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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 002446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AIMED TO PERPETUATE 
STRANGLEHOLD ON DEMOCRACY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.   (SBU) Summary:  Constitutional reform is the hot 
political topic of the moment in Nicaragua.  The Sandinista 
Front for National Liberation (FSLN) and the Constitutional 
Liberal Party (PLC) are privately negotiating a major 
overhaul of the Nicaraguan body politic, focused on creating 
likely the first true parliamentary system -- including the 
position of a powerful Prime Minister -- in any Latin 
American country.  The main proponents for these proposed 
changes are President Daniel Ortega and former president and 
convicted felon Arnoldo Aleman.  These mooted constitutional 
reforms are little more than a thinly veiled attempt to 
perpetuate indefinitely the Ortega-Aleman power-sharing 
"pacto." A November 1 decision by a majority of the PLC 
National Assembly Deputies appears to have blocked the 
changes for now, but not the effort of Ortega and Aleman to 
remain in power beyond 2011, by hook or by crook.  End 
summary. 
 
Key Proposed Amendments 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U) According to drafts provided to the press and the 
Embassy, Aleman and Ortega have agreed upon a range of 
sweeping changes to the Constitution that would fundamentally 
alter the governmental structure from one in which power is 
split between the executive and legislative branches to a 
quasi-parliamentary system headed by a strong Prime Minister, 
a weak President, a small and more susceptible National 
Assembly, and a court system fully subjugated to the 
authority of the Prime Minister and National Assembly. 
Constitutional changes require a 60-percent majority vote in 
two consecutive legislative years. 
 
¶3. (U) Key amendments made public include: 
 
Article 34 - A convicted criminal whose case is still in the 
appeals process would retain all legal rights provided by the 
Constitution.  This provision would have the effect of 
restoring Aleman's full legal rights, including to vote and 
run for office. 
 
Article 129 - would eliminate the Supreme Electoral Council 
(CSE) as an independent branch of government and replace it 
with a new "Electoral Institute" named by the National 
Assembly. 
 
Article 133 - would: 1) reduce the number of National 
Assembly Deputies from 90 to 70; 2) extend the term for 
deputies from five to six years; 3) provide all presidents 
and first runners-up since 1984 Deputy slots for life, 
including Ortega, Violeta Chamorro, Arnoldo Aleman, Enrique 
Bolanos and Daniel Ortega; 4) eliminate the re-election of 
Deputies; and, 5) prohibit Deputies from being members of the 
Prime Minister's Cabinet. 
 
Article 138 - The National Assembly would elect from among 
the Deputies a Prime Minister, with 60 percent of the vote. 
The Prime Minister would be confirmed by the President.  If a 
Prime Minister is not selected within 30 days, the President 
would have the authority to send up to three names to the 
Assembly for a vote.  If none of these is selected, the 
President would have the authority to dissolve the Assembly 
and call for elections in sixty days.  In the interim, the 
President would enjoy the full authority to govern the 
country.  Article 138 also would provide for the removal of 
the Prime Minister on a 60 percent vote in a "no 
confidence/vota de censura" vote and would provide for life 
terms for justices of the Supreme Court. 
 
Article 143 - would eliminate the veto power of the President. 
 
Article 144 - divides the executive functions of the 
government between the President, who would be the head of 
state and would control the armed forces and police, and the 
Prime Minister, who would be the head of government. 
 
Article 145 - would eliminate the office of the Vice 
President. 
 
Article 147 - would require a vote of 50 percent plus one of 
votes cast to elect a President.  This provision would also 
eliminate the current prohibition on re-election of the 
sitting President and on holding consecutive terms in office. 
 
Article 148 - would set the term for the President at six 
years.  Once the President leaves office, he or she would 
become a member of the National Assembly for life and would 
continue to hold immunity from prosecution. 
 
Other Key Provisions: 
 
-- All elections (presidential, National Assembly and 
municipal) would be held at the same time starting in 
November 2011. 
-- Mayors elected in November 2008 would end their term in 
2011, when the new rules on elections and terms would come 
into effect. 
-- Although Deputies cannot be re-elected, those currently 
holding seats would be eligible to run again in 2011, but 
could not be re-elected after that. 
-- Raise the voting age from sixteen to eighteen. 
 
Aleman as Kingmaker or Overplaying His Hand? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) PLC Deputy and Chairman of the Justice Committee Jose 
Pallais has told us privately that the underlying intent of 
these changes is to allow Ortega to remain in control after 
his current term of office expires in 2011.  Under existing 
constitutional rules, Ortega would have to wait a whole 
presidential term (i.e. until 2016) before he would be 
eligible to stand again as president.  Pallais believes 
Aleman will continue to support Ortega in this effort if he 
sees sufficient personal benefit, but the move presents 
dangers for him.  According to Pallais, if Aleman succeeds in 
delivering the approximately 18 votes needed by Ortega to 
meet the 60-percent majority needed to effect constitutional 
changes, he will completely alienate all grass-roots Liberals 
and destroy the PLC.  If, however, Aleman promises to support 
to Ortega but can not deliver, this failure will deliver a 
mortal blow to his long and dirty political career; 
effectively, he will have lost what amounts to an internal 
vote-of-confidence.  Backing Ortega is a lose-lose 
proposition for Aleman, Pallais commented, so Aleman will do 
so only if potential the reward is high. 
 
¶4.  (C) The rumblings of discontent about constitutional 
change within the PLC are significant.  In a meeting of the 
PLC deputies in Montelimar on November 1, a majority of the 
deputies voted not to support the proposed constitutional 
changes this year or in 2008 and to seek a public referendum 
before any constitutional reforms are enacted.  Even PLC 
members who are widely considered close to Aleman, such as 
PLC First Secretary Wilfredo Navarro and ex-Foreign Minister 
Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, are publicly voicing their 
discontent.  Maximino Rodriguez, chief of the party in the 
Assembly, told us that it would be "political suicide" for 
any deputy to vote for these reforms now, as the base and a 
growing number of the deputies are very angry that Aleman 
pre-cooked the changes with Ortega and then presented them to 
PLC deputies for approval.  In Rodriguez's view, the "reform" 
effort is now "dead" for this legislative term. 
 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
¶5. (C) One of the ongoing debates surrounding the proposed 
constitutional changes is whether these reforms are simply a 
smokescreen by the Ortega-Aleman pacto to divert attention 
away from other issues, including the GON's poor performance, 
and to derail opposition unity efforts -- or whether these 
proposals represent instead a real effort at a lasting power 
grab that would perpetuate the pacto's hold.  As the debate 
over the amendments continues, we believe the two views are 
mutually compatible.  Indeed, the furor over the changes has 
succeeded in slowing down efforts by the ALN and PLC to 
develop a mechanism to jointly participate in the 2008 
municipal elections and has served to exacerbate tensions 
between and within the parties.  At the same time, it is 
clear that Ortega and Aleman are keenly interested in 
preserving and perpetuating their hold on power and are 
seeking some manner to institutionalize that hold prior to 
the municipal elections.  If these constitutional changes 
fail, we can be sure we'll see some other effort by Ortega in 
the coming weeks and months, with the collusion of Aleman, to 
remain in power beyond 2011. 
 
TRIVELLI