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RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON PLEASE PASS TO GAYLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2027 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IQ
SUBJECT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN: IRAN SEES U.S. AS ITS 
BIGGEST STRATEGIC ISSUE 
 
BAGHDAD 00003903  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: by CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(S) Summary:  In the course of several meetings with U.S. 
officials, UK Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams laid out the 
following perspectives of the current state-of-play in Iran 
and Iran,s views of the situation in Iraq in advance of the 
next rounds of trilateral talks.  He said Iran,s 
relationship with the U.S. is the biggest strategic issue 
facing the country, and he believes views are divided how to 
deal with the U.S.  While reactions he heard to the previous 
trilateral discussions on Iraq were lukewarm, he believed 
they had triggered an internal debate over Iran,s strategic 
interests.  That said, he thought there were pockets inside 
the Iranian government lobbying to shut down the talks.  He 
maintained that Iran,s strategies on all issues ) Iraq, 
nuclear, the U.S., etc, -- were intertwined, and Iran sees 
Iraq, in part, as a tool in its broader strategy to 
counteract the U.S. threat.  Iran,s top priority in relation 
to Iraq was that its territory not be used to launch an 
attack against Iran -- by the Iraqi government, the U.S., or 
any terrorist groups.  He underscored the importance of the 
Iran-Iraq war in shaping the psyche of those currently in 
office, adding that mistrust and misunderstanding of the West 
are rampant.  He added that Iran,s obsession with the West 
at times blinds it to its other interests, which is why the 
Iranians will align itself with otherwise anathema groups or 
promote instability in Iraq when it appears contrary to their 
 national interests.  Adams thought that if Iran had had a 
hand in bringing down violence in recent months in Iraq, it 
may have been because intra-Shia killing crossed a redline 
and prompted push-back from clerics in Qom.  To change 
Iranian behavior, Adams said, &unanimity and uncertainty8 
were the international community,s best tools.  While 
Iranian officials will be on a very short leash in talks with 
the U.S. and will be required to stick to talking points, the 
questions and points the U.S. raises will likely spark useful 
internal debate over their interests.  The Iranian side will 
return to the next meeting with at least some responses. 
While the system of consensus-seeking in Iran makes changing 
course slow and difficult, Iranian decision-makers will 
reassess policy if it feels it advances their interests.  End 
summary 
 
2.(S) British Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams described his 
views of Iran,s mindset towards Iraq and the U.S. in a 
series of meetings with U.S. officials and military officers 
in Baghdad November 23-24.   The following is an amalgamation 
of three meetings held in advance of the fourth round of 
Iran-Iraq-US trilateral discussions on Iraq.  Adams, who has 
served in Tehran for almost two years, also described the 
general political situation inside the country.  British 
Ambassador to Kuwait Stuart Laing also joined the 
discussions, as well as British First Secretary in Tehran 
Alex Pinfield.  Among those present on the US side at various 
briefings were Ambassador Crocker, MNF-I Commanding General 
Petraeus, Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries, 
MG Kevin Bergner, Special Advisor David Pearce, and IRPO 
Director Jillian Burns.  The British ambassador's 
recommendations on negotiating strategy with the Iranians to 
be reported septel. 
 
His Take on Iranian Strategy 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.(S) Iran,s relationship with the U.S. is the biggest 
strategic issue facing it, according to Adams, and he 
believes that power circles in Iran remain divided on the 
issue of how to deal with the U.S.  Adams suggested that the 
Supreme Leader may have approved talks regarding Iraq as a 
conciliatory gesture towards those who advocate opening a 
relationship with the U.S., and perhaps also to actually test 
the waters.  However, he added, there is a &significant 
lobby8 within the policymaking apparatus that opposes these 
talks.  The feedback in Tehran that Adams heard of the 
previous rounds of trilateral talks on Iraq was 
disappointment, with Iranians claiming the meetings contained 
no substance.  Nonetheless, he thought the talks had 
triggered a useful internal debate on Iran,s interests. 
 
