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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005646 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF KDEM MARR MCAP TH BM
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER PLEDGES NO INTERFERENCE IN 
ELECTIONS 
 
REF: BANGKOK 5600 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Defense Minister Boonrawd Somtas told the 
Ambassador that the Thai military is committed to not 
interfering in the coming political campaign and that the 
Council for National Security could dissolve as it has no 
role to play at this point.  Boonrawd stated his hope that 
the Burmese regime understands that there is an opportunity 
to resolve the situation in Burma through dialogue.  End 
Summary. 
 
BURMA 
----- 
 
¶2. (C) In a November 1 call on Minister of Defense General 
Boonrawd Somtas, the Ambassador told Boonrawd his decision to 
cancel his visit to Burma was correct, as the U.S. believes 
that all countries should keep their contacts with the 
Burmese military to an absolute minimum.  (Note. Boonrawd 
planned to visit Burma at the same period as the recent 
violent crackdown but canceled when the Burmese regime 
cracked down on the opposition. End note.)  Boonrawd 
expressed his hope that the Burmese regime is at a point 
where it will recognize that the use of force is not the 
answer to the situation in Burma and that dialogue with all 
parties is the way to solve the crisis.  Special Envoy 
Gambari's visit to Burma is an opportunity for the Burmese 
regime to demonstrate that it is willing to work with all 
parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi, monks, and minority 
groups, Boonrawd said. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador stressed that USG policy on Burma 
should be seen as a signal of support for the Burmese 
people's desire for democracy and asked about RTG thinking on 
the situation in Burma.  Boonrawd described the difficulties 
that the RTG faces due to the long Thai-Burmese border, the 
large number of illegal Burmese immigrants living in 
Thailand, and pressure from the Burmese government for the 
RTG to do something about Burmese activists.  Despite these 
challenges, the RTG is trying to accelerate the transfer of 
power to a democratic government in Burma through political 
and economic development.  Burmese transition to democracy as 
an accepted member of the international community is of 
primary concern to the Thai government.  The RTG will watch 
Special Envoy Gambari's upcoming visit closely to judge the 
intentions of the Burmese regime. 
 
CNS ACTIVITIES AND THE ELECTION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador stressed to the Minister that, with 
elections formally scheduled, the military should not be 
involved in shaping the political environment.  Any 
perception of military plans to interfere in election 
processes, such as the Council for National Security (CNS) 
documents discussing the strategies to discredit the 
pro-Thaksin People's Power Party (PPP), runs the risk of 
casting the election as illegitimate.  Boonrawd said military 
had endeavored to illustrate to the public the damage that 
Thai Rak Thai policies had brought upon Thailand, and that 
PPP would bring corruption and abuses of power back to the 
country.  Thailand is now at a point in the political process 
that this Royal Thai Army effort was no longer necessary, 
Boonrawd explained. 
 
¶5. (C)  The Ambassador asked Boonrawd to comment on the 
recent comments by Royal Thai Supreme Commander General 
Boonsrang Niampradit that the CNS no longer has a role to 
play and should dissolve.  With the political campaign 
beginning soon, the Ambassador said dissolution of the CNS 
would be a positive signal that the military does not plan to 
interfere in the elections.  Boonrawd said he agrees with 
Boonsrang that the CNS lacks a role and should therefore 
dissolve. 
 
¶6. (C)  Boonrawd described the October 30 decision by the 
Thai Cabinet to lift martial law in all but 179 primarily 
border districts as a signal of the RTG's commitment to free 
 
BANGKOK 00005646  002 OF 002 
 
 
and fair elections.  Security problems, such as narcotics 
trafficking and illegal immigration, in the districts that 
will remain under martial law substantiate the need for the 
law to remain in those areas.  The Ambassador said a complete 
lifting of martial law would be another positive signal. 
 
GRIPEN FIGHTER PLANE DECISION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador told Boonrawd that we had hoped that 
the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) would have chosen the F-16 to 
replace Thai F-5 aircraft.  Despite disappointment with the 
RTAF decision to buy the Swedish SAAB Gripen, we look forward 
to working with the RTAF to address munitions requirements 
for the Gripen and believe the Mid-Life Update to existing 
RTAF F-16s is still the best choice to meet the fighter 
aircraft requirements in the future.  Boonrawd said he had no 
role in the decision, which had been made by the RTAF. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Boonrawd did not deny the existence of the CNS 
documents or the activities described therein; this lends 
credence to the charges that the CNS did indeed have a media 
plan to "educate" the public about choosing "the right" 
candidates in the coming election.  Boonrawd said the right 
things on election issues, but he has had little apparent 
influence during his term as minister.  We will continue to 
raise these concerns with our military interlocutors. 
BOYCE