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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
NSC FOR V ALVARADO 
SOUTHCOM FOR FPA 
SOUTHCOM PASS J2\J3\J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ORTEGA'S CITIZENS' COUNCILS - PANDORA'S BOX? 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1944 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 2375 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 2486 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4(B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On November 21, a Pandora's Box was opened 
when the Nicaraguan National Assembly (NA) voted to override 
President Ortega's veto of a controversial legislative change 
that would prevent him from creating his Citizen Power 
Councils (CPC) as an extension of the Executive branch. 
Since the vote, three departmental appeals courts have filed 
injunctions and counter-injunctions to prevent the NA from 
officially recording the veto override vote.  Opposition 
deputies have boycotted the NA, leaving Ortega's other 
proposed legislation dormant due to a lack of quorum; Ortega 
has threatened to use "whatever means necessary" to implement 
the CPCs, including the issuance of Presidential decrees for 
all future legislation.  Social tensions are building over 
the government's utilization of the CPCs to sell below 
market-price beans, in effect to blunt popular discontent 
over rising inflation.  The controversy has not affected 
Ortega's plans formally launch the CPCs on November 30.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Injunction Anyone? 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U) Since the November 21 vote to override Ortega's veto, 
three separate appeals courts have issued injunctions and 
counter-injunctions to, respectively, prevent and support the 
National Assembly from publishing the reformed law (ref. C). 
The first injunction, issued by the Managua Appeals Court 
(TAM), came only 63 minutes after the vote, and forbade the 
Assembly from publishing (and thereby formalizing) the law. 
On the afternoon of November 26, the Liberal-dominated 
Bluefields Appeals Court (located in the South Atlantic 
Autonomous Region - RAAS) issued a counter-injunction, 
overruling the TAM's earlier decision and allowing the law to 
be published. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to Supreme Court (CSJ) Justice Rafael 
Solis, within hours of the Bluefields decision, the 
Sandinista-dominated Matagalpa Appeals Court issued a 
counter-injunction against the counter-injunction. 
Commenting on this "domino effect", Solis smugly noted that 
"certainly there will be a war of resolutions throughout the 
country, but those Liberals are at a disadvantage because 
they only have control over two appeals courts - Bluefields 
and Masaya - and we, the FSLN, control seven."  (COMMENT:  As 
these appeals courts have no binding authority over each 
other, their counter-injunctions amount to little more than 
public spectacle.  Only the Constitutional Court within the 
CSJ enjoys this final legal authority.  Further, it is 
unclear whether the TAM even had the legal authority to issue 
an injunction -- against the implemention of a still 
unpublished law -- in the first place.  According to Solis, 
the Constitutional Court will hear the case on December 5. 
END COMMENT) 
 
All Quiet on the Legislative Front 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) In protest of the TAM's quick (and questionable) 
legal move, Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), Constitutional 
Liberal Party (PLC), and Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS) 
deputies boycotted the Assembly for two days following the 
court's decision, leaving the legislature without the quorum 
necessary to vote on other pending legislation.   (NOTE: The 
boycott might have lasted longer, but the Assembly was 
officially closed the following week as previously scheduled. 
 END NOTE.)  In a November 26 meeting with Polcouns, PLC 
caucus chief Maximino Rodriguez stressed that the three 
opposition parties would attempt to "stack the deck" during 
the last two weeks of the Assembly's session to prevent 
FSLN-favored legislation from getting on the agenda (septel). 
 
Round Two - Off With the Gloves 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (U) In response to the opposition bloc's veto override 
and subsequent boycott of the NA, Ortega has gone on the 
offensive, using nearly every public event or press 
conference to drive home the point that he will do whatever 
it takes to breath life into his CPCs, including "governing 
by (presidential) decree."  In a closed press conference on 
November 26, referring to the opposition's boycott of the NA, 
Ortega warned that "If they (the NA) will not approve this 
law in benefit to the people, I will approve it.  They would 
obligate me to govern by decree."  In a clear sign that 
Ortega is digging in his heels, he emphasized that he will 
match every legal challenge mounted by the NA with a new 
decree "until the CPCs are installed." 
 
Full Steam Ahead for November 30 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (U) Despite the legal stalemate and the ongoing battle 
between the government branches, Ortega has repeatedly 
emphasized that he will formally launch the CPCs on November 
30 in the Plaza of the Revolution with the long-anticipated 
naming of a national CPC cabinet.  This cabinet, sitting top 
of a pyramid structure consisting of thousands of local CPCs 
will, according to Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo, 
advise Ortega and provide him with a "street-level" check on 
the effectiveness, efficiency, and conduct of the government 
ministries (ref. A).  (COMMENT:  Given the growing 
controversy surrounding the CPCs and recent poll results - 
referenced by Liberal legislators during the November 21 
debate (ref. C) - that indicate that upwards of 95 percent of 
Nicaraguans are opposed to the CPCs, there is no doubt that 
Ortega will spare no expense or effort to pack the plaza as a 
demonstration of "popular support."  END COMMENT) 
 
CPCs Get Beans 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Adding to the tension was the recent announcement 
that the State-run National Enterprise of Basic Grains 
(ENABAS) has begun setting up subsidized bean distribution 
centers overseen by the CPCs.  While citizens desperately 
need price relief after bean prices more than tripled this 
year (ref. B), there is concern about CPC partisan bias 
against non-Sandinistas.  Nicaraguans have nerviously joked 
that this marks the return of the Sandinista's "AFA" 
rationing of the 1980s - Arroz, Frijoles, y Azucar (Rice, 
Beans, and Sugar). 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) President Ortega's very public row with the National 
Assembly over the legal status of the CPCs is costing him and 
the CPCs popularity as he threatens to use increasingly 
draconian measures to get what he wants.  However, within the 
storm of controversy, the CPCs are calmly going about their 
business within communities, seemingly unaffected by the 
battle raging above them. 
 
¶9.  (C) This stark contrast suggests that Ortega is willing 
to gamble - and sacrifice - popular support to lock down this 
formal social mechanism.  Legal recognition of the CPCs would 
enable Ortega to "verticalize" party (and personal) control 
of the government from the cabinet level down to the 
neighborhood level, where the CPCs are already demonstrating 
that they can wield considerable influence, both through 
genuine efforts to improve the lives of their neighbors and 
potentially less benign forms of controlling access to State 
services (such as distribution of daily staples, like beans). 
 Thus, even if the FSLN lacked a broad base of popular 
support leading up to the 2008 municipal elections, Ortega 
could use the localized power and control of the CPCs to 
influence voting by either persuading or preventing voter 
participation, as needed. 
 
¶10.  (C) With the "Pacto" controlling the CSJ (ref. C), 
chances are good that Ortega will eventually get what he 
wants.  The only remaining question is what will be the 
extent of the "collateral damage."  Ortega's efforts to push 
the CPCs have already exposed fissures within the FSLN party 
struture (FSLN Mayor of Managua Dionisio "Nicho" Marenco 
recently has been embroiled in a public and vicious 
altercation with First Lady Murillo, in part, over whether 
the CPCs are necessary).  It remains to be seen whether the 
internal FSLN resentment of and external opposition to the 
CPCs will finally compel opposition political groups and 
civil society organizations to work together to develop a 
unified strategy against Ortega for the 2008 elections (or 
successfully turn the campaign into a referendum on Ortega 
and the CPCs). 
TRIVELLI