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S E C R E T ANKARA 002695 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2027 
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER MOPS ETTC KOMC MG UP CY IZ TU
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH TURKISH SUSPICIONS REGARDING US ARMS 
SHIPMENTS TO IRAQ 
 
REF: A. STATE 108929 
     ¶B. ANKARA 2247 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. ANKARA 1913 
     ¶D. ANKARA 1976 
     ¶E. ANKARA 1464 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Rising PKK violence and the leakage of potentially 
thousands of US-procured weapons from Iraq have heightened 
Turkish government and public sensitivities about the 
transfer of weapons to Iraq.  Delays and confusion as we 
attempted to provide the GOT with information on the origin 
and destination of Iraq-bound military equipment aboard the 
MV Slavyanin (later MV Oniks) raised GOT suspicions to the 
point where Turkey threatened to interfere with the vessels 
and requested high-level, written assurances from us.  This 
could easily happen again.  While asserting our right to 
provide military equipment to Iraq, we must be prepared to 
address reasonable Turkish concerns quickly and accurately. 
We must also keep the Turks apprised of controls and 
safeguards being put into place to prevent the diversion of 
weapons provided to Iraqi forces to the PKK or other 
terrorist groups.  This will also be key to gaining Turkish 
cooperation in monitoring and even stopping arms shipments 
involving Iran, Syria, and regional terrorist groups.  End 
Summary. 
 
Concern Over Arms Leakage from Iraq 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Continued PKK attacks against Turkish military and 
civilian targets in the southeast as well as urban areas, and 
the routine discovery by Turkish security forces of weapons 
originating from US-provided stocks in Iraq in the hands of 
PKK terrorists, feed a popular perception here that the US is 
either directly or indirectly arming PKK terrorists.  Turkish 
officials strongly believe that Kurdish authorities in 
northern Iraq are complicit in supplying arms and equipment 
to the PKK and believe many of these weapons come from 
US-procured stocks in Iraq (ref b).  Open source reporting on 
accountability problems with US materiel supplied to Iraq 
since 2003 (including tens of thousands of small arms) have 
led to grave concerns here about our ability to control 
leakage of weapons to Turkey, where they have already been 
used in several high-profile attacks. 
 
¶3. (C) As a result, Turkey is scrutinizing tenders for 
supplying the Iraqi military as well as actual shipments of 
materiel to Iraq that come through the Bosphorus or eastern 
Mediterranean. D/CHOD GEN Ergin Saygun questioned us June 6 
about a proposed FMS sale of large quantities of weapons, 
ammunition, and explosives to Iraq (ref e), expressing 
skepticism that the Iraqi government could control such 
materiel.  At the same time, he expressed concern about a 
Danish firm working with a US company to provide bullet-proof 
vests and large amounts of ammunition directly to the 
"Kurdistan Security Forces." 
 
¶4. (C) Turkish authorities have demonstrated a willingness to 
intervene in suspect shipments.  Foreign Ministry officials 
told us their intervention compelled a ship carrying 
Albanian-origin arms for Armenia to turn back this summer. 
 
Late Assurances for the Slavyanin and Onyx 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) In the case of the Slavyanin/Onyx, the Turks 
identified the cargo of BMPs and AT-4 mounts as the Slavyanin 
transited the Bosphorus.  They were particularly concerned 
about the AT-4 weapons systems and feared that the actual 
anti-tank missiles and warheads were included.  Delays in our 
ability to confirm to the Turks that the cargo was US-owned 
and did not contain missiles or ammunition increased GOT 
unease and caused the Slavyanin to be listed as a suspect 
vessel by NATO/Operation Active Endeavor for a period of 
time.  The Turks watched with growing concern as the ship 
 
broke down, headed to Limassol (in problematic Cyprus) for 
repairs, and ultimately transferred its cargo to the 
Mongolian-flagged Oniks.  Turkish authorities expressed 
particular concern over the apparent lack of knowledge on the 
part of senior Iraqi officials concerning this shipment.  In 
fact, the MFA claimed, Iraqi authorities at first denied all 
knowledge of the vessel and its cargo and recommended the 
Turks simply seize it. 
 
¶6. (C) Confusion over the Slavyanin, as well as delays in 
confirming to the Turks that Slavyanin's cargo was 
subsequently transferred to the MV Oniks in Limassol, raised 
Turkish suspicions to the point where both MFA U/S Apakan and 
D/CHOD GEN Saygun convoked the Ambassador several times and 
called late at night to express concerns on this subject. 
They requested written assurances from Washington officials 
not only of the origin and ownership of the cargo, but its 
end use and safeguards in place to prevent its diversion to 
terrorists (ref d).  Our inability to provide the GOT with 
straight answers to its legitimate questions in light of arms 
diversion issues that have affected Turkey and US-Turkish 
relations has further eroded our credibility here, especially 
as we subject Turkey to extensive end use monitoring and 
other statutory restrictions on use of US military equipment 
that it procures. 
 
¶7. (S) Turkish suspicions were not allayed by our support of 
an October 3 French request that Turkey inspect cargo aboard 
the MV Neptune.  Turkish officials told us later that the 
French information, and by association ours, lacked 
credibility in that case.  (Note: It may be useful to brief 
the GOT on our findings from the inspection of cargo aboard 
the MV Neptune in Greece, if it turns out to be illicit. End 
Note).  If we expect Turkish cooperation on monitoring and 
stopping arms transfers between Iran, Syria, and terrorist 
groups in the area, we must take Turkish concerns seriously. 
¶8. (C) While protecting our right to arm and equip Iraqi 
forces as we and the Iraqis see fit, we must be prepared to 
address reasonable Turkish concerns.  The Slavyanin/Onyx 
experience indicates that we need to be ready to provide a 
quick and convincing answer to the Turks on particular 
shipments.  Iraqi authorities should be prepared to do the 
same to the extent they have visibility over such transfers. 
Over the longer term, keeping the Turks informed about the 
safeguards and controls we are establishing over the use and 
transfer of lethal US-origin equipment in Iraq will help ease 
their concerns.  The Turks must also realize that the GOI, as 
a sovereign nation, has the right to procure military 
equipment from non-US sources and that we have no control 
over the GOI's use or disposition of that equipment. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON