VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #4578/01 3191213
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151213Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0902
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 5538
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1193
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0337
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 004578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCW, NEA/I, S/I 
DOD FOR WINPAC/MRIT, OSD/GSA/CN, CP & GT, JS-J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW BWC IZ JO
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) MEETING WITH 
IRAQ ON ACCESSION TO CWC, OCTOBER 29-31, 2007 
 
REF: A. 2006 AMMAN 9090 (DECEMBER 2006 MEETING REPORTING) 
     ¶B. 2007 STATE 107595 (FOLLLOW-UP COMMENTS ON 
        DECLARATION) 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel Rubinstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) From 2005 through 2007, the Organization for 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has held a series of 
meetings with Iraqi officials to assist them in preparing for 
accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (Ref A). 
The Technical Secretariat (TS) hosted the fourth and final 
meeting in Amman, Jordan on October 29-31, 2007 with the 
objective of developing a complete and correct declaration 
appropriate for submission to the OPCW within 60 days after 
Iraq's submission of its articles of accession to the United 
Nations, which could take place at any time.  This final 
meeting focused on review of the revisions made by Iraq to 
its December 2006 draft in response to the additional 
information needs identified in December, and the follow-up 
U.S.-UK comments on the December 2006 draft declaration.  The 
meeting also afforded an opportunity to review and make 
suggested edits to the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 
implementing legislation that includes CWC issues.  This 
final meeting, therefore, was organized into three sub-groups 
that addressed the chemical weapons-related declaration, the 
industrial declaration, and implementing legislation. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Chemical Weapons-Related Declaration 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The basis of the Iraqi declaration for CW activity 
remains unchanged from the December 2006 draft: 
- declaration of the possession of CW; 
- declaration of five past CW-production facilities: 
Al-Rashad, Al-Muthanna, and Al-Falluja I, II, and III, 
- declaration of two "other facilities" for CW development at 
Al-Rashad and Al-Muthanna, 
- inclusion of a separate annex to provide available 
information on the remnants of CW assessed to still remain at 
the Al-Muthanna storage site; 
- declaration of four "other chemical production facilities" 
(OCPFs); and the 
- declaration of CW-related transfers on a 
country-by-country, non-company specific basis. 
 
The format of the December 2006 draft declaration has been 
expanded to include new annexes for additional information, 
including site diagrams, process flow diagrams, photos, and 
tabulated information, e.g., equipment lists. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The CW sub-group conducted a line-by-line review of 
the revised sections of the declaration, and provided 
clarification and appropriate revisions as needed.  The 
Iraqis had addressed the U.S-UK additional comments (Ref B) 
in preparation for this meeting, as well as the open issues 
from the December 2006 session.  However, complete sets of 
process flow diagrams did not provide for all manufacturing 
steps, and the detail of annotation provided was not 
adequate.  A comprehensive list of acronyms for the entire 
declaration was also needed.  The UK will assist Iraq with 
preparing final site diagrams and process flow diagrams with 
appropriate annotation.  The TS representatives suggested 
that all drawings should be recreated by computer to a 
uniform standard.  However, the U.S. delegation agreed with 
the UK that original (including hand-drawn) figures are 
acceptable for submission as part of the declaration as long 
as they are completely legible and fully annotated. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The TS encouraged the Iraqi delegation to obtain 
additional photographs that could demonstrate the 
completeness of destruction of declared facilities and 
equipment.  The Iraqi delegation reported that they had been 
unsuccessful in accessing the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) archives in 
order to obtain useful photos.  The U.S. delegation provided 
the Iraqi side with 11 aerial photographs and 5 preliminary 
site diagrams for three of the five declared CWPFs.  The U.S. 
delegation agreed to continue to look for useful, 
unclassified photographs (e.g., bunkers), and asked the TS to 
 
SIPDIS 
consider using the OPCW's specifically designated status - 
paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's Report on paragraph 5 
of Resolution 1762 (2007), S/2007/568 - to access useful 
photos from the UNMOVIC archives. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Iraqis had not understood that the Convention 
requirements for destruction of CW facilities differ from the 
criteria used by the UN for CW destruction, i.e., that 
equipment was permanently disabled, that equipment was 
dismantled and reused for other legitimate commercial use, OR 
that the facilities were destroyed from coalition strikes and 
deemed unusable for CW development.  TS participants reviewed 
several of the photographs provided by the Iraqis, pointing 
out examples of facilities that did not meet the CWC 
definition for destruction. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The TS defined four specific tasks to be completed 
by the Iraqis, in addition to minor corrections and required 
clarifications identified in the text of the draft 
declaration, in order for the draft declaration to be 
considered complete: 
- To address remaining issues (highlighted in the current 
draft of Initial Declarations), including comprehensive site 
diagrams, process flow diagrams (CW-related), inventory of 
buildings and equipment (original) for each CWPF, to the 
extent possible; 
- To check for additional photographic evidence regarding the 
current condition of Iraqi CWPFs, to the extent possible; 
- To review the draft for editorial completeness, to check 
the availability and correctness of CAS numbers and other 
data; and 
- To provide an introductory narrative for the declaration 
that covers the history of the Iraqi CW-program, and the 
circumstances and problems in retrieving information evolving 
from the events since the 1991 Gulf war. 
 
