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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1670
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002466 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
NSC FOR V. ALVARADO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON KDEM NU
SUBJECT: THE CITIZEN COUNCILS' GROWING SHADOW 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1783 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 2207 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: President Ortega's Citizen Power Councils 
(CPC) continue to penetrate Nicaraguan society, increasing 
fear among civil society leaders.  Over the past month, cases 
have been reported in which the CPCs have incited civil 
unrest, demanded CPC membership in exchange for emergency 
aid, and toppled legally elected community representatives. 
Police Commissioner Aminta Granera publicly acknowledged that 
the 2008/9 police strategy will incorporate the CPCs into 
their citizen education efforts and the Minister of 
Government confirmed that the Ministry is training the CPCs. 
Ortega continues to implement his Zero Hunger program through 
the CPCs, which incurred USD 1.7 million in questionable 
administrative expenses in 2007.  While opposition 
legislative forces do have sufficient votes to overturn 
Ortega's veto of legislation forbidding the creation of the 
CPCs, there are serious questions about their capacity to 
align the necessary votes, especially in the face of overt 
threats from the Sandinista National Liberation Front's 
(FSLN) caucus chief.  For Ortega, maintaining the legal basis 
for the CPCs is essential to facilitate his future political 
aspirations, as it allows him to expand and strengthen a 
centrally run patronage state at the expense of locally 
elected authorities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Ortega's Octopus - The Growing Reach of the CPCs 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U) Since President Daniel Ortega's late-September veto 
of legislation designed to curb the CPCs' legal power (ref 
B), their reach and influence have grown dramatically.  The 
following is a brief summary of some CPC "services" rendered 
since the beginning of October: 
 
- Civic Action:  On November 6, residents in two of Managua's 
poorer neighborhoods took to the streets and burned tires in 
protest against Union Fenosa, the Spanish electricity 
distributor.  Press reports allege that CPC members organized 
and participated in the activities.  Three weeks earlier, 
during a march against Fenosa in the northern town of Jalapa, 
CPC representatives threatened to organize "block-by-block, 
neighborhoods, and communities" against Union Fenosa in a 
protest over price increases. 
 
- Job Placement:  A number of organized labor contacts in the 
health and education sectors have complained that CPC 
representatives are targeting non-Sandinista labor union 
leaders and members to be fired and replaced by CPC-approved 
teachers, doctors, etc.  In addition, CPC representatives 
exert growing influence over the hiring decisions in schools, 
clinics and hospitals, ministries, and other public 
institutions, creating fear and uncertainty among 
non-Sandinista employees. 
 
- Community Involvement:  In the northern department of 
Esteli, the coordinator of the legally-mandated Departmental 
Development Council (DDC) alleged that CPC members pressured 
and forced the resignation of most DDC members and, in a 
surprise meeting on September 24, the new DDC members deposed 
him six months before the end of his term. 
 
- Humanitarian Assistance:  Although they have no legal basis 
to perform State responsibilities, First Lady Rosario Murillo 
has dispatched the CPCs to participate in a month-long 
campaign to clean up the country and educate the population, 
in coordination with the Ministry of Health, about dengue and 
the recent outbreak of leptospirosis that has swept across 
the northern departments in recent weeks.  In the North 
Atlantic Autonomous Region's (RAAN) "mining triangle," 
citizens affected by Hurricane Felix alleged that the CPCs 
were demanding "loyalty" to the CPCs in exchange for relief 
assistance.  In the aftermath of the flooding and mass 
displacement in several northern departments caused by heavy 
rains, there were similar allegations of coercion. 
 
CPCs - Counterweight to American "Imperialism" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (U) During a November 8 public event, Ortega declared 
that "if the Nicaraguan right has its movements financed by 
the North American taxpayers, being the spokespeople for 
imperialism, then the FSLN has every right to organize the 
CPCs."  He went on to say that "We would be stupid to believe 
the CPCs aren't important; to accept that the CPCs don't 
matter is to accept that the people don't matter." 
 
