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P 211837Z NOV 07
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE 
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017 
TAGS: PREL EAID ZL EUN
SUBJECT: EU FMS AND KOSOVO:  GETTING TO A "GENUINE" DEBATE 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 3120 
 
Classified By: Acting DepPolCouns V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (B/D). 
 
SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) EU FMs discusse Kosovo at their November 19 GAERC. 
According to several contacts, various FMs want a "genuine 
internal EU debate" on Kosovo, sometime after December 10, 
before taking key decisions on recognition and the ESDP 
mission.  Some reportedly do not want to be seen as simply 
rubber-stamping a Quint decision.  Our contacts believe a 
"critical mass" of member-states will recognize Kosovo 
independence and see no member-state blocking the launch of 
an ESDP mission; the question of timing, however, remains. 
Greece proposed accelerating the accession process for all 
countries in the region; Rehn's office apparently had not 
been consulted on this beforehand.  All 27 FMs are scheduled 
to meet next at the December 10 GAERC and are expected to 
meet on the margins of the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon 
December 13 and the European Council December 14.  Slovenia 
may be preparing an "early" January special GAERC to focus on 
Kosovo, but the Council Secretariat believes it will happen 
one or two days after a UDI.  Germany reportedly continues to 
support conditioning recognition by member-states on the 
promulgation of a Kosovo constitution enshrining the 
Ahtisaari Plan.  End summary 
 
DESIRE FOR GENUINE, COMPREHENSIVE DEBATE 
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¶2.  (C) Several contacts have told us that some foreign 
ministers want a "genuine" internal EU debate on Kosovo 
before deliberating on the critical questions of recognition 
and launching an ESDP mission.  German PSC ambassador told 
POL M/C Nov 21 that GAERC discussion had demonstrated that, 
for all the notes of caution, most of the foreign ministers 
now saw Kosovo as an EU responsibility, not "a problem for 
the Quint".  He credited this new attitude in large part to 
the Troika process, especially Ishinger's frequent briefings 
in Brussels, where he invariably described himself as the 
"EU's representative."  However, there was no question but 
that the member states would want to be full participants in 
subsequent EU decisions on Kosovo.  This echoes what we have 
heard from other contacts that some ministers want to ensure 
that they not simply "rubber-stamp" a Quint proposal.  UK 
Mission Balkans watcher (protect) told us November 21 that 
the GAERC demonstrated that FMs are finally starting to 
acknowledge the need for detailed contingency planning. 
While some member states are unenthusiastic about Kosovo 
independence, they accept the need to make "tough" decisions, 
our UK contact added. 
 
BILDT:  NEED TO TALK ABOUT REGION, NOT KOSOVO IN ISOLATION 
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¶3.  (C) According to the Council Secretariat and the British, 
Swedish FM Bildt urged further discussion of Kosovo in a 
wider context.  While apparently not referring to his "soft 
landing" line, Bildt stressed that Kosovo should not be seen 
in isolation. Two contacts characterized Bildt's intervention 
as "realistic."  Council Secretariat Director for the W. 
Balkans Stefan Lehne (protect) told us November 21 that a 
Swedish delegation had told him earlier that day that there 
should be some "accompanying measures" included in the 
discussion, but that they had remained extremely vague over 
specifics.  The Portuguese Mission told us that planned 
reactions to the possible expulsion of EU ambassadors from 
Belgrade and a potential UDI from Banja Luka likely would be 
included in such a discussion.  Lehne stressed that Bildt 
could prove important in moving the EU quickly on Kosovo and 
urged that all consider engaging him more on how to achieve 
this. 
 
¶4.  (C) Another Council Secretariat contact noted that Solana 
is very concerned about both BiH and the Serbian presidential 
elections, and the effect that Kosovo independence will have 
on them.  UK Mission noted that some FMs mentioned the 
Serbian elections at the GAERC, but only to emphasize that 
Belgrade would continue to change the election date to ensure 
that it falls after a UDI from Pristina.  Lehne told us that 
there was "nothing new" in Solana's one-on-one meeting with 
Tadic; Solana also met with Kostunica and the Serbian 
delegation (there was no one-on-one), with Kostunica 
predictably reiterating the need to respect international law 
and Solana calling for flexibility. 
 
ROMANIA AND CYPRUS THE HOLDOUTS 
 
BRUSSELS 00003382  002 OF 003 
 
 
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¶5. (C) Although misgivings may abound, the hard-core 
opposition continues to shrink.  Most contacts ascribe only 
Romania and Cyprus to this hard-core.  At the Monday GAERC, 
the Romanian FM even submitted a written statement urging 
that, if needed, more time after December 10 should be 
devoted to negotiations. Nevertheless, our contacts do seem 
sanguine that the opposition of just these two countries can 
be managed.  The Spanish and Slovaks reportedly did not voice 
any concerns over Kosovo. 
 
GREEKS PROPOSING ACCELERATED ACCESSION 
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¶6.  (C) The UK Mission confirmed that Greece had proposed 
accelerating the accession process for all countries in the 
region, with the intention of providing Serbia some degree of 
a softer landing.  The Slovenian Mission Balkans expert 
(protect) told us November 21 that the Greeks proposed 
immediate signing of the SAAs with Belgrade and Sarajevo, 
with candidate status for Serbia by the end of 2008.  The 
Commission would be tasked with front-loading financial 
assistance.  Our UK contact noted that the Greek proposal 
goes too far for London and several other capitals.  Our 
Slovenian contact, however, said that no member state 
appeared opposed in principle to the Greek proposal. 
 
¶7.  (C) The proposal (the first to be formally tabled but not 
the first to be floated, as the Slovenes have been making 
similar noises in Brussels) apparently was not "pre-cooked" 
well in advance -- Commissioner Rehn's Serbia/Kosovo advisor 
had not even read it as of November 21.  Lehne told us he 
thought that the proposal was good "in principle," but 
unlikely to gain much traction; rather, it demonstrates that 
Greece will no longer seek to slow down the process regarding 
Kosovo.  He noted that Athens might also be demonstrating 
greater flexibility in order to earn allies in its "name 
dispute" with Macedonia in the run-up to the Bucharest 
Summit. 
 
HUNGARIAN ADVICE:  AVOID THE "I" WORD 
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¶8.  (C) The Hungarian PSC ambassador told us November 20 that 
several delegations, in corridor conversations, noted that 
the U.S. and Kosovars should refrain from talking about UDI 
and rather focus on Kosovo's implementation of the Ahtisaari 
plan  in coordination with the EU and U.S.  (Comment:  These 
corridor discussions likely were fueled by Thaci's 
post-election statements about declaring independence very 
quickly after December 10; a Council Secretariat contact told 
us that Thaci had assured Solana that he would coordinate 
closely with the EU and the U.S. before declaring 
independence.) 
 
COMMENT 
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¶9. (C/NF) Two of our contacts noted that this GAERC was 
neither as productive as it could have been on Kosovo, nor as 
bad as some might have feared.  The very size of this massive 
ministerial (81 ministers, including those covering defense 
and development) made it hard to have substantive 
discussions.  On the plus side, there seems to be more 
cautious optimism about the state of EU unity.  The challenge 
is that the troika process has given the member states the 
sense of participation in the process, but without the 
responsibility of having to make any difficult decisions.  If 
another extended discussion is indeed necessary to ensure EU 
unity after Dec 10, logistics will be difficult, given the 
packed agendas for the December 10 GAERC and the Dec 14 EU 
Summit.  Brussels' minds are clearly grappling with this 
problem right now, but we haven't seen any answers, and we do 
not exclude the possibility of pressure for slippage of the 
January time frame  (A number of Council and permrep contacts 
have told us that Kosovars will need to have flexibility, 
given that the EU may need time to keep the 27 together).  We 
also continue to hear much appreciation for the low public 
profile of the US over the past weeks -- our contacts credit 
this with helping to bring states in the region along.  That 
said, it may be useful to reach out to non-Quint member 
states who share our views on Kosovo independence to help 
focus their counterparts in the EU on a timeline for further 
deliberations -- one that does not go beyond mid-January.  We 
should also use the presence of EU FMs at the Annapolis 
meeting and at the NATO ministerial to underscore privately 
that any further delays will only increase instability on the 
ground and will not provide softer landings. 
 
BRUSSELS 00003382  003 OF 003 
 
 
GRAY 
.