4.(S) Adams claimed that from the U.S., Iran wants respect -- 
&at least on par with Turkey8 as one interlocutor put it to 
him. In light of this, Adams believed that the largest 
carrots the U.S. holds in its dealings with Iran remain 
security guarantees and acceptance of the legitimacy of the 
Islamic government. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003903  002 OF 004 
 
 
5.(S) At the same time, Adams said, Iran sees Iraq as a tool 
in its broader strategy to counteract the U.S. threat, by 
seeking to exploit perceived U.S. vulnerability there.  Adam 
noted that Iran calibrates its tactics to protect its 
interests without compromising its broader strategic goals. 
(Comment: Although it is often said that the U.S. did Iran a 
favor by ridding it of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, Iran 
actually views the U.S. as a bigger threat than either of 
these.  Iran is likely prioritizing its threats.  It is 
therefore willing to deal with groups it considers enemies in 
order to counter its perceived most significant threat, the 
U.S., with the expectation that it can handle the lesser 
threats down the road.  End Comment.) 
 
6.(S) When asked if they do not see that if we fail in Iraq 
they also fail, Adams replied that Iran believes it is more 
important to avoid a situation where the U.S. withdraws from 
Iraq with a plausible claim of success, believing that would 
be perceived as an Iranian failure.  He also said that 
despite Iran,s public statements demanding a withdrawal of 
foreign forces from Iraq, Iran fears a quick withdrawal could 
lead to chaos.  He added that does not believe the Iranians 
took seriously their Istanbul proposal on Iraq.  Adams said 
that Iran,s obsession with the West ) particularly the U.S. 
and the UK ) can blind Iran to its own interests.  He 
recommended that in the trilateral talks, the U.S. try to 
stir internal debate by asking whether it truly serves 
Iran,s strategic goals to link itself with Al Qaida, 
Taliban, and Arab Shia extremists that have given it trouble 
in the past. 
 
7.(S) Because of this linkage between Iraq and other 
strategic interests, Adams noted the possibility that the 
nuclear issue, as well as the upcoming parliamentary 
elections in Iran, could negatively impact the course of the 
Iraq trilateral talks.  (Note:  Adams did not think that the 
replacement of Ali Larijani by Saeed Jalili as nuclear 
negotiator was a good sign.  He said in his conversations 
with Jalili, who served in the IRGC and was wounded during 
the Iran-Iraq war, Jalili would lecture on the theological 
and ideological basis of foreign policy in a very academic, 
but pointless, manner.  End Note.) 
 
Distrust, Misreading of the West 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.(S) Adams underscored the ongoing impact on the Iranian 
psyche of the Iran-Iraq war.  Those in power today in Iran 
think they are operating from lessons learned from the war. 
In Iran,s view, after the Iranian people succeeded in 
casting off their dictator, the world -- namely the West -- 
tried to strangle their revolution by supporting Saddam 
Hussein against them and imposing sanctions.  Iran,s success 
came from relying on traditional Shia virtues, such as 
sacrifice.  Because of this experience, Iranians concluded 
they could not trust the West and have to rely on themselves. 
 
9.(S) Adams added Iranians are prone to miscalculate and 
misread the U.S., largely because of their lack of 
understanding and exposure to the country.  Asked how they 
are currently misreading the U.S., he said that the Iranians 
are overestimating the political difficulties facing the Bush 
Administration.  Some are convinced, he said, that a military 
attack is not possible because President Bush is too weak. 
Others within power circles are arguing internally that this 
may not be the case, and Iran must be careful to avoid 
missteps.  A third group believes that attack is inevitable, 
no matter what the U.S. says about seeking a diplomatic 
solution, because they believe that regime change remains the 
primary U.S. objective. 
 
Dealing with Iran 
--------------------- 
 
10.(S) To change Iranian behavior, Adams said that the 
international community,s best tools were &unanimity and 
uncertainty.8  He thought that the unanimity of the first 
two UNSCRs regarding Iranian nuclear activity had a 
tremendous impact.  On the other hand, the U.S. Executive 
Order designations of the IRGC and the IRGC Qods Force made 
less of an impact because they were unilateral and had been 
previewed in the press for some time.  He underscored that 
Iranians want predictability in their strategic environment. 
To keep them off-balance and reassessing their interests, it 
is sometimes useful to leave them unclear on consequences. 
For instance, when queried about the possibility of US 
 
BAGHDAD 00003903  003 OF 004 
 
 
military action due to Iran,s nuclear program, his standard 
response is that Iran,s refusal to comply with UNSCRs are 
putting it in &the danger zone,8 and he doesn't know what 
will happen.  Adams recommended that in talks with Iran, the 
U.S. be firm and steady, determined, with hand extended.  He 
said that based on his experience, the negotiating team would 
be on a very short leash and would not have authorization to 
go beyond talking points, but that they would take our 
questions and points back to Tehran, where they would 
stimulate new discussion of Iran,s interests. 
 
11.(S) Adams said that the Iranian system of 
consensus-seeking makes a bold policy change difficult to 
achieve.  That said, when the Iranians decide that something 
is in their interest, they will change course.  He added that 
Iranians can justify any means to the desired end, and they 
have a &high threshold on embarrassment.8 (Comment: This 
means they can both justify a negative action, as well as 
find a way to do a complete about-face on an issue.  End 
Comment) 
 
12.(S) He also said Iranians try to convey messages in 
various subtexts and assume we are doing the same.  At the 
same time, because much of their rhetoric is only for 
propaganda purposes, they assume this is true for other 
countries as well, meaning they discount much of what other 
countries say.  For instance, Adams said he believed that 
Iran no longer has as its goal exporting the revolution, 
saying that this line of rhetoric now only serves propaganda 
goals.  Additionally, he said, Iran probably intended its 
proposal on Iraq put forward at the Istanbul Conference 
merely as a means to &muddy the waters.8 
 
Strategic Goals in Iraq 
-------------------------- 
 
13.(S) Adams described in the course of several meetings that 
in his view, Iran,s first priority in Iraq is to prevent any 
future threats from Iraqi soil -- from the Iraqi government, 
the U.S., or terrorist groups.  While Iran sees it in its 
strategic interest to maintain a degree of instability in 
Iraq, it does not want a precipitous withdrawal of foreign 
forces, fearing a complete meltdown and perhaps the return to 
power of Baathists.  It also uses the U.S. presence next door 
as a lever, as well as a scapegoat on which to blame Iraqi 
violence in its propaganda.  Iran also wants a politically 
subservient Basra and access to religious sites. Adams said. 
Among its tactics to advance these strategic interests were 
providing support for certain groups, keeping up pressure for 
the dismantling of the MEK, and inflicting damage to 
Coalition Forces. 
 
14.(S) The MEK holds a mythic image in Iran, Adams said, not 
necessarily in line with its current capacities.  The Iranian 
government and the people remember the spectacular attacks 
the group launched after it was ousted from the ranks of the 
new revolutionary government.  Among those injured by MEK was 
Supreme Leader Khamenei.  Adams noted that he had not heard 
of any negative repercussions to former MEK members who have 
returned to Iran.  He stressed that the act of &recanting8 
is very important in Iran.  He added that the Iranians made a 
big show of introducing some former MEK members to the recent 
delegation of British MPs, in an attempt to counter-balance 
pro-MEK sentiment in the British Parliament. 
 
15.(S) As opposed to MEK, Adams said, he hears very little 
about Iranian concerns regarding PJAK.  Although he said PJAK 
is a very sensitive issue, he sees no real danger of Kurdish 
independence in Iran. 
 
16.(S) Adams believes that the IRGC -- probably IRGC-Qods 
Force leader Soleimani -- leads Iraq policy, with instruction 
from the Supreme Leader.  He is not sure of other influences 
on Iraq policy.  President Ahmadinejad and others from his 
administration likely seek to influence the policy.  The 
Supreme National Security Council serves in general as the 
policy clearinghouse, but he did not know if the SNSC had 
taken up the Iraq issue recently.  MOIS likely also plays a 
role. 
 
17.(S) Adams did not think that Iran would expect thanks for 
the recent decline in violence in Iraq as it has not sought 
credit.  In public comments, Iran has credited the Iraqi 
government, while continuing to blame the presence of foreign 
troops as the cause of violence.  In Adams,s view, Iran 
likely calibrated its support of Shia groups in recent months 
 
BAGHDAD 00003903  004 OF 004 
 
 
because its strategic interests were crossed, fearing an 
approaching meltdown in Karbala and Najaf.  Intra-Shia 
killing likely crossed redlines and generated push-back from 
the clerics in Qom. 
 
Public Sphere 
---------------- 
 
18.(S) Adams said there was very little detailed information 
in the Iranian press on the ongoing situation in Iraq. 
Furthermore, while the IRGC as a whole plays a very prominent 
role in Iran, there is very little knowledge by the general 
public of the Qods Force or its activities outside the 
country.  The government has not sought to create national 
consensus behind its involvement in Iraq and publicly denies 
any interference, taking a very different tack to its 
position on the nuclear issue in which it seeks public 
support.  Adams agreed that the result of this secrecy could 
be greater room for maneuverability on the Iranian part, 
should it decide to change course. 
 
19.(S) Asked about public perceptions regarding Iraqis, Adams 
said he had expected to find enmity toward the former enemy 
but felt that actually, Iranians distinguish between Saddam 
Hussein and the Iraqi people.  He said the permeability 
between the two countries, in terms of kinship, trans-border 
tribes, as well as travels of pilgrims, helped forge ties 
between the two peoples.  On the other hand, he said, 
businessmen with whom he talks never mention much interest in 
trade with Iraq.  Their focus is usually on other countries 
such as Turkey, Kazakhstan, etc.  That said, it was clear 
there was a substantial black and gray market with Iraq, much 
of it controlled by the IRGC. 
 
Other issues 
--------------- 
 
20.(S) Adams said the Majles elections will be an important 
barometer of Ahmadinejad,s popularity and could mark the 
beginning of his decline.   Economic problems are hurting the 
president,s popularity.  In addition, urban Iranians with 
access to internet and satellite TV are very aware of the 
global reaction to Iran,s nuclear policy and are worried 
about the threat of war.  Those Iranians without outside 
access tend to believe the government statements that the 
U.S. will not attack, he said. 
 
21.(S) Adams said there is some evidence (not described) that 
Ahmadinejad was gunning for Foreign Minister Mottaki, who 
Adams described as a loose cannon.  Adams confirmed the press 
report that Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been 
named ambassador to Japan, which Adams saw it as an attempt 
to sideline elements in the Foreign Ministry who were not 
clearly aligned with the president.  He said when he asked 
Araghchi about the assignment, Araghchi look none too pleased. 
 
22.(S) Adams also noted that Iran sees Saudi Arabia as a 
long-term threat to manage, because of its economic power, 
its religious credentials, and its closer relationship with 
the West. 
 
His Working Environment in Tehran 
------------------------------------------- 
 
23.(S) Adams noted that working as a Western diplomat in 
Tehran is somewhat similar to serving behind the Iron Curtain 
during the Cold War:  cold, hostile relations with the 
government, with restrictions on operations, contrasted with 
friendly relations with the people.  Diplomats can travel 
outside Tehran, but sometimes the Iranian government will 
prevent trips, such as a recent one in which they intended to 
visit reform-minded clerics in Qom. 
 
24.(S) Adams said that the British have no choice but to deal 
with the stereotype they have in Iran as all-knowing and 
manipulative.  The upside is that it puts the UK in a 
position of strength because Iranians believe that the 
British are important.  They also assume that the British and 
the U.S. coordinate on all positions.  (Comment: this feeds 
the conspiracy theory in Iran that the British work &behind 
the curtain8 to keep the U.S. out of Iran, out of concern 
they would lose relevance. End comment) 
BUTENIS