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RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHLM #1488/01 3050853
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010853Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7106
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1512
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0493
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7482
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 5642
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 8076
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RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INS, EEB/IFD/ODF AND EEB/IFD/OMA 
STATE PASS USTR FOR ADINA ADLER 
COMMERCE FOR JONATHAN STONE 
MCC FOR S. GROFF, D. TETER, D. NASSIRY AND E. BURKE 
TREASURY FOR LESLIE HULL 
 
E.O 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN EINV ECON KMCA CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEBUT SOVEREIGN BOND ISSUE RAISES $500 MILLION 
DESPITE DOMESTIC CRITICISM 
 
REF: A. Colombo 1218  B. Colombo 1056 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary and comment: International investors, 40% of them 
American, purchased all $500 million of Sri Lanka's first-ever 
sovereign bond issue, despite domestic opposition efforts to block 
the sale.  The government offered 8.25% coupon bonds with a 
five-year maturity, and received orders from investment bankers in 
Asia, Europe, and the United States totaling about triple the 
quantity of bonds for sale.  The government cited the strong 
investor interest as an endorsement of Sri Lanka's economic 
stability.  However, it appears the government chose to set the bond 
duration to five years because it feared insufficient investor 
interest in ten-year bonds due to Sri Lanka's instability.  As 
expected, the opposition United National Party's threat that a 
future UNP government would not honor the bonds appeared to have 
little impact on investor appetite for the bonds.  Nevertheless, the 
opposition continues to question the government's stated intent to 
use the bond proceeds entirely to finance infrastructure investment. 
 Central Bank Governor Cabraal assured the Ambassador that the 
government would indeed use the money for infrastructure.  The 
Rajapaksa government is prone to fiscal irresponsibility, so the 
opposition's doubts may be justified.  On the other hand, the 
transparency that international investors require to maintain 
confidence in Sri Lanka's sovereign debt may serve as an effective 
incentive for fiscal discipline.  End summary and comment. 
 
SRI LANKA JOINS THE RANKS OF 
EMERGING MARKET BOND ISSUERS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Sri Lanka successfully sold its $500 million debut sovereign 
bond issue to international investors the week of October 15.  The 
bond, priced at 8.25% for five-years, was oversubscribed -- 
investors offered to purchase nearly triple the government's $500 
million target.  The bond offering was joint lead-managed by JP 
Morgan, HSBC, and Barclays Capital, and is listed and traded in 
Singapore.  Sri Lankan Central Bank Governor Nivard Cabraal told 
Ambassador November 1 that U.S. investors had bought 40% of the 
bonds, with Asian and European buyers taking about 30% each.  Prior 
to the sale, Cabraal and other Central Bank officials joined 
representatives of the three financial firms for a "road show" to 
seven cities in Asia, Europe, and the United States. 
 
¶3. (U) On the road show, Governor Cabraal pitched possible investors 
on the Sri Lanka "story," which included the following highlights: 
 
- Sri Lanka is poised to grow along with India in fields like 
information technology and business process outsourcing. 
 
- Sri Lanka's free trade agreements with India and Pakistan position 
it as both an export and investment platform into those two 
markets. 
 
- Sri Lanka's resilience -- demonstrated by economic growth of 7.4% 
in 2006 -- is the untold story of the well-known ethnic conflict. 
 
- The ethnic conflict is confined to the North and East, which 
cumulatively account for less than ten percent of the economy. 
 
- Sri Lanka has an unblemished debt service record; it is one of 
only five "emerging market" countries that have never defaulted on 
domestic or external debt. 
 
¶4. (SBU) JP Morgan's Colombo representative described the successful 
bond sale to EconOff as remarkable on two counts: both for the 
strong demand for Sri Lankan debt, and for the fact that this demand 
existed despite reduced investor interest in emerging market debt 
following the onset of the sub-prime loan crisis.  He noted that 
this was the first emerging market bond floated since the sub-prime 
crisis hit, and that its timing was fortuitous, as markets had 
fallen dramatically during the week after the bond issue.  He cited 
as a critical boost for the bond the Standard & Poor's credit rating 
agency's August revision of its Sri Lanka rating outlook to "stable" 
from "negative" (ref A).  In the week since the bond was listed in 
 
COLOMBO 00001488  002 OF 004 
 
 
Singapore, he added, it has traded well -- volume has been good and 
its price has remained around par. 
 