CPC as Civilian Police Force? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (U) In a November 2 meeting that included CPC leaders, 
senior police officials, and Ortega/Murillo to discuss the 
relationship between the police (NNP) and the CPCs, Police 
Commissioner Aminta Granera announced that she had held a 
long meeting with Murillo two days earlier to discuss "the 
best way" for the NNP and CPCs to work together.  In her 
November 2 comments, Granera emphasized that the CPCs would 
play an important role in the strategic evolution from 
"National Security" to "Citizen Security," which she 
characterized as a "return to the origins of this police 
(force)."  (NOTE:  Both the military and the police were 
created by the Sandinistas in the late 1970s to replace 
Somoza's National Guard structure.  END NOTE) 
 
¶5.  (U) Although Granera did not outline a specific strategy, 
she mentioned the 15,000-member community Crime Prevention 
Committees as a possible mechanism to involve CPC stalwarts. 
She reported that some Crime Prevention Committee members are 
also CPC members.  Further, Granera remarked that 
community-level police action plans would be coordinated with 
the CPC cabinets' security representatives to ensure "perfect 
agreement." 
 
CPCs Receive Government Support 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (U) In spite of the dubious legal status of the CPCs, 
President Ortega is implementing his "Zero Hunger" program 
(ref A) through the CPC network, using the councils to find 
and evaluate appropriate families and distribute the 
"packets" of supplies.  Ortega and the CPCs recently came 
under fire, however, when opposition deputies in the National 
Assembly revealed that the program had incurred 32 million 
Cordobas (USD 1.7 million) in operating expenses during 2007 
despite the fact that all CPC members work as volunteers. 
 
¶7.  (U) In late October, a number of civil society 
organizations asked the Comptroller's office to investigate 
the Ministry of Government (MIGOB) for allegedly providing 
weekend training and capacity building to the CPCs.  MIGOB 
Minister Ana Morales defended the twice-monthly sessions as 
an obligation to inform the people, stating that we "don't 
incur a single expense, (aside from) our time on a Sunday." 
 
Formation of CPC National Cabinet on the Horizon 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (U) During the November 2 meeting with Granera and CPC 
representatives, Murillo proclaimed that the CPC "National 
Cabinet" would be installed before the end of November, 
marking the nationwide completion of the CPC structure. 
Originally slated for September 14, the ceremony was 
purportedly delayed due to the Hurricane Felix crisis. 
According to earlier estimates, the CPC structure will 
encompass over 900,000 members at the neighborhood, 
municipal, departmental, and national levels.  (NOTE:  A 
variety of Managua sources have reported that the CPC 
structure in Managua is functionally well.  Neighborhood and 
district CPCs are reportedly holding regular weekly meetings, 
facilitating a smooth flow of information both vertically and 
horizontally within the structure.  END NOTE.) 
 
Overriding Ortega's Veto - Risky Business 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C) Although announced in late September, the National 
Assembly Justice Commission did not receive Ortega's official 
Presidential Veto until early October, according to Jose 
Pallais, Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) deputy and 
President of the Justice Commission.  In public statements, 
Pallais gave assurances that the PLC, Nicaraguan Liberal 
Alliance (ALN), and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) 
would unite and use their combined 49 votes to overturn 
Ortega's veto.  In private, however, Pallais questioned the 
legislative experience and administrative capacity of the 
three opposition parties to quickly pull together their 49 
votes against the maneuverings of the much more experienced 
FSLN.  Pallais further revealed that Edwin Castro, head of 
the FSLN caucus, had threatened him and other opposition 
deputies if they "dared" to call a vote, stating that there 
could be "car accidents" and "sudden sicknesses" on the day 
of the vote.  Ortega has made it abundantly clear that the 
CPCs will be empowered -- with or without the National 
Assembly's blessing. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) For Ortega, Murillo, and the FSLN, establishing a 
legal basis for the CPCs is essential to facilitate their 
future political aspirations.  With a legally-mandated CPC 
structure in place, Ortega will be that much freer to channel 
his Venezuelan petro-dollar-funded programs and projects 
through the CPCs, enabling him to spread and fortify his 
power base by buying and rewarding loyalty while isolating 
and choking political, civil society, and labor opposition. 
If National Assembly opposition forces fail to override 
Ortega's veto, USG funding for democracy building and civil 
society strengthening programs will become even more critical 
as a democratic counterweight. 
TRIVELLI