and pushed for a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia.  Araud hoped that 
any UDI could be delayed for just a few weeks (until 
mid-January) so as not to foreclose the possibility of an 
OSCE mission mandate extension, and to give the Europeans 
more time to prepare their response.  The GOF opposes MAP for 
Georgia, but supports creating a special program with 
incentives for Georgia that would not refer to "membership." 
That said, Sarkozy would have to eventually pronounce on the 
Georgia MAP question.  Burns and Araud also discussed 
possible new members in connection with NATO's April 2008 
Bucharest summit, with Araud articulating GOF understanding 
of Greece's position on Macedonian membership.  On 
Afghanistan, both agreed on the benefits of giving an 
appropriately expanded mandate to the UN High Representative 
to better integrate civilian and military efforts.  The 
French agreed to provide a draft job description.  Araud 
countered U/S Burns' call for greater West European 
engagement in southern and eastern Afghanistan by citing the 
purported need need for an overall strategy, including 
conditions for eventual withdrawal of foreign forces.  U/S 
Burns expressed appreciation for FM Kouchner's recent visit 
to Asia and helpful statements on Burma.  Araud said Kouchner 
would want to discuss Burma with the Secretary, possibly in 
Istanbul.  On India, the French acknowledged that a U.S. 
agreement with India on nuclear cooperation was needed for 
them to move forward on their own agreement, and Araud 
suggested unblocking the issue for the GOI by having a 
joint-signing ceremony of "Agreements of Cooperation" and 
"Letters of Intent" with France, Russia and the U.S.  In a 
brief one-on-one discussion of Iran, Araud expressed 
pessimism about an Iranian willingness to negotiate or 
suspend enrichment, and was negative about El-Baradei.  He 
said he expected the EU would wait until Dec. 19 before 
coming up with fairly weak sanctions -- and possibly none at 
all if a new UNSCR is not adopted.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
WHEN TO RECOGNIZE AN INDEPENDENT KOSOVO? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (C) Araud began the discussion by noting that the GOF 
believed a negotiated settlement on Kosovo's final status was 
very unlikely; it was therefore important to plan how to 
manage a probable UDI and its aftermath.  The question was 
not "whether" to recognize Kosovo, but "when."  U/S Burns 
emphasized that for the USG the December 10 deadline was 
firm.  The U.S. would not agree to any further extensions of 
negotiations.  Araud supported this position, but stated the 
French preference that any UDI and subsequent recognition of 
Kosovo not take place until mid-January.  This would assist 
the effort to obtain a renewal of the OSCE mission mandate by 
December 31 (for which there was a greater chance of 
obtaining Russian approval if there was no prior UDI).  If 
the Russians refuse to renew the OSCE mission, the burden 
will fall upon the EU to fill the gap and further delay the 
implementation of the ESDP mission they are planning. 
Furthermore, the December 13-14 European Council could better 
prepare a text for a declaration by the 27 members (a neutral 
text similar to that done for Montenegro) if there was no 
complicating UDI immediately after the December 10 deadline. 
 
¶3.  (C)  U/S Burns expressed concern that a delay of UDI and 
a recognition of Kosovo could lead to public unrest or 
encourage those who favor further negotiations.  He noted 
that Kosovo's unresolved status is a problem for the U.S. as 
well as Europe.  Araud acknowledged these concerns, but said 
that a delay until mid-January would help the Europeans to 
achieve a "critical mass" of 18-20 countries that would be 
able to recognize Kosovo's independence immediately; the 
"delay" they are requesting is one of only a few weeks (until 
January 10-15).  He added that Thaci was promising other 
European leaders that, if elected as Kosovo's next Prime 
Minister, he could agree to delay a UDI until mid-March, 
something many Europeans wanted to hear.  Araud raised 
concerns about the possible Serbian reaction to a UDI, noting 
that Kostunica has been less and less willing to help reach a 
solution (and in fact was linking Kosovo to the current 
situation in the Republika Serbska).  A strong Serbian 
backlash could lead to the expulsion of ambassadors of 
countries that recognize Kosovo initially and a stirring up 
of conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo.  Therefore, it is 
imperative to work out the chronology of a UDI and 
recognition as soon as possible, and in the view of the GOF, 
 
PARIS 00004439  002 OF 004 
 
 
a "minimum decent interval" between the end of the 
negotiating process and the UDI and recognition of Kosovo is 
their preferred solution.  Araud also said the international 
community sould send a signal to Serbia about what its future 
wil be after Kosovo is resolved.  Carla Del Ponte's recent 
statements did not help.  U/S Burns noted how important it 
was for Serbia to apprehend and bring to justice Mladic and 
Karadzic. 
 
¶4.  (C) On Bosnia, U/S Burns informed Araud about the recent 
A/S Fried telephone call to support the High Representative. 
The USG believes that long-term, Bosnia will have to engage 
in constitutional reform to normalize their institutions to 
succeed in joining NATO or the EU.  Araud agreed and said 
that it was important to send positive signals on a European 
future to both the Bosnians and Serbs, although their 
current, revanchist approach was more shaped by the past than 
constructively focused on their European future. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DIVERGENCE ON GEORGIA MAP 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  (C) U/S Burns stated to Araud that the USG strongly 
supports giving Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at 
Bucharest in April.  However, for tactical reasons, he said 
that a firm decision on this issue was not needed until after 
Kosovo was decided this December.  That said, every country 
has a right to choose its alliances and if NATO turns down 
Georgia's application, it would be tantamount to allowing 
Russia to make membership decisions for the alliance.  Araud 
agreed that this is a decision for NATO to make, but the 
Russian obsession about encirclement is real, something we 
had to contend with.   There is also a real danger of a harsh 
Russian reaction, possibly even military action against 
Georgia, putting the credibility of the alliance at stake. 
Araud also criticized "inflammatory" Georgian actions that 
have led to increased tensions with Russia.  The GOF is 
prepared to offer a "significant package" to Georgia, but 
does not want it to be called the MAP (or have any word 
associated with "membership").  He suggested simply calling 
it the "Georgia Action Plan" and said the alliance could 
include a declaration of concern about Georgian security. 
This is the plan the French and Germans are currently working 
on. 
 
¶6.  (C) U/S Burns quickly noted that Russia had been given 16 
years to integrate more fully into the Alliance, but had 
chosen partnership instead, and had since done nothing in the 
NATO-Russia Council and had pulled out of most military 
missions.  In his view, the Russians wouldn't dare to react 
militarily against Georgia, knowing how damaging such a move 
would be to its standing.  A "Georgia Action Plan" (GAP) 
would not work; NATO needs to make a decision on its own 
without Russian interference. Philippe Carre, Director of 
Strategic Affairs at the MFA, noted that the GOF recognizes 
Georgia's aspirations and takes them seriously.  The French 
consider MAP to be a promise of full membership and the 
alliance should not accept a country as a member just to 
spite Russia.  The French have concerns about Saakashvili's 
government and corruption in Georgian politics.  U/S Burns 
responded that Saakashvili had matured in office and that 
NATO had never used corruption as a bar for membership for 
other countries.  Closing the discussion, Araud noted that 
the French position was not cast in stone:  MAP for Georgia 
would eventually go to Sarkozy for a decision, a decision 
that could not be pre-judged. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND NEW MEMBERS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Araud stated that the GOF supports Croatia becoming a 
full member of NATO at the April 2-4 summit in Bucharest. 
The French do not consider Albania and Macedonia ready to 
join the alliance yet, but if the USG insists on including 
them as well, the GOF will not resist.  U/S Burns said that 
the USG didn't have a firm position yet.  Ambassador Nuland 
would be visiting all three candidate countries November 7-9 
and NATO could debate membership in January/February 2008. 
He added that the greatest difficulty was being posed by 
Greece, which is threatening to veto membership for Macedonia 
over the name dispute.  While we understand the domestic 
Greek politics driving that position, we do not agree that 
Greece should risk of destabilizing Macedonia over the name 
issue.  The United Nations Matthew Nimitz is continuing 
efforts on this issue.  Araud agreed that this was a real 
problem, but said that the GOF was unwilling to put any 
pressure on Greece on this issue; Greece is also a member of 
 
PARIS 00004439  003 OF 004 
 
 
the EU and France will align itself in solidarity with Athens. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
FUTURE STRATEGY AND CAPABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.  (C) U/S Burns stated that the international structure to 
provide assistance in Afghanistan was not working well.  The 
USG supports the appointment of a more senior civilian 
coordinator with an appropriately expanded mandate to focus 
on economics, narcotics control, rebuilding of infrastructure 
and uniting civilian and military efforts.  He hoped that 
France and the UK could agree on a job description and person 
to fill it in in December.  Araud agreed and suggested 
nominating Paddy Ashdown as someone with requisite civilian 
and military experience.  He noted that the GOF does not/not 
think the representative should also wear an EU hat. 
 
