VZCZCXRO1069
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #1377/01 3241123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201123Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5928
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001377 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017 
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV RS TN MD
SUBJECT: VORONIN PERCEIVES KREMLIN-MFA SPLIT ON MOLDOVA, 
WILL UNDO DAMAGE TO HIS TRANSNISTRIAN CBM'S 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a meeting with the Ambassador on November 
30, President Voronin said his meeting with Deputy Secretary 
of the Russian Security Council Yuri Zubakov produced little 
forward movement on Transnistria (TN).  Instead, the meeting 
showed Voronin that the Russian MFA and Kremlin seemed 
divided on Moldova.  The President said his Prime Minister's 
decision to require TN vehicles to register with Chisinau 
surprised him.  Voronin stated he would settle the 
vehicle-registration issue, acknowledging that the poor 
timing of the decision had affected his TN 
confidence-building proposals.  The GOM Security Council soon 
will review the possibility of sending a new contingent of 
deminers to Iraq.  Voronin did not seem opposed to this 
possibility.  End summary. 
 
Little from Zubakov Meeting, Speculation about Kremlin-MFA 
Split 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (C) President Voronin said that during his meeting with 
Zubakov the two discussed Zubakov's future visit to Brussels 
to talk with the EU and U.S. about CFE issues.  The President 
and his Russian visitor also talked about the Russian ban on 
Moldovan wine, though Voronin understood that Zubakov had 
little say in this matter. 
 
¶3. (C) Voronin said emphatically that he and Zubakov did not 
discuss the upcoming OSCE Madrid ministerial, nor the Russian 
position on the ministerial statement.  Voronin was 
disappointed in Russia's current efforts on drafting the OSCE 
ministerial statement.  The Ambassador noted that, as in 
previous years, the U.S. preferred no ministerial statement 
than one that contained unacceptable language.  The U.S. 
would like to find a solution to Russia's threatened 
withdrawal from CFE, the Ambassador noted, but not at any 
cost.  The Ambassador added that U.S officials were still 
working on ideas to civilianize the peacekeeping forces in TN 
and to remove or destroy munitions stored at Colbasna. 
 
¶4. (C) Voronin stated that Zubakov, as a representative of 
the Kremlin, did not explicitly mention that the Russian 
MFA's position today was like that of 2003, when Russia 
proposed the Kozak Memorandum.  However, the President 
understood that some Russian officials wanted a Kozak-like 
solution to TN:  federalization, TN authority to engage in 
foreign affairs, and a return to the 1992 peacekeeping 
accords.  (Note: Voronin did not provide further explanation. 
End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) Voronin shook his head as he concluded:  "I don't 
understand.  The position of the Russian MFA doesn't coincide 
with that of the Kremlin."  Voronin related how he tested his 
hypothesis about this bureaucratic split by noting to Zubakov 
that Russian TN negotiator Nesterushkin had made some public 
statement on the frozen conflict.  Voronin got the reaction 
he expected; Zubakov dismissively asked, "who is this 
Nesterushkin?"  Voronin remarked to us that in other fora 
Nesterushkin would say that Zubakov had little standing on 
Moldovan affairs. 
 
Voronin Surprised by Decision to Register TN Vehicles 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (C) The President raised the issue of his government's 
recent decision to require TN vehicles to be registered with 
Chisinau authorities.  "I found out about this decision on 
the TV news," Voronin said in exasperation.  He asked Prime 
Minister Tarlev the next morning how the issue had been 
decided, Voronin recounted.  Tarlev responded that TN vehicle 
registration had been the President's idea for a long time. 
How long ago did I raise this idea?, Voronin asked Tarlev. 
"From two years ago" was the response, Voronin said.  Voronin 
said he noted to Tarlev that the Prime Minister had issued 
this decision in the middle of the President's efforts to 
reach across to Tiraspol.  Voronin said he would find a way 
to solve the vehicle-registration problem. 
 
¶7. (C) Meanwhile, Voronin said, his government had formed an 
agricultural committee to consider the distribution of land 
taking place in Transnistria.  Smirnov had decided to rent 
land for 99 years to three companies that had suddenly 
appeared in TN, Voronin stated.  GOM security services were 
looking into the companies; Voronin suspected they were 
Russian.  With determination in his voice the President 
stated that Moldova would not recognize Smirnov's land 
distribution. 
 
 
CHISINAU 00001377  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶8. (C) Voronin thought TN "foreign minister" Litskai did not 
have the mandate from TN "president" Smirnov to discuss GOM 
confidence-building proposals with Minister for Reintegration 
Sova.  Without authority from Smirnov, Litskai was avoiding a 
meeting with Minister for Reintegration Sova. 
 
Moldovan Contingent to Iraq 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador thanked the President for Moldova's 
contribution to demining efforts in Iraq.  Voronin noted that 
his Security Council would discuss the possibility of sending 
a new contingent of 20 deminers and 4 others to Iraq this 
Friday, November 23.  Voronin asked whether a group of 
civilians (e.g., medical personnel) would be needed in Iraq. 
The Ambassador promised a USG response in time for the 
Security Council's meeting.  (Comment:  In a conversation 
with the Ambassador later on November 20, Minister of Defense 
Vrabie expressed an interest in sending Moldovan military 
medical personnel to Iraq.  End comment.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Voronin related the details of his Zubakov meeting 
rather matter-of-factly.  The President did not seem 
particularly optimistic, or pessimistic, for that matter, 
about a resolution to the Transnistrian conflict.  Perhaps, 
like his advisor Marc Tkaciuk, Voronin feels that the next 
developments on TN are out of his hands and will come from 
CFE-related talks with Russia. 
 
¶11. (C) When discussing the TN vehicle-registration issue, 
Voronin kept his irritation in check.  President Voronin, his 
advisor Tkaciuk and Minister Sova have told us they were 
surprised by the decision.  We assume Prime Minister Tarlev 
did not have the President's blessing to issue this decision. 
 
 
¶12. (C) We speculate that Tarlev colluded with Minister of 
Information Technology Molojen to issue the 
vehicle-registration decision.  Tarlev recently backed 
Molojen's decision to require a special stamp on bottled 
beverages, a decision which would bring revenue to Molojen's 
Ministry.  We cannot determine whether Tarlev and Molojen 
issued the TN vehicle-registration decision as a way to gain 
revenue, as a deliberate attempt to undermine the President's 
efforts to warm relations with Transnistria, or as part of 
political maneuvering in advance of the March 2008 Communist 
Party Congress. 
 
¶13. (C) As the pre-2009 electoral season heats up, 
Transnistria remains frozen. 
KIRBY