VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSW #1077/01 3121601
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081601Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4667

UNCLAS BERN 001077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CIA FOR NCTC AND DEPT FOR S/CT KEN MCKANE 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL CVIS ASEC KVPR SZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST GOV PRACTICES 
 
REF: A) 06 STATE 190832 B) 07 STATE 133921 
 
1.(SBU)  Post would like to submit responses to questions in STATE 
¶133921.  We have been as complete as possible but can approach the 
governments of Switzerland or Liechtenstein for further information 
if something in particular is required. We also note that while 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland's practices are similar and in some 
areas identical, the responses in this cable are focused on 
Switzerland. 
 
¶A. WATCHLISTING 
 
ICE Attache/Bern does not interact with any Swiss agency maintaining 
any type of "watchlist."  Such task is the responsibility of the 
Transportation Security Administration attach assigned to the U.S. 
Embassy in Brussels, Belgium. 
 
¶B. TRAVELER INFORMATION COLLECTION Air travelers have their 
passports scanned upon arriving and departing Swiss airports.  Land 
border crossings, to include rail crossings, generally have 
identifying data manually entered into hand-held devices that are 
later downloaded into a migration data base. 
 
The information is collected by entities under the Swiss Office for 
Migration and Swiss Border Police. 
 
Obtaining border crossing information from Swiss authorities is 
difficult.  Written and verbal requests for such information within 
the past six months have been ignored.  However, Swiss authorities 
freely provide detailed information to ICE Attache/Bern on subjects 
being deported to the U.S., or have some type of U.S. connection. 
 
Passenger Name Records are collected from arriving commercial 
flights and shared with Swiss law enforcement agencies.  Such 
information can be shared upon request pursuant to existing Customs 
Mutual Assistance Agreements. 
 
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) has been effective in 
identifying wanted subjects who have an active NCIC (National Crime 
Information Center) warrant, TECS (Treasury Enforcement 
Communication System) subject lookout, and INTERPOL lookout. 
Recently, such information was used to aid Zurich Canton Police in 
identifying and arresting an individual wanted in Switzerland for a 
narcotics offense. 
 
¶C. BORDER CONTROL AND SCREENING 
 
ICE Attache/Bern does not interact with the host government on 
software to screen travelers of security interest.  Such interaction 
is done with TSA and the National Targeting Center (NTC) operated by 
the U.S. Customs and Border protection (CBP).  However, APIS 
information from outbound Swiss flights bound for the United States 
are downloaded to queries in TECS, NTC data bases, and U.S. agencies 
maintaining watch list or no fly lists. 
 
¶E. PASSPORTS 
 
Switzerland presently issues passports which are machine readable 
and have a digital photo (Model 03) as well as passports that 
contain a chip with biometric information on it (Model 06). 
However, there are older passports (Model 85) which are not machine 
readable and do not contain biometric information and are still in 
use.  The passports of this type will expire on 12/31/2007 and they 
are not renewable. 
 
When Swiss citizens lose a passport the authorities will issue a 
replacement passport with full validity, that does not look any 
different from the outside nor does it have a different series 
number. If a person loses more than three passports within five 
years the Swiss will only issue another passport valid for two 
years. 
 
The personal data in Emergency passports is printed on laminated 
security paper. The emergency passports are machine readable, 
include a digital photo, but do not include a biometric chip. 
 
Model 03 (F1234567), model 06 (X1234567) and emergency passports 
(J1234567) have different series numbers, starting with different 
letters of the alphabet followed by a seven digit number. 
 
Post sees no widespread pattern of applicants obtaining new 
passports in order to hide evidence of prior travel.  However, as 
many Swiss citizens have taken advantage and obtained new model 
passports, post does see many visa applicants with 'clean' passports 
as the newer models have only been issued since 2003. 
 
¶F. FRAUD DETECTION 
The Swiss Federal Police and Swiss Office for Migration have 
reported passport fraud matters to ICE Attache/Bern.  The Swiss 
Office for Federal Migration is persistent and will contact multiple 
sources regarding passport fraud, including INTERPOL and police 
agencies in other countries. 
 
In one case, the Swiss Federal Police submitted fingerprint 
exemplars for ICE Attache/Bern to compare on an immigration 
violation case.  The prints were submitted to the Southwest regional 
Lab in Houston, Texas for analysis and comparison in both the 
immigration and NCIC data bases. 
 
Stolen Swiss passports and fraud trends are normally reported to 
Interpol by the Swiss Federal Office of Police. 
 
¶G. PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY 
 
Transmittal of personal information to agencies outside Switzerland 
is severely restricted.  Disclosure of personal data is governed by 
the Swiss Federal Office of Data Protection. 
 
Switzerland presently does not grant Freedom of Information Act 
rights (similar to that of the U.S.) to non-citizens/residents. 
 
¶H. IMMIGRATION DATA BASES 
 
Computerized data bases with passport scanning capabilities are 
employed at Swiss airports.  However, in practice, passports are 
normally scanned upon entry at an airport and are normally visually 
inspected upon departure. 
 
