VZCZCXRO9403
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3299/01 3101739
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P 061739Z NOV 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017 
TAGS: PREL EAID TU ZL EUN MCC
SUBJECT: COMMISSION'S ENLARGEMENT STRATEGY:  CONSOLIDATION 
AND CONDITIONALITY 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 3192 
 
Classified By: POL Enlargement Unit Chief V. Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/ 
d). 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
 
¶1.  (C) The European Commission's (EC) "Enlargement 
Strategy," published November 6, aims at tackling key issues, 
such as promoting judicial reform, both earlier than during 
previous enlargements and with the help of benchmarks.  On 
Turkey, the EC's strategy notes that "the pace of 
negotiations (with Ankara) depends on the pace of the reforms 
in Turkey."  The EC's policy of consolidation will mean that, 
while the door for other potential member states remains 
open, the focus will be on the W. Balkans and Turkey. 
Greater focus on conditionality will translate into 
challenges for the current candidate and accession countries 
that other waves of accession did not necessarily address. 
The strategy also notes that EC financial assistance will be 
better targeted to reform priorities in the accession 
process.  While the strategy pays lip service to the EU's 
"absorptive capacity," it does not address the issue in 
depth.  END SUMMARY 
 
CONSOLIDATION 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) Weeks before the EC published its report on 
"Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-08," Director 
General for Enlargement Michael Leigh told us that the EC's 
focus would be on consolidation of commitments and increased 
visibility of conditionality.  According to Commission 
contacts, consolidation translates into a focus on the EU's 
existing commitments -- namely to the countries of the W. 
Balkans and Turkey.  The door for other potential accession 
countries remains open, but the Commission will not encourage 
any other country to pursue EU accession at this time. 
Commission and various member state contacts have provided 
different reasons for this:  to assuage "enlargement fatigue" 
among the European population by focusing on two immediate 
regions already in the accession pipeline; to avoid 
endangering the Reform Treaty's (Treaty of Lisbon) 
ratification, and to dampen further calls from France and 
elsewhere for a genuine debate on the borders of Europe. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Turning to more technical issues, several contacts 
have pointed to the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA) as 
another example of consolidation on the EC's part.  IPA 
combines the EC's several instruments for pre-accession 
financial assistance into one program.  The EC has also 
decided to try to match program assistance with reform 
priorities more closely, including via proposed revised 
partnership agreements with accession and candidate 
countries. 
 
CONDITIONALITY 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) In efforts both to deflect public criticism (and 
therefore contain the outbreak of "enlargement fatigue") and 
address genuine shortcomings in the accession process, the EC 
is also highlighting the use of benchmarks in the accession 
process.  While the strategy report sidesteps the 2007 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria by merely noting that the 
EC took "safeguard measures at the end of 2006 to address 
shortcomings in both countries," it stresses that "rigorous 
conditionality at all stages of the enlargement process helps 
consolidating reforms" in all countries concerned. 
Technically, conditionality has always existed in the 
accession process; candidates had to meet the acquis 
criteria.  In practice, the EU sees Turkey and the countries 
of the W. Balkans as less willing than the central European 
states of the 2004 enlargement to take the necessary bold 
reforms voluntarily.  Benchmarks, they observe, is one way of 
prodding the reforms along.  Our contacts also note that the 
Commission itself has grown considerably over the past ten 
years.  This translates into a larger number of officials 
reviewing how each candidate and accession country complies 
with its EU obligations.  While there will always be 
political masters who determine whether to cut corners or 
apply conditionality even more rigorously, a greater emphasis 
on conditionality is a reality in Brussels. 
 
¶5.  (C) While not specified in its 2007 strategy, the EU will 
avoid the mistake it made with Bulgaria and Romania of 
promising accession by a certain date (even with a fall-back 
date) to any country.  Rather, it will seek to judge each 
country on its own merits and address "difficult reform 
 
BRUSSELS 00003299  002 OF 002 
 
 
issues at an early stage."  Its strategy pointedly notes that 
in Turkey's case, the pace of accession negotiations will 
depend on the pace of reforms -- a pace that slowed down 
since negotiations began in 2005, according to the EC's 
Turkey Unit. 
 
AND SHARING THE BLAME 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) For once, the EC shifts from a Brussels-centric 
policy when the strategy addresses public relations and 
enlargement. It reasons that member states have the largest 
responsibility to communicate the benefits of enlargement to 
their citizens.  "The Commission will continue to play its 
part, by promoting a better flow of factual information on 
enlargement issues."  Left unsaid is how poorly the EU as a 
whole, whether EC, member states, the European Parliament, or 
any combination thereof, has communicated the value added of 
the various waves of enlargement to European citizens.  The 
EC has basically abdicated this important task. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) While the EU consolidates its enlargement 
commitments, we will need to remind Brussels and member 
states to keep the door open to other potential accession 
countries.  The EU is portraying Croatia as a success story 
to the rest of the W. Balkans, but the citizens of the region 
may require more to support needed reforms.  In this vein, we 
may want to press member states to engage actively on visa 
liberalization for the region as an incentive to increase 
reforms.  We may also want to consult with Commission 
representations on the ground in Ankara and the capitals of 
the W. Balkans on how best to use this year's strategy and 
Commission reports to promote needed reforms.  We likely will 
need to focus accession and candidate countries' attention on 
the reports' specific recommendations rather than on the 
strategy that notes. "Their accessions are likely to occur in 
the medium to long-term."  While there will always be 
political factors affecting decisions (i.e., Rehn's different 
positions on an SAA with Serbia over the past year), the 
accession process will, indeed, be stricter for those 
countries already in the pipeline compared to the 2004/07 
waves. 
GRAY 
.