A comprehensive list of acronyms is also needed, which the 
Iraqis agreed to provide. 
 
¶7. (C) The Iraq delegation made no commitment as to its 
schedule for completing the final revisions to the draft 
initial declaration.  The U.S. and UK delegations plan to 
conduct a final review of the October 2007 version of the 
initial declaration draft to ensure that all of the changes 
were properly entered, and to add technical details not 
captured by the TS during the meeting, e.g., correct chemical 
names and structures, etc.  The U.S. and UK plan to submit a 
final coordinated set of comments to the Iraqi side within 
the next few weeks, which will include restatement of our 
shared view that at least the annex defining the assessed 
content of the two Al-Muthanna bunkers be classified Highly 
Protected.  The issue of classification of the Iraqi 
declaration, currently marked as Highly Protected as a place 
holder, was not discussed in detail, and was left to the 
Iraqis for decision and incorporation into their final 
version. 
 
¶8. (C) The U.S. and UK delegations raised concern that the 
generic entry for 122 mm rockets did not reflect the known 
four types that were imported, i.e., Sakr, Sakr-18, Sakr-30, 
and Firos-25.  An acceptable clarification for this entry was 
to add the word "different types" to represent the four types 
as referenced in UNSCOM official documents. However, when the 
two delegations asked about a fifth type of "aluminum" 
rocket, also known as the "Al-Borak" that was produced 
indigenously, Iraqi officials denied their existence.  U.S. 
and UK delegations made reference to this type of rocket 
which is referenced in Chapter III of the June 2007 UNMOVIC 
Compendium, and in press reporting describing such rockets as 
being recovered.  Although this matter was not resolved at 
the meeting, TS Director of Verification Horst Reeps opined 
in discussions on the margins of the meeting that since the 
Al-Borak rockets were not imported, the Treaty does not 
require their declaration as received CW.  This issue still 
remains unresolved, and U.S. and UK will raise it again in 
our joint comments on the final draft declaration review. 
 
----------------------------- 
Industry Declaration 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) As in the case for the draft Iraqi CW related 
initial declaration, the basis of the Iraqi industry 
declaration remains unchanged from the December 2006 draft: 
- declaration of declarable industry facilities; and 
- declaration aggregate national data (AND), in particular 
imports and exports of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Since the last workshop in December 2006, six other 
chemical production facilities (OCPFs) had been identified by 
 
the Iraqis as possibly meeting the requirements for 
declaration under Article VI (note that the codes assigned 
were adjusted at this workshop): 
-IRQ001, State Company for Petrochemical Industries, Basra, 
vinyl chloride monomer; 
-IRQ002, State Company for Vegetable Oil Industries, Baghdad, 
LABS; 
-IRQ003, State Company for Fertilizer Industries-Northern 
Area, Baghdad, urea; 
-IRQ004, State Company for Fertilizer Industries-Southern 
Area, Basra, 
-IRQ005, State Company for Vegetable Oil Industries, Baghdad, 
LABS; and 
-no code, Alswari Chemical Industries, Taji, vinyl acetate. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Four of the OCPFs met the criteria in 2006 for 
declaration in 2007, IRQ002-IRQ005, and only three -- 
IRQ002, IRQ004, and IRQ005 -- met the criteria in 2007 for 
declaration in 2008.  IRQ001, while intact and capable of 
production, did not operate in 2006 and 2007, but may do so 
later.  The Alswari Chemical Industries plant site did not 
produce vinyl acetate monomer and only polymerized imported 
monomer, so it did not meet the criteria for a declarable 
OCPF.  It was determined that Iraq will have no AND 
declarations for either 2006 or 2007.  The necessary 
declaration forms 4.1 were completed.  The industry portion 
of the Iraqi initial declaration is ready for submission. 
 