At land border crossings, passport data is normally captured when a 
vehicle and its occupants are subject to a secondary examination. 
Examination of all persons and vehicles crossing a Swiss land border 
is impractical and would adversely affect commerce. 
 
¶I. WATCHLIST AND INFORMATION SHARING 
 
No available information. 
 
¶J. BIOMETRICS 
 
Switzerland currently does not routinely capture biometric data at 
its ports of entry. 
Since September 2006, the Swiss government issues passports with 
electronically stored data.  However, some of the older Swiss 
passports still in use contain no biometric identifiers. 
 
¶K. IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE PARTNERS 
 
Swiss Federal Office of Police 
Swiss Federal Office for Migration 
Swiss Federal Office of Police, Service for Analysis and Prevention 
(SAP) 
 
Presently, the Swiss are not partners with the United States under 
the C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism).  One of 
the main issues is the protection/disclosure of Swiss privacy data. 
Any such data sharing is precluded by Swiss law. 
 
However, the recent ratification of the Operative Working Agreement 
(OWA) does provide sharing of information at a law enforcement level 
as it relates to terrorism.  But, ICE Attache/Bern has not yet been 
in a position or had the opportunity to share or receive any 
information pursuant to this agreement. 
 
The Swiss Federal Office of Data Protection is admittedly 
short-staffed but adequately safeguards the protection of privacy 
data pursuant to strict Swiss laws. 
 
The Swiss law does not specifically define terrorism per se, but 
select provisions of the Swiss penal code criminalize numerous 
offenses indicative of and associated with terrorism. 
 
ICE Attache/Bern, Switzerland 
 
1)  Please provide an inventory of what interagency efforts you have 
undertaken with State and Justice to increase our capacities at the 
Embassies and Consulates in detecting and eliminating document 
forgery. 
 
Liaison with the FBI Legat, Regional Security Officer, and Consul 
General have established an informal, but effective system of 
reporting document fraud to the ICE Attache/Bern.  Issues relating 
to document and visa fraud are brought to the attention of consular 
officers and contemporaneously reported to ICE Attache/Bern.  One 
such case involved an American citizen, who was suspected of 
passport fraud.  The case was subsequently closed due to 
insufficient evidence, but was later re-opened by the U.S. State 
Department, Diplomatic Security Service based upon information 
developed by the Tulsa, Oklahoma Police department and ICE 
Attache/Bern. 
 
As a result of liaison efforts, cases pertaining to document and 
visa fraud are routinely reported to ICE Attache/Bern as a matter of 
standard procedure.  Consular staff refer all document and visa 
fraud matters to their supervisor AND to ICE Attache/Bern.  The 
majority of the reporting to date has dealt more with visa fraud 
than general document fraud. 
 
Within the past year, the following cases with multiple violators 
have been initiated based primarily on liaison efforts with the 
Consul General and regional Security Officer: 
 
CASE NUMBER       VIOLATORS           RESULT 
 
SZ16MT07SZ0002         2   Case ongoing. 
SZ16MT07SZ0003         1           Case ongoing 
SZ17FT07SZ0001         3           Case ongoing. 
                                   Two people secondaried. 
SZ19HT07SZ0001         1           Case ongoing. 
SZ13FT07SZ0006         1           One individual excluded 
                          from the U.S. 
 
2)  Please provide an assessment of the level of FDUA trend analysis 
information sharing you would find appropriate for foreign 
government collaboration.  Presuming there is some degree of sharing 
already taking place; provide an inventory of what foreign 
government information sharing you have done to date on fraudulent 
document trend analysis and with whom. 
Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit trend analysis and related 
training would be welcome by Swiss authorities.  Trends should not 
be region or country specific but worldwide as Swiss Embassies and 
Consulates overseas frequently encounter visa, refugee, and document 
fraud and often consult with the Consul General on such matters. 
These cases are then referred to ICE Attache/Bern.  All types of 
document fraud should be shared with Swiss authorities as they 
encounter many immigrants from Europe, Africa, China, and the 
Dominican Republic etc. 
 
Within the past year, the following cases have been worked with 
Swiss authorities: 
 
CASE NUMBER       VIOLATORS    RESULT 
 
SZ17FT07SZ0001        3        Case ongoing.  Two people 
secondaried. 
Swiss Consulate/Tehran. 
 
SZ16CE07SZ0001        1        U.S. immigration violation. 
Swiss Federal Police 
Zurich Kantonspolizei 
Bezirksgericht Bulach 
Swiss Federal Office of Justice 
 
SZ09YL08SZ0001       1         Identity and passport fraud. Subject 
pending 
Swiss Office for Migration deportation from Switzerland. 
 
SZ09YL07SZ0003       1         Identity fraud-negative results. 
Swiss Office for Migration 
CBP SW Document Lab, Houston 
 
SZ02PK05MV0004       1         Bank account frozen pending MLAT. 
Swiss Federal Police 
 
CARTER