VZCZCXRO6069
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBY #1603/01 3060634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020634Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8507
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 4661
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 2832
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 2954

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 001603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AS PM
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENT 
ON ELECTION OUTCOME 
 
REF: STATE 150164 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert D. McCallum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) Australia's requirements to deploy forces to Iraq 
following expiry of the MNF-I mandate will depend heavily on 
which party forms the government following the November 24 
election.  The Liberal/National Coalition government under 
Prime Minister John Howard has been solidly behind the 
mission in Iraq and would likely find it easier to reach a 
political decision to continue its participation under most 
scenarios envisioned reftel, but likely would transition its 
combat role in southern Iraq to a training role in the short 
term.  The opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) led by 
Kevin Rudd, on the other hand, has pledged to remove all 
Australian combat troops from Iraq gradually and in close 
consultation with the United States, if his party wins the 
election.  Rudd, currently well ahead in the polls, would 
need political cover in order to move forward with any future 
deployments, probably including a new Chapter VII UN Security 
Council resolution.   Both parties are likely to prefer to 
keep Australia forces under U.S. command and under the 
umbrella of a U.S.-negotiated agreement. 
 
-------------------------- 
A LIBERAL PARTY GOVERNMENT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In the event the Liberal/National Coalition is 
returned for a fifth term in the November 24 election, we 
would expect PM Howard to continue his strong, 
conviction-driven support of the mission in Iraq.  Of the 
scenarios offered reftel, we believe that John Howard would 
prefer for Australia to act as a full participant in any 
negotiation and agreement the United States makes with Iraq 
regarding the continuing presence of troops beyond the 
lifespan of UNSCRs 1546 and 1723.  In this eventuality, a 
Howard government would likely want to keep its forces under 
U.S. command.  The PM has made clear, however, that he wishes 
to have combat troops in the Overwatch Battle Group succeeded 
by military trainers as soon as possible.  The decision to 
join in any U.S. negotiation could be made relatively quickly 
by the National Security Committee of Cabinet, probably 
within weeks.  As Australia's deployment of troops to 
Afghanistan and later Iraq was based on the U.S. and 
Australian September 14, 2001, invocation of the mutual 
defense provision (Article IV) of the ANZUS Treaty, there are 
no major legal impediments to continued deployment of troops 
to Iraq. (see also para 6 on war-making powers.) 
 
¶3. (C) Howard would likely prefer but not require a generic 
United Nations (non-chapter VII) call to support Iraq in 
order to move forward with post UNSCR troop involvement in 
Iraq.  Despite his strong commitment, however, he likely will 
follow the lead of the United States, if we commence a 
drawdown of forces, and to transition the current combat 
elements to a training role. 
 
------------------------ 
A LABOR PARTY GOVERNMENT 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) ALP Leader Rudd has pledged to withdraw the 550 
Australian combat troops comprising the Overwatch Battle 
Group in Southern Iraq in the event of a Labor victory, 
leaving approximately 1,000 defense force personnel in and 
around Iraq, including a joint security task force in Baghdad 
that provides security for the Australian diplomatic mission, 
Qthat provides security for the Australian diplomatic mission, 
and naval and air patrols in the Gulf.  Rudd has insisted 
that he would not withdraw Australian combat troops 
precipitously but gradually and in coordination with the 
United States and the Iraqi governments. He has indicated he 
would allow a further six-month rotation, if he should be 
elected, leaving current troops in place at least until 
August 2008, and may replace combat forces with trainers and 
other security personnel. 
 
¶5. (C) It is unlikely that Rudd would be inclined to support 
continued deployment of Australian troops to Iraq in the 
absence of a clear UN Chapter VII mandate and as part of a 
multi-national force.  On the other hand, he is committed to 
the alliance with the United States, and has committed to 
maintenance of an expeditionary capability that can assist 
Australia's allies and the United Nations globally.  In the 
 
CANBERRA 00001603  002 OF 002 
 
 
event an ALP government can be persuaded to deploy additional 
forces to Iraq after expiry of the current UNSCs, we believe 
a Rudd government would accept allowing the U.S. to negotiate 
an agreement with the Iraqi government on its behalf and 
would prefer to keep Australian defense forces under U.S. 
command. 
 
------------------------ 
HOW THE DECISION IS MADE 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (U) War-making powers are not clearly spelled out in the 
Australian Constitution.  In practice, the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet have assumed that power, including deploying military 
forces overseas, with discretion to put the issue to 
Parliament for debate.  On matters of great national import a 
parliamentary vote is usually called, but because the 
executive is drawn from the majority party or coalition in 
Parliament, the vote generally would correspond closely to 
the decision of the National Security Committee of Cabinet. 
 
MCCALLUM