¶9.  (C) Burns then raised the problems stemming from lack of 
military commitments in the east and south of Afghanistan. 
Araud responded that the GOF recently decided to send a new 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) to work with 
the Dutch in Uruzgan.  However, President Sarkozy had not 
made any military decisions for 2009 and beyond, and noted 
that the GOF is currently undertaking a comprehensive defense 
and security review.  He said the French are against staying 
"indefinitely" in Afghanistan and the Europeans want a 
clearer vision of the benchmarks that will trigger a drawdown 
of NATO forces.  The problem for many in Europe is public 
opinion; Europeans don't understand why they should have 
forces in Afghanistan; the difficulty is compounded in 
countries where parliament has a say in troop deployments. 
U/S Burns responded that in our view, the U.S. and NATO 
forces will be in Afghanistan for the long-term. 
Unfortunately, the lack of burdensharing (particularly by 
west European countries) is causing resentment in those 
countries whose troops are shouldering the greatest burden. 
Until the Afghan government has the capacity to defend 
itself, it is in the interest of all NATO countries to make a 
sufficiently strong military effort to support it.  That was 
the decision agreed to in 2003 and the USG is prepared to 
discuss future strategy in Afghanistan in greater detail if 
that will assist the French to move troops into the east and 
south in greater numbers.  A strategy discussion of the kind 
the French were calling for could be linked to the 
appointment and mandate enlargement of the new UN rep. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
SUPPORTING BURMA 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) U/S Burns expressed appreciation for FM Kouchner's 
statements on Burma and his presence in the region.  He added 
that it was important for UN Special Representative Gambari 
to return to Burma soon, and that the UN needed to be more 
forceful about whom he would see (and not leave these 
decisions to the Burmese generals).  Araud agreed and added 
that the last EU GAERC meeting had agreed on no new 
investment in the country.  He clarified that Kouchner's 
recent call for "financial incentives" for Burma referred to 
a proposed foundation to support the opposition in Burma and 
not/not financial incentives for the Burmese generals.  Araud 
noted that FM Kouchner will want to discuss Burma at the next 
opportunity, possibly at Istanbul. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
INDIA: NUCLEAR COOPERATION AT STANDSTILL 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Araud informed U/S Burns that a proposed 
French-Indian agreement on nuclear cooperation was on hold 
until the U.S. agreement could be signed by India and 
ratified by the U.S. Congress.  The GOF would like to quickly 
sign an "Agreement of Cooperation," which alone would not 
have commercial implications.  Burns expressed hope that the 
Indian government would find a way to move forward as soon as 
possible. The USG hopes that India would move forward on 
agreements with the U.S. before moving forward with 
agreements with third countries if they remained blocked on 
an agreement with the U.S.  Araud, saying he fully 
understood, suggested that perhaps the Indian government 
could consider signing cooperation agreements and letters of 
intent at the same time with the three interested countries 
(U.S., Russia and France).  This might dilute domestic 
opposition and allow the process to move forward.  He added 
that the GOF would like to see progress on this issue before 
President Sarkozy's visit to India at the end of January, 
 
-------------------- 
 
PARIS 00004439  004 OF 004 
 
 
IRAN:  GOF PESSIMISM 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) In a brief one-on-one discussion of Iran, Araud 
expressed pessimism about an Iranian willingness to negotiate 
or suspend enrichment, and was negative about El-Baradei.  He 
said he expected the EU would wait until Dec. 19 before 
coming up with fairly weak sanctions -- and possibly none at 
all if a new UNSCR is not adopted. 
 
¶13.  (U) This message was reviewed and cleared by U/S Burns. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
PEKALA