VZCZCXRO6106
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #1367/01 3181527
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141527Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5922
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 001367 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017 
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV TN GM RS MD
SUBJECT: NO VORONIN-ZUBAKOV AGREEMENT ON TRANSNISTRIA; 
CONCERN ABOUT RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS IN MOLDOVA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a meeting with the DCM, Presidential 
advisor Marc Tkaciuk categorically denied the existence of 
any agreement made between President Voronin and Russian 
Security Council Deputy Secretary Yuriy Zubakov.  The meeting 
with Zubakov mostly concerned domestic political issues and 
the emergence of Moldovan political groups affiliated with 
Russian nationalists.  Tkaciuk repeated Moldovan government 
(GOM) support for USG efforts on CFE/Istanbul Commitments 
with two caveats:  the need for a timeline for removal of 
Russian peacekeeping forces (PKF) and the need for real 
progress towards a final, political settlement of 
Transnistria (TN) in tandem with the removal of Russian PKF. 
Tkaciuk concluded that future progress on TN would depend on 
the outcome of U.S.-Russian talks on CFE.  End summary. 
 
No TN Agreement, Concern about Russian Nationalism in MD 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2. (C) Tkaciuk explained that the Moldovan government (GOM) 
had invited Zubakov to Moldova to discuss Voronin's recent 
proposals to improve relations and increase interaction with 
Transnistrian (TN) officials.  Zubakov praised Voronin's 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) as very interesting and 
very promising, the president's advisor related.  He added 
that the Russian government was apparently discussing the 
CBMs internally, so Zubakov didn't have a definitive response 
to them.  No "Kozak 2" plan emerged from the Voronin-Zubakov 
conversation, Tkaciuk stressed. 
 
¶3. (C) Tkaciuk wondered why the international community had 
gotten spun up about the Zubakov visit, when the recent visit 
of Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin had elicited no 
similar wave of concern.  (Note:  It seemed Tkaciuk had been 
asked about a Voronin-Zubakov agreement during Tkaciuk's 
recent trip to London.)  Tkaciuk noted that Zubakov had 
talked to ambassadors (not further specified) during his trip 
here and speculated that rumors about an agreement may have 
developed from those meetings. 
 
¶4. (C) Moldova's domestic political situation and the 
emergence of Russian nationalist groups in Moldova took up 
most of the meeting, according to the presidential advisor. 
He described as alarming the appearance of political parties 
and movements supported by Russian "structures."  He cited 
the November 4 "Imperial Russia" march in Moldova organized 
by Russian nationalists. 
 
GOM Supports USG Proposals on CFE with Two Caveats 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) Tkaciuk reiterated his government's interest in USG 
efforts to work out a solution that addressed Russia's CFE 
concerns and Istanbul Commitments on Transnistria.  He 
stressed that he understood the U.S. had a broad agenda with 
Russia and that Transnistria was only one small point on that 
agenda.  The president's advisor said the GOM had two 
clarifications it needed to have included in any agreements 
on CFE and TN:  1) Russian forces guarding the Colbasna 
munitions should leave TN at the early stages of a final 
agreement and Russian PKF should have a specified deadline 
for their final withdrawal; and 2) parallel to the withdrawal 
of the Russian PKF, real movement towards a final political 
settlement of TN should take place.  International civilian 
and military observers could be put in place while Russian 
PKF withdrew step by step, Tkaciuk opined. 
 
¶6. (C) Tkaciuk suggested it might be easier to set a deadline 
for the political settlement, rather than setting one for the 
withdrawal of Russian PKF.  For example, he thought aloud, 
the TN parliament could pass a law, stating that on a certain 
date TN would become part of a reunified Moldova.  As soon as 
Chisinau and Tiraspol agreed to reunification, Russian PKF 
would not be needed.  Russia could claim victory (it had kept 
the peace), say its forces were no longer needed, and 
withdraw its PKF. 
 
Concern about German Position on Russian Peacekeepers 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7. (C) Tkaciuk shared in confidence his worry about Germany's 
position on Russian PKF in TN.  The presidential advisor said 
that German officials believed that, if Moldova and Russia 
agreed on the disposition of Russian PKF in TN, then the 
issue of foreign forces in a sovereign country was off the 
table and the international community had no more say in the 
issue.  Tkaciuk thought that the Germans were trying to find 
a way of using the 1992 TN ceasefire accords to legitimize 
the Russian military presence in TN.  Tkaciuk stated that 
 
CHISINAU 00001367  002 OF 003 
 
 
Moldova would not agree to a Russian military presence on its 
territory. 
 