¶5. (U) (Note: Sri Lanka has sold about $800 million worth of 
dollar-denominated "Sri Lanka Development Bonds" to international 
investors, but these were not sovereign bonds tradable in 
international markets.  They were domestic debt sold in Sri Lanka 
subject to Sri Lankan law and tradable only in the Sri Lankan 
market.  Sri Lanka has also allowed foreign investors to purchase up 
to 5% of total domestic Rupee-denominated debt, currently totaling 
about $350 million.) 
 
OPPOSITION CHALLENGE: BOND LIKELY TO BE USED 
IRRESPONSIBLY AND VIOLATED PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 
-------------------- ----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The opposition United National Party's threat (ref A) that a 
future UNP government would not honor the bonds appeared to have 
little impact on investor appetite for the bonds.  Following the 
sale, the UNP and other critics continued to charge in the media 
that the bond issue was both imprudent and illegal.  They doubted 
that the government would use the proceeds of the bond to finance 
infrastructure investment.  They claimed that the government could 
easily have obtained additional concessionary loans from 
multilateral development banks for infrastructure projects and that 
therefore the market interest rate and short duration of the bond 
was an undue burden on public finance.  They identified 
discrepancies in the list of infrastructure projects that the 
government said it would pursue with the bond proceeds (such as 
project amounts and whether certain donors had committed funds for 
the projects.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ambassador asked Cabraal about these charges.  Cabraal 
assured the Ambassador that the government would be able to show 
that it had spent the $500 million on infrastructure.  He explained 
that Sri Lanka has $4.5 billion worth of infrastructure projects in 
the "pipeline," and that it needed "buffer funds" to avoid 
unnecessary delays in projects.  The Government would use the funds 
for steps like acquiring land before the start of a project, for 
example, he said, adding that investors "could see the logic of 
this." 
 
¶8. (SBU) The opposition and critics also argued that the bond issue 
had not been conducted in accordance with parliamentary procedure 
and was therefore illegal.  (Comment: Post's review of this charge 
suggests that it would make a good constitutional case -- there 
appear to be reasonable points both in favor of the government's 
right to proceed with such debt financing and also in favor of 
Parliament having a role in the matter, which it basically did not. 
The claim that the bond sale was illegal simply because it violated 
the 2003 Fiscal Management Responsibility Act is less convincing, 
since the act sets forth "objectives" for spending, debt, and 
deficit, not actual limits.) 
 
GSL: TRUST US, BOND PROCEEDS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE, 
NOT DEFENSE OR CURRENT SPENDING 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (U) The Government continues to insist that it intends to spend 
the bond funds on infrastructure projects.  The offering circular 
for the bond stated: 
 
"The Government will use the net proceeds from the issue of the 
Bonds to supplement available concessional funds to develop 
infrastructure projects that have been previously approved by the 
Government and included in the current 2007 Budget.  Such 
infrastructure projects include but are not limited to: electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution, and substation facilities; 
roads and bridges; water supply, sanitation and sewage facilities; 
port facilities; and highways and railway lines.... A portion of the 
net proceeds will be used for bridging finance for such projects.... 
Nevertheless, the Government is subject to budgetary and funding 
limitations and there is no assurance that all the net proceeds will 
ultimately be used only for these projects." 
 
COLOMBO 00001488  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) A mid-level Central Bank source explained to EconFSN that 
the final clause was included not to give the government wiggle room 
to spend the funds on whatever it wants, but to allow the government 
to use the money for temporary purposes until it is needed for 
specific projects. 
 