------------------------ 
Implementing Legislation 
----------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Representatives from the TS and all delegations 
except the UK discussed in detail the "Final Draft" Law on 
Non-Proliferation in the Republic of Iraq.  According to the 
Iraqis, the Shura Council will have one more (the third) 
reading of the text before it is forwarded to the Parliament. 
 After the second reading, the Shura Council requested 
changes to the text; however, the Iraqi delegation only 
brought a revised Arabic draft to the meeting since it is 
still undergoing revisions.  The Shura Council had requested 
that the law be revised to add in three objectives to the 
preamble, and provide elaboration on the handling of 
classified information.  The three new/revised objectives to 
the law are:  1) prevent the exploitation of any activities 
related to weapons of mass destruction; 2) implement 
sanctions for violations to treaty provisions and protocols; 
and 3) more closely incorporate Convention definitions (which 
were not fully articulated during discussions).  The Iraqi 
delegation agreed to incorporate, with some modifications, 
the informal U.S. CWC-related comments previously provided. 
The group also discussed the informal comments on the 
BWC-related provisions, and reached agreement on the changes 
the Iraqi government needs to make to the text.  The Japanese 
delegate also provided substantive comments on the text, some 
of which were accepted.  Additions by the Shura Council and 
those discussed during the Amman working group are to be 
incorporated prior to the third reading, but are subject to 
change. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The group discussed at length the differences 
between the term "means of warfare" and "method of warfare" 
with regard to the use of riot control agents.  The Arabic 
version of the CWC uses the term "means of warfare" which 
explains the difference in the English translation.  For 
consistency, the Iraqi delegation will continue to use the 
same term used in the Arabic version of the CWC. 
 
---------------------- 
Other Issues Discussed 
---------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) U.S. delegation met with Horst Reeps on the margins 
of the Tuesday session to discuss the status of the U.S. 
submission on recovered munitions, and stated that the 
updated summary was still being developed.  The delegation 
indicated that we expect to have the summary available prior 
to Iraq's submission of its initial CWC declaration.  Reeps 
opined that the United States had met its immediate reporting 
obligation via the joint U.S. and UK letter to the United 
Nations (Annex I of Security Council Resolution 1762(2007)). 
The UK delegation suggested that we consider providing a 
joint status report on recovered munitions, and was told that 
this approach appeared to have merit.  Comment:  Agreement to 
this approach could be made part of the coordination of final 
 
declaration comments. End Comment. 
 
¶15. (C) The U. S. Delegation also discussed informally with 
Horst Reeps how the TS planned to assist the Iraqis in their 
verification obligations after they become a State Party. 
Mr. Reeps said the Director-General has decided that in light 
of the current security situation in Iraq, no on-site 
inspection activities will take place.  Further, the 
Director-General does not want Iraq to be perceived as having 
been party to this decision.  On the other hand, the 
Director-General is looking for ways to provide interim 
verification that can be reported to the Executive Council. 
Methods being considered include imagery provided by 
interested States Parties or commercial imagery purchased 
from commercial satellite operators.  No decisions have yet 
been made. 
 
¶16. (U) Participants: 
 
IRAQ 
-- Muhaned T. Kareem, Director of Chemical Department, 
National 
Monitoring Directorate (NMD), Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
-- Abbas Ghadab, Head of Declaration Activities, NMD 
-- Adnan Abbas, Head of Verification and Inspection, NMD 
-- Reyadh Abd, Inspection Activities, NMD 
-- Farouq Jassim, Import-Export Officer, NMD 
-- Ahmed Mohammed, Head of Operations, NMD 
-- Mahmood Ahmed, Legal Advisor, NMD 
-- Mushin Y. Abdul Majid, Second Secretary, MFA 
-- Kurdistan A. Kittani, Second Secretary, MFA 
-- Basim Mohammad Saleh, Ministry of Industry and 
Minerals 
-- Hessien N. Hamad, Kurdish Region Government 
 
OPCW TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT 
-- Horst Reeps, Director of Verification 
-- Santiago Onate, Legal Advisor 
-- Kenneth Penman, Officer, Declarations Branch 
-- Oleg Ukharov, Officer, Chemical Demilitarization Branch 
-- Jose Renato Carvalho, Head, Inspectorate Management Branch 
-- Mahmoud El-Ghabbach, Interpreter 
 
UNITED STATES 
-- Tom Ferguson, ISN/CB, State 
-- Don Clagett, VCI/CCW, State 
-- Bill Parker, ISN/CB, State 
-- Sarah Nett, OSD, DOD 
 
UK 
-- Jim McGilly, DSTL, Porton Down 
-- Chris McCormick, Ministry of Defense 
-- Sheilesh Patel, DSTL, Porton Down 
 
JAPAN 
-- Tatsuya Abe, Advisor to Delegation of Japan to OPCW, 
University of Kyoto 
 
¶17. (U) This message was drafted by ISN/CB. 
Hale