VZCZCXRO7527
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #2450/01 3320654
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280654Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1524
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0064
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 8333
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002450 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOE FOR CAROLYN GAY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MASS EPET KPKO KCRIM NI
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH NIGERIAN NATIONAL 
SECURITY ADVISER MUKHTAR 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Piascik for reasons 1.4.(b & d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Nigerian National Security Advisor Mukhtar 
welcomed Deputy Secretary Negroponte's November 12 visit as 
USG recognition of Nigeria's importance and the Yar'Adua 
government's efforts to correct problems associated with the 
April 2007 elections.  Mukhtar described the GoN's efforts to 
bring peace to the Niger Delta.  He acknowledged corruption 
and past failures by all levels of government in the region, 
but also blamed oil companies and the international 
community, citing oil bunkering, weapons smuggling, and money 
laundering as key problems which needed to be addressed 
before the situation could improve significantly.   Mukhtar 
requested USG and international community assistance with 
technical equipment and enhanced intelligence sharing to help 
detect oil theft and weapons smuggling by international arms 
dealers, and asked that countries stop allowing stolen funds 
to enter their banking systems.  The Director General of the 
Nigerian State Security Service (SSS) discussed recent 
arrests of Islamic militants in the North, noting the 
militants had been trained in terrorist camps in Algeria and 
Mali, and were planning attacks on unspecified foreign 
targets in Nigeria.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S.-NIGERIAN RELATIONS 
----------------------- 
¶2. (C) Mukhtar thanked the Deputy Secretary for his visit, 
noting that he and President Yar'Adua considered it an 
affirmation of U.S. belief that Nigeria played an important 
role in Africa and the region.    He said the visit indicated 
that the USG believed the GON was taking steps to address 
problems related to the difficult and controversial April 
2007 elections.   Mukhtar outlined numerous historical and 
cultural challenges Nigeria faced in implementing democracy 
and asked for USG understanding when formulating responses to 
less-than-perfect elections.   The Deputy Secretary affirmed 
the USG's understanding of Nigeria's importance, and stressed 
that it was in the U.S. interest to have a strong 
relationship with Nigeria.  The Deputy Secretary highlighted 
his recent visit to Darfur, and his meeting with the Nigerian 
commander of the United Nations force there to illustrate 
Nigeria's critical role in Africa. 
 
NIGER DELTA 
----------- 
¶3. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked for Mukhtar's views on the 
Niger Delta, noting that he had briefed President Bush on the 
region several times when he was Director of National 
Intelligence. Mukhtar acknowledged that residents of the 
Delta had legitimate grievances, and that previous Nigerian 
federal and state governments had neglected the region, 
allowing environmental degradation and corruption to continue 
over long periods of time.  He also blamed international oil 
companies for contributing to the current situation by 
entering into memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with local 
communities, which often exacerbated conflict, particularly 
between those communities that were, and the majority who 
were not, benefiting from oil company largesse.   In 
addition, he maintained that oil companies often did not 
honor their agreements, which increased resentment among the 
unemployed and uneducated local youths.   He noted that 
state-level politicians, including several prominent 
governors, had compounded the problem by funding and arming 
local "cult" groups (Note: the term refers to armed gangs. 
End note), turning them into personal militias for political 
support during elections, and then disavowing them after 
elections were over.  Such groups then began engaging in 
criminal activities such as oil bunkering, hostage taking, 
and weapons smuggling. 
 
OBASANJO's EFFORTS TO ADDRESS DELTA GRIEVANCES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶4. (C) Mukhtar said former President Obasanjo had instituted 
a series of Niger Delta consultative commissions during the 
last two years of his administration.  All governors and 
select members of Delta communities were invited and 
encouraged to make their views and grievances known to the 
federal government.  Obasanjo had adopted a carrot and stick 
approach, attempting to enforce laws while injecting 
significant funding into newly established federal entities 
like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to address 
 
ABUJA 00002450  002 OF 004 
 
 
development needs in the region.  Mukhtar acknowledged that 
progress in the region did not reflect the massive amounts of 
funding provided to local and state governments, which 
clearly indicated that significant corruption, waste, and 
misuse of funds had occurred over the years. As a result, 
youths in the region had lost faith in traditional 
institutions, and community leadership had collapsed, leading 
to alienation and increased criminal activity. 
 
PRESIDