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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 002954 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BL VN
SUBJECT: EVO BACKS HUGO THREAT TO TURN BOLIVIA INTO VIETNAM 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 2830 
 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 2949 
 
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In an interview released November 4, 
Bolivian President Evo Morales supported Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez's threat to turn Bolivia into another Vietnam for 
forces that might attempt a coup against Morales.  Media 
pundits and opposition leaders vehemently criticized the 
statements as an assault on Bolivia sovereignty.  Alleged 
Venezuelan involvement in the Bolivian takeover of Santa 
Cruz's Viru Viru Airport further ignited criticism of the 
Bolivian-Venezuelan relationship.  Venezuelan "imperialism" 
has stayed in the headlines since, fed by heated exchanges 
between opposition and government officials, an alleged 
attack on the Venezuelan consulate in Santa Cruz, and a 
scandal involving $11 million in missing Venezuelan 
micro-credit loans.  Foreign Ministry sources contend the 
handling of the Viru Viru takeover is universally considered 
(behind government doors) to have been a significant error 
that is costing the government public support.  Another 
Foreign Ministry insider added that Evo and his inner circle 
are genuinely afraid of being removed from power, and are not 
just using the issue as a rhetorical tool to rally support, 
distract from domestic problems, or curry favor with Chavez. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Bolivian President Evo Morales defended Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez's October 14 remarks about defending 
Evo from coups or assassination attempts.  In an interview 
with Chilean daily La Tercera released November 4, Morales 
echoed Chavez's comments about turning Bolivia into a second 
Vietnam should the U.S. attempt to unseat Morales and 
expanded the analogy: "If the empire meddles in Latin 
America, Latin America will become a second Vietnam." 
Morales also dismissed Bolivians who took offense to Chavez's 
threat as "oligarchs, conservatives, and pro-imperialists." 
He asserted "observers" have been "knocking at the door" of 
the Bolivian military since 2006 without success, apparently 
implying foreign powers have been plotting Morales' downfall. 
 He said the military is unresponsive to such overtures 
because commanders have changed mentality and are against 
dictatorship.  Opposition Deputy Fernando Messmer 
(Podemos-lower house) responded November 5 to Morales' 
statement with "indignation and shame" for "destroying the 
country" by "following the same line as Chavez." 
 
Chavez Chic Loses Luster; Opposition Rallies Around 
Sovereignty 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- 
 
¶3. (C)  Morales enters the fray following more than two weeks 
of silence regarding Chavez's controversial statements, while 
opposition and government leaders traded insults and spin in 
the press.  Evo's comments are sure to increase media and 
opposition criticism regarding Venezuela's presence in 
Bolivia, which still has not died down since the alleged 
involvement of Venezuelan troops in the October 18 takeover 
of Santa Cruz's international airport.  Chronology follows: 
 
--October 14: Apocalypse Not 
 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez threatened to "turn Bolivia 
into a new Vietnam" should the Bolivian oligarchy or anyone 
else try to kill or oust his ally President Evo Morales.  In 
a broadcast from Cuba honoring Che Guevara, Chavez added the 
Venezuelan people would not "stand by with their arms folded" 
if Morales is attacked, rather "what you will see is not 
going to be the Vietnam of ideas ...it will be, God forbid, 
the Vietnam of arms, the Vietnam of war."  Chavez further 
accused the U.S. of sabotaging efforts by the Bolivian 
Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution, thereby 
providing an excuse for coup.  Opposition and media pundits 
took strong offense to Chavez's specific "meddling" and 
attacked the idea of any foreign government using Bolivia as 
an battleground on sovereignty grounds. 
 
--October 18: Viru Viru Involvement Backfires 
 
Bolivian military and national police took over Santa Cruz's 
Viru Viru International Airport October 18 (ref a), causing a 
massive backlash of locals to reestablish civilian control. 
Although the incident ended peacefully October 19, fallout 
from the supposed involvement of Venezuelan uniformed 
military in the takeover remains a volatile and debated 
issue, with some members of the opposition accusing the 
Venezuelan military of orchestrating and participating in the 
takeover while the government maintains a small group 
Venezuelan troops were at the airport to escort Bolivian 
scholarship winners to study in Venezuela.  Santa Cruz Civic 
Committee leader Branko Marinkovic accused Chavez of 
"fulfilling his threat" about turning Bolivian into Vietnam. 
The issue motivated protesters and inspired a slew of 
editorials damning Venezuelan "interference." 
 
--October 21/22: Prefects Rally Against Imperialism 
(Venezuelan) 
 
Cochabamba Prefect (Governor) Manfred Reyes published a 
full-page screed in prominent newspapers against Morales, 
calling on him to "tell your commander Hugo Chavez that 
Bolivia still has some dignity left and to respect Bolivian 
sovereignty.  Reyes characterized the Viru Viru standoff as 
resistance to a "brutal repression" engineered by the 
"Venezuelan military" with Morales' complicity.  Reyes said 
any "intruder that dares to think of Bolivia as another 
Vietnam, should know that Bolivians are not willing to accept 
that international humiliation."  Another half-page October 
22 advertisement signed jointly by five of nine Bolivian 
prefects (Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Tarija, Beni, and Pando) 
called for the removal of "all foreign military forces that 
are intervening in the country's internal matters."  Although 
the statement uses generic references to foreign troops, it 
is clearly aimed at "interference of the Venezuelan 
Government in the militarization of the departments and 
repression against civilians in Santa Cruz and other place of 
the country."  The next day Minister of Defense Walker San 
Miguel asserted the request was political and unfounded, as 
there are no foreign military troops that fit the statement's 
description. 
 
--October 21: Monkey Racism 
 
Presidency Minister (Chief of Staff) Jorge Quintana called 
Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas "racist and xenophobic" after 
the Prefect charactered Chavez as a "big monkey, little 
dictator, coup monger, and coward."  Quintana said the 
remarks implied Morales was the "little monkey." 
 
--October 22: Oligarchs Serving Molotov Cocktails? 
 
Unidentified assailants apparently threw a quarter stick of 
dynamite and a Molotov cocktail, respectively, at the 
Venezuelan Consulate and a residence housing Cuban doctors 
during the early morning hours.  There were only minor 
damages and no injuries.  Both Bolivian and Venezuelan 
government officials condemned the attack, which they blamed 
the "oligarchy."  Bolivian Presidential Spokesman Alex 
Contreras condemned "this type of cowardly violent action, 
which is designed to create a climate of tension and panic." 
(Comment: There was no/no such outrage concerning the October 
17 demonstration at the our embassy, where similar dynamite 
derivatives were tossed over the embassy wall and the crowd 
attempted to break through the embassy gate. End Comment.) 
Government Minister Alfredo Rada claimed the attack was 
inspired by Prefect Costas' "xenophobic" remarks.  Opposition 
leaders, including Podemos leader Jorge Quiroga, denounced 
the attack as a self-inflicted smokescreen to implement 
Chavez's "Vietnamization" policy. 
 
--October 22:  Venezuelan Micro-credit Scandal 
 
Unrelated to the fallout from Viru Viru, an article in 
leading daily La Razon investigated the apparent 
disappearance of $11 million in Venezuelan micro-credit funds 
for Bolivia.  Although the loan funds were approved, 
Venezuela apparently decided to revert the loan.  According 
to the National Confederation of Micro and Small Businesses 
of Bolivia (CONAMYPE), 227 recipients only received a portion 
of the credit, but they were forced to sign contracts for and 
their names appear on official lists as receiving the entire 
amount. 
 
--October 23: Defense Minister Concedes Chavez Should Simmer 
Down 
 
Referring to his October 15 remarks, Defense Minister Walker 
San Miguel admitted the Bolivian Government had asked Chavez 
to tone down his public comments considering current 
political and regional Bolivian sensitivities, particularly 
in regard to "healthy" Bolivian disdain for "foreign 
interference and respect for national sovereignty."  San 
Miguel also rejected the presence of Venezuelan troops in 
Bolivia and any role they might have in the internal affairs 
of Bolivia. 
 
Gauging the Damage 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) Almost two weeks after the Viru, Viru incident, fiery 
editorials and political charges continue.  Opposition 
Senator Walter Guiteras accused the Bolivian Government 
November 1 of subservience to Chavez, who is using Bolivia to 
confront the U.S.  "This country has shown it will not be 
disposed to tolerate grand tyrants ... or people who meddle 
in Bolivian affairs."  He accused Chavez of trying to "buy 
off our conscious," implying Morales was already bought off. 
 
¶5. (C) A reliable foreign ministry contact in the office of 
the Vice Foreign Minister told us that Morales' ramblings of 
coup and assassination plots are not just rhetoric to rally 
the masses, distract from domestic problems, or curry favor 
with Chavez (although they also serve this purpose), but are 
based on genuine fears.  He said Evo's inner circle is fed a 
constant diet of conspiracy theories from Chavez that "keep 
them up at night."  This contact also said Morales' inner 
circle directed the Viru Viru takeover without prompting or 
influence from Venezuela, and any Venezuelan presence was 
tertiary and inconsequential.  He said the government on "all 
levels" understands this was a "huge mistake" that handed the 
opposition an easy victory and an issue it can exploit and 
organize around for the foreseeable future.  "Going in (to 
Viru Viru) and leaving the next day looks bad, there's no 
getting around that and everyone realizes it."  Another 
Foreign Ministry contact told PolOff that careerists in the 
MFA considered the Chavez statements a "horrible mistake" 
that everyone ignored and hoped would go away.  The 
Venezuelan presence at Viru Viru played perfectly into the 
opposition's hands and will have a lasting negative impact on 
the government's public support.  "Even Bolivians in 
(government bastion) El Alto care about sovereignty issues; 
we Bolivians are very sensitive about this." 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶6. (C) It is unclear what Evo hopes to accomplish by 
supporting Chavez's inflammatory Vietnam comments.  Coming 
simultaneously with accusations about U.S. coup mongering and 
connections between the Ambassador and Colombian paramilitary 
(ref b), Post is bracing for the next outrageous accusation. 
We remain concerned that this latest and increasingly 
strident volley of hyperbole may be setting the stage for 
concrete anti-democratic or anti-U.S. actions on the part of 
the Morales government.  Chavez's Bolivia as Vietnam remarks, 
followed by the appearance of Venezuelan troops at Viru Viru, 
gave opposition leaders plenty of ammunition to blast 
President Morales by association and rally supporters against 
Venezuelan "imperialism." 
 
¶7.  (C)  Many viewed the government's sending the military 
into Viru Viru airport, the heartland of the opposition, as a 
trial balloon to see if, a) the military would follow Evo's 
orders and b) the opposition would be cowed by the show of 
force.  While the military proved loyal, the opposition 
certainly was not intimidated.  In fact, the quick military 
withdrawal the following day in the face of massive civilian 
demonstrations may reflect the conventional wisdom that the 
military is not willing to use force to impose Morales' will. 
 Even though the airport takeover backfired badly, and the 
government is taking a beating in the press over its close 
ties to Venezuela, Evo's latest rhetorical bravado reflects 
his determination to have his way. 
GOLDBERG