VZCZCXRO5224
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1702/01 3051038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011038Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9027
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001702 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND ON INTENTIONS IN DARFUR 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1680 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 1681 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez, reasons: 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Despite differences in ideologies and 
political platforms, leaders of Darfur groups are expressing 
a common level of suspicion about the Government of Sudan's 
(GOS) current actions with regard to Darfur.  They believe 
the GOS is pursuing a strategy to further undermine the 
efficacy of international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and peacekeepers and the probability of political 
settlement throughout the Darfur region.  Representatives 
pointed to the October 30-31 Arab League Donors Conference 
for Humanitarian Aid for Darfur, the allegations of human 
trafficking by foreign aid workers in eastern Chad, the 
stalled Sirte talks, and the increased pace of "Arabization" 
of Darfur lands.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On October 29 Poloff met with Adam Abdul Ahmed, 
Chairman of the Darfur Land Commission of the Darfur 
Transitional Regional Authority (TDRA), established by the 
Darfur Peace Agreement and headed by Minni Minawi.  On the 
same day Poloff met with representatives of the Fur tribes' 
Shura (consultation) Council, including Secretary-General 
(SYG) Dr. Idriss Yusuf and Deputy SYG Amin Mohammed Osman. 
On October 30 Poloff followed up with Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SLM) representative to the Darfur Ceasefire Joint 
Commission Ali Trayo. 
 
DONORS CONFERENCE ILLUSTRATES GOS HIDDEN AGENDA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶3.  (C) TDRA leaders saw no good will in Khartoum,s hosting 
of the Arab League Conference on humanitarian aid for Darfur 
(even though TDRA power Mini Minawi was prominently featured 
at the conference).  Abdul Ahmed acknowledged TDRA resentment 
at having been upstaged by the GOS to spearhead this 
conference.  During his visit to Cairo in early October, 
Minni Minawi accepted an AL offer to assume responsibility 
for this conference, only to have the AL later hand over the 
reins to the GOS without explanation.  Ahmed complained that 
the conference had not been coordinated through the TDRA,s 
Darfur Reconstruction Fund, which he said would have ensured 
a transparent disbursement mechanism for the $500 million 
goal (Note: Actual pledges at the conference amounted to $250 
million, real figures will be much less.) 
 
¶4. (C) The absence of any oversight mechanism would enable 
the GOS to channel funds directly to local Sudanese NGOs, 
which Ahmed claimed are "99 percent pro-government," and 
which he claimed were established solely to delegitimize the 
INGO community.  Ali Trayo was blistering in his contempt for 
GOS efforts in this regard, stating that the AL conference 
was convened only as a way to empower GOS-affiliated local 
NGOs at the expense of INGOs, which he claimed the GOS saw as 
"international spies" for the incoming United Nations-African 
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  In this way, Trayo 
explained, the conference was intended to downplay UNAMID 
deployment. 
 
CHADIAN COLLUSION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶5.  (C) According to Trayo, another calculated blow to the 
credibility of INGOs and international peacekeepers was the 
relentless publicizing in the Arabic press in Sudan of the 
alleged trafficking of 103 children from eastern Chad by 
foreign aid workers of the organization Zoe,s Ark.  Trayo 
asserted "there was no coincidence on timing" of the breaking 
of that story.  The conspiracy-minded Trayo did not dismiss 
the possibility of collaboration between Chadian President 
Deby and Sudanese President Bashir (and possibly Libyan 
leader COL Muamar Qadhafi) in inflating the incident as part 
of an overall campaign to discredit INGOs operating in Chad 
and Darfur and to stall deployment of international 
peacekeepers on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border.  Trayo 
had no doubt that further foot-dragging would result, as 
already evidenced in Bashir,s October 30 assertion that 
UNAMID,s composition would remain mostly African (and 
therefore perpetually lacking in capacities), with Chinese 
and Pakistani elements permitted. 
 