¶8. (C) The DCM reiterated the U.S. position on Moldovan 
neutrality:  it was the prerogative of the Moldovans to 
decide to be neutral and the U.S. would respect Moldova's 
choice.  However, the U.S. as a sovereign nation would not 
guarantee the neutrality of Moldova as another sovereign 
nation. 
 
"Subversives" Responsible for GOM Decision on TN Vehicle 
Registration 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶9. (C) The DCM noted that the recent GOM decision to require 
Transnistrians to register their vehicles with Chisinau 
authorities (else be barred from circulating in the right 
bank) had undermined the positive atmosphere GOM officials 
had created starting with Voronin's CBMs.  Tkaciuk was 
dismayed at the decision and noted that it had not been 
carefully coordinated within the GOM.  The idea had been 
wandering through the bureaucracy untended, Tkaciuk 
explained, when suddenly it appeared in the press.  Minister 
for Reintegration Sova had been out of the country, and 
Tkaciuk himself learned of the decision when he read the 
morning news.  Tkaciuk said "subversives" were responsible 
for issuing the government decision.  He didn't know who 
exactly was behind it; officials were trying to find out. 
(Comment:  The initiative came from Minister Molojen's 
Ministry of Information Development.  End Comment.) 
Meanwhile, Tkaciuk grimaced, the decision had undermined 
fragile progress on CBMs and TN.  The GOM was now trying to 
change parts of the decision and find a face-saving way out 
of the mess. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶10. (C) When asked if the Russian elections would slow down 
the search for a resolution to the TN conflict, Tkaciuk 
thought not.  The presidential advisor dismissed the recent 
Russian Duma vote confirming Russia's December withdrawal 
from CFE as merely an instrument that President Putin could 
wield in the ongoing CFE discussions with NATO allies.  When 
no longer needed, Tkaciuk said, the Russians would just hang 
the idea back up on its nail.  Asked about Moldova's next 
steps on TN, Tkaciuk said they depended on the outcome of the 
conversations between Russia and the U.S. on CFE.  Moldova 
has done all it could, Tkaciuk concluded. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) This time the storm around rumors of another TN 
agreement/plan was more of a rain shower.  Perhaps we're a 
little wiser, perhaps a little more cynical, or just less 
hopeful.  Tkaciuk, the official who most closely reflects 
President Voronin's thinking on TN, seems to be waiting for 
the outcome of the U.S. discussions with Russia on CFE. 
Other than repairing the damage to Chisinau-Tiraspol 
relations caused by the vehicle-registration flap, Moldovan 
officials don't appear to be preparing new efforts on the 
Transnistrian front.  From our vantage point, we believe that 
Moldova's next steps on TN will be tied to the CFE 
discussions. 
 
¶12. (C) Tkaciuk's idea about establishing a deadline for a 
political settlement rather than focusing on a time line for 
withdrawal of Russian PKF is a good one, if we assumed the 
Russians would recognize they were no longer needed after 
Chisinau and Tiraspol had agreed to reunification -- an 
assumption we're not prepared to make.  Either way removal of 
Russia's ammunition stored at Colbasna is a necessary step 
for the withdrawal process. 
 
¶13. (C) When Tkaciuk discussed Russian nationalists in 
Moldova, he might have been concerned about the possible 
involvement of individuals sent from the Russian Federation 
to influence the 2009 national, parliamentary elections.  A 
couple years ago, governmental leaders accused Russian groups 
of trying to undermine the Communist Party during the 2005 
parliamentary elections and prohibited a Russian group from 
entering Moldova.  Because of Voronin's rejection of the 
Russian Federation's Kozak Memorandum in 2003, Russian 
operatives may have been trying to retaliate against 
Voronin's party.  It seems Tkaciuk is Voronin's closest 
advisor on Communist Party affairs.  If so, Tkaciuk may want 
to forestall a return to the Moldovan and Russian cycle of 
retaliation of 2005 and will keep a close eye on these 
developments. 
 
CHISINAU 00001367  003 OF 003 
 
 
KIRBY