VZCZCXRO8558
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #2081/01 3201642
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161642Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9814
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0211
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8665
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1887
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9213
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0861
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 9839
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0200
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0555

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR YI KO GM
SUBJECT: "STURM UND DRANG" FOLLOWED BY "STAY THE COURSE" - 
WHAT TO EXPECT FROM GERMANY ON KOSOVO 
 
REF: A. STATE 146242 
 
     ¶B. BERLIN 01913 
     ¶C. BERLIN 01995 
 
Classified By: Charge John Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite deeply-rooted German desires for a 
UN-mandated Kosovo/Serbia settlement, the German government 
has indicated it will recognize Kosovo if, as expected, 
Pristina unilaterally declares independence following the 
completion of the Troika process.  The German government has 
also signaled that it will continue to maintain its military 
presence in Kosovo through KFOR and press for a planned 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission.  While 
some German politicians are likely to call for a new 
parliamentary mandate to cover German forces in Kosovo after 
UDI, this should not be a serious threat to the governing 
Grand Coalition's decision to stay the course and maintain 
Germany's KFOR mission in Kosovo. END SUMMARY. 
 
Working Hard for Compromise... 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Germany remains one of the most active members of the 
Contact Group/Troika process.  MFA Political Director Volker 
Stanzel recently highlighted German efforts to get all 27 EU 
members "comfortable" with the way forward, and is hosting 
the EU PolDirs in Germany on November 18 to discuss these 
matters in advance of the next meeting of EU Foreign 
Ministers.  However, according to MFA Kosovo Desk Officer 
Christian Plate, the most recent Troika meeting in Vienna on 
November 5 left German MFA officials with a pessimistic 
outlook on the chances for a Serb/Kosovar settlement.  EU 
Troika Representative Wolfgang Ischinger had earlier forecast 
a 10 percent chance for success. "That number is slipping 
quickly" lamented Plate.  With only two more Troika meetings 
remaining before December 10 deadline, the Troika wants to 
put "new ideas on the table," and Ischinger plans to discuss 
a proposal modeled after the German-German Basic Treaty of 
1972, which allowed special relations between East and West 
Germany by granting de facto, but not de jure, legal 
recognition of both sides' sovereignty. 
 
¶3. (C) In his effort to reach an agreement, FM Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier met November 7 with Serbian FM Vuc Jeremic for 
bilateral talks in Berlin before receiving the Kosovar Unity 
Team on November 8.  Both meetings failed to produce new 
results with Steinmeier making clear to Jeremic that he had 
no intention of agreeing to any extension of talks. 
Steinmeier urged the Kosovars to closely coordinate all steps 
with "key allies" prior to and immediately following a UDI. 
Officially, the government line remains that there is no Plan 
B after December 10.  According to MFA State Minister Gernot 
Erler, "even if chances are slim, every effort must be made 
to find a negotiated solution." 
 
...But Recognizing Realities 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Privately, MFA Western Balkan Division Chief Joachim 
Bleicker admits that he expects a Kosovar UDI sometime after 
December 10 and "preferably not before late January." 
Speculation in Germany about the time frame ranges from "the 
day after" the December 10 Troika deadline to the second half 
of 2008.  According to Bleicker, Bundestag (Parliament) 
members are anxious that a Kosovar UDI during the winter 
recess could require a special recess session to deal with 
the question.  Regardless, the German government is prepared 
to recognize an independent Kosovo, "if not in the first 
wave, then shortly thereafter," said Bleicker.  According to 
Dirk Sawitzky, Erler's Chief of Staff, MFA officials and 
Bundestag members' biggest concerns remain social unrest in 
Kosovo, a radicalization of Serbia's domestic politics, and 
destabilizing effects in Bosnia with the possible separation 
of Republica Sprska.  Germany is also increasingly concerned 
with Russian actions in the region, especially Russian 
threats to link Bosnia and Kosovo by only supporting a 
limited extension of the EUFOR mandate at the UN. 
 
Government: No New Mandate Required 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Traditionally, Germany's legalistic tendencies would 
 
BERLIN 00002081  002 OF 003 
 
 
call for a new UNSCR on Kosovo following UDI, and we expect 
some German parliamentarians to make this demand.  According 
to SPD Bundestag member Johannes Jung, a new UN mandate would 
provide the EU with a sound legal basis for the planned ESDP 
mission (Germany has already begun to recruit experts to 
participate) and also calm concerns expressed by German 
Bundestag members about the legal footing of Germany's 
participation in the NATO KFOR deployment.  However, the 
German government recognizes Russian intransigence makes this 
increasingly unlikely and is therefore prepared to keep UNSCR 
1244 as a legal basis for its Kosovo deployment.  The GoG is 
also defending this decision within the EU (where there is no 
consensus as of yet).  Furthermore, the GoG believes that a 
new Bundestag mandate authorizing Germany's participation in 
the KFOR mission is not required.  The situation, however, is 
similar to the debate on Germany's Tornado deployment to 
Afghanistan earlier this year.  The government was certain 
early on that the deployment was covered by the 
already-existing ISAF mandate, a view which was widely shared 
by legal experts.  Nevertheless, political pressure resulted 
in the government seeking a new, separate mandate for the 
Tornados.  The Bundestag has not, in fact, debated Germany's 
role in Kosovo for some time and such a debate, while 
cumbersome, could reinvigorate the public and the Bundestag 
to continue Germany's role in the region during this "next 
stage." 
 
Bundestag: New Mandate 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (C) Under the German constitution, the German Bundestag is 
responsible for authorizing the deployment of the German 
military abroad.  While all parties are still considering how 
to respond to UDI, some initial conversations indicate that: 
 
(a) An advisor to CDU/CSU Deputy Caucus Chair Andreas 
Schockenhoff told us that the Union parties do not see any 
need to rush a debate on Kosovo.  They believe that there is 
a sound legal basis to continue the KFOR deployment even 
after UDI.  They do recognize that a new Bundestag mandate 
may be forthcoming, but that "Germany's commitment to Kosovo 
is unwavering." 
 
(b) SPD staffers emphasized that the debate within the Caucus 
had only just begun.  (NOTE: The SPD-affiliated 
Friedrich-Ebert Foundation is hosting a public event on 
Kosovo during the week of November 26. END NOTE.)  While we 
expect the SPD's debate to be a bit more controversial than 
in the Union parties, the SPD will not want to damage the 
SPD-led MFA (which assesses that there is no need for a new 
mandate) and, according to Jung, the SPD "remains committed 
to keeping the Bundeswehr in Kosovo, even after UDI." 
 
(c) Green Party staffers noted that there is a "real desire" 
in the caucus to keep the Bundeswehr in Kosovo, but that 
there is still a need to discuss the issue internally and to 
reconcile this with more fundamental convictions of the 
rank-and-file party members.  The Greens expect to have a 
position by the end of November and a call for a new 
Bundestag mandate is "highly likely."  The party's Balkan 
expert, Marieluise Beck, plans to visit Pristina and Belgrade 
at the end of November. 
 
(d) FDP Caucus staffers noted that at this point the party 
would be comfortable moving forward with the current mandate, 
but this could change as caucus members and the public begin 
to focus on Kosovo in the coming weeks. 
 
(e) Only the left-wing Linke caucus indicated it will 
challenge a decision to keep the Bundeswehr in Kosovo at the 
Constitutional Court.  While a new Bundestag mandate for 
Kosovo is not a foregone conclusion,  Bleicker commented that 
the MFA is already working to respond should that occur. 
 
A Longer Road, But in the Right Direction 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: UDI will spur a lively debate here in 
Germany, and some politicians, including from the coalition 
parties, are likely to claim that a new UNSCR and/or a new 
Bundestag mandate are required for German military forces to 
continue to operate in Kosovo or for the new ESDP mission to 
proceed.  While this domestic debate could prove messy and 
 
BERLIN 00002081  003 OF 003 
 
 
difficult, the government remains committed to the position 
that the existing UNSCR 1244 and the current Bundestag 
mandate provide a sufficient legal basis for continuation of 
the KFOR operation as well as the launch of the ESDP mission. 
 Importantly, all major political players and parties in 
Germany are supportive of Germany's ongoing role in Kosovo 
and the western Balkans.  End comment. 
KOENIG