 
GOS "EXPERT" AT DELAYING POLITICAL PROCESS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
KHARTOUM 00001702  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C) In addition to undermining the INGOs and 
international peacekeepers, the GOS was succeeding in its 
plot to keep the rebel and non-signatory movements 
politically divided, according to members of the Fur Shura 
Council (the Council is strongly in favor of Sirte 
rejectionist rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur).  Idriss and Amin 
said Sirte had made the GOS look like the good guy in the 
eyes of the international community through GOS participation 
in preliminary talks, its declaration of a unilateral 
ceasefire (which the Council dismissed as lip service) and 
its stated "commitment" to giving non-signatories political 
space to reach a common negotiating position for subsequent 
rounds of talks.  Amin interpreted this behavior as a front 
for active GOS conspiring against rebel and non-signatory 
movements, efforts toward unity in a bid to divide the 
groups along tribal lines.  Idriss elaborated that a 
systematic upending of the pyramidal structure of Darfur 
tribes was underway by the GOS, creating an imbalance within 
the tribal system that was resulting in the current security 
situation in Darfur.  Idriss went on to say that the GOS, 
separation of the movements, political leadership from the 
IDPs on the ground was marginalizing the leaders and bringing 
in their place at the negotiating table field commanders, who 
lacked the knowledge to address political questions, and 
tribal leaders/civil society representatives, who lacked a 
force on the ground to command, none of whom was a bona fide 
representative of the parties in Darfur. 
 
STAGE SET FOR RE-SETTLEMENT OF DARFUR 
------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C) Ali Trayo argued that as a result of GOS maneuvering 
on the political, humanitarian and peacekeeping fronts, the 
time was ripe for the "Arabization" of Darfur through GOS 
resettling of nomadic Arab tribes there.  Both the TDRA and 
the Shura Council acknowledged that this phenomenon was not 
new, but Trayo noted its frequency had recently spiked (Note: 
Trayo added that he was compiling a "database" of this trend 
to track numbers of tribes and areas of "occupation" and 
offered to share this information with Poloff upon arrival in 
El Fasher.)  The Fur Shura Council reps added that the GOS 
was becoming increasingly sophisticated in its methods of 
incorporating Arab tribes into the Darfur population, saying 
that COL Qadhafi had a big hand in the execution of these 
processes.  Here again, Trayo did not rule out the 
possibility of collusion by the Chadian Government as well 
(seeking to eliminate a potentially disloyal Arab tribal 
minority inside Chad).  Trayo warned that the longer the 
political reconciliation process in Darfur dragged on, the 
deeper the "war fatigue" among IDPs would become and the 
greater the ability of the GOS and the janjaweed to assert 
themselves in Darfur territory would grow.  The only way to 
stave off this eventuality, according to Trayo, was to 
accelerate the political process, which he said necessitated 
pressure on Sudan Liberation Army faction leader Abdulwahid 
al-Nur. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Conspiracy theories and illogical reasoning 
are nothing new among the political opposition, and certainly 
not for the TDRA, whose roadmap for Sirte talks had just been 
outright rejected by the UN/AU mediation.  Similarly, the Fur 
Shura Council, with its close ties to Abdulwahid, harbors an 
equal if not greater amount of vitriol for the GOS.  The TDRA 
and the Shura Council are likely to see evil in almost any 
action taken in Darfur by the GOS, Libya, Chad, UN, and AU. 
However, their common perception of a concerted push by Arab 
interests on all sides of the border to insulate the region 
from the international community,s efforts to get 
peacekeepers on the ground is noteworthy as an example of the 
deep distrust on the ground.  As the international community 
seeks to stabilize the Darfur region, it is not unexpected 
that there should be a reaction from governments in the 
region, and we should only expect this opposition to 
intensify as deployment deadlines draw nearer.  The level of 
paranoia on all sides is bound to increase. 
FERNANDEZ