BOND WILL EASE PRESSURE ON RUPEE AND 
INTEREST RATES, BUT COULD ADD TO INFLATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (U) The Central Bank asserted in its October monetary policy 
statement that the bond sale would ease recent Rupee depreciation, 
high interest rates and high inflation.  Indeed, since the issuance 
of the bond, the Rupee has strengthened against the dollar to about 
112 from a low of about 114 on October 14 (just before the bond 
sale).  The prime lending rate is now 17.6% after having reached 
20.5% on October 10. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Comment: The strengthening of the Rupee follows from there 
now being a greater supply of dollars in Sri Lanka.  The easing of 
interest rates follows from the government's reduced need to borrow 
funds domestically.  However, the Central Bank's assertion that 
inflation will ease due to the stronger Rupee's effect in reducing 
the cost of imports is probably too optimistic.  The influx of 
dollars, when converted to Rupees and given to the government, will 
add to the money supply and thereby contribute to the demand-driven 
portion of Sri Lanka's current 17% inflation.  This could be avoided 
if the Central Bank "sterilizes" by selling local bonds and thereby 
absorbing Rupees from private hands.  However, a senior Central Bank 
official told Econoff he doubted the Bank would fully sterilize the 
influx. 
 
BOND WON'T SERIOUSLY ADD TO SRI LANKA'S 
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEBT BURDEN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Critics cited the large figures for Sri Lanka's total 
outstanding external debt (about $12 billion) and external debt as a 
percentage of GDP (about 46%) as additional reasons that the bond 
sale was imprudent.  While true that Sri Lanka owes a lot of money 
both domestically and externally, the $500 million bond will not 
drastically change Sri Lanka's overall debt service burden.  Sri 
Lanka's debt service ratio of 12.7% (2006) is manageable because a 
large majority of its external debt -- about 96% -- is on 
concessionary terms.  Nor is the country in imminent danger of a 
balance of payments crisis.  Sri Lanka consistently runs a balance 
of payments surplus thanks to continued strong inflows of 
remittances, donor funding, and even growing foreign direct 
investment.  It receives little portfolio investment -- so called 
"hot money" that could be pulled out quickly if the country lost 
favor with investors.  Thus Sri Lanka's balance of payments surplus 
and its ability to service this debt and the rest of its debt 
appears secure -- all reasons why international investors snapped up 
the bonds with their attractive 8.25% return. 
 
COMMENT: AN "EXERCISE IN FISCAL DISCIPLINE" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) The opposition and other critics are not wrong to be 
concerned that the government would use the money irresponsibly. 
The Rajapaksa government is likely to spend the money on projects 
run by state-owned or -connected enterprises that are inefficient 
and, in some cases, incompetent.  It is likely to pursue projects 
that Americans would recognize as political "pork" designed to 
deliver benefits to favored constituents, not to be economically 
viable.  In fact, these are reasons why the critics were wrong to 
charge that the government could easily have received more 
concessionary loans for the infrastructure it wants to build.  It 
could not have, because donors like the Asian Development Bank and 
World Bank would not finance the types of projects the government 
wants, though they are already financing plenty of infrastructure 
and other projects here.  The government may also be tempted to 
spend some of the money to cover current expenses like salaries for 
 
COLOMBO 00001488  004 OF 004 
 
 
the bloated civil service and subsidies for the loss-making Ceylon 
Electricity Board and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation.  As long as it 
continues to run a budget deficit, it will have to borrow from 
somewhere to cover such costs.  In financial terms, it is not 
significant whether money used for these particular expenses is 
borrowed at home or abroad. 
 
¶15. (SBU) More significant would be if the government uses the 
dollars it raised in the bond sale to finance weapons purchases, 
which generally must be paid for with hard currency.  The local HSBC 
head told EconOff that he directly warned the government against 
this when HSBC first evaluated whether to seek the bond management 
role.  He said use of the bond proceeds for military procurement 
would be the surest way to lose investors' confidence and 
willingness to purchase future debt. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ironically, the government's likely interest in returning 
to international markets to borrow more in the future is the main 
factor that could keep it from frittering the money away on useless 
infrastructure, current expenses, or military hardware.  As the JP 
Morgan rep told EconOff, the government being free to do what it 
wants with the money makes the bond sale an "exercise in fiscal 
discipline."  With credit ratings services scrutinizing Sri Lanka's 
accounts, he asserted, investors will know before long if the 
government fails to spend the money wisely.  Thus, while we share 
concerns that the Rajapaksa government may not use the money 
responsibly, we think the long-term implications of the government's 
borrowing in international markets could be healthy for Sri Lanka, 
by creating a functional incentive for greater transparency and 
accountability. 
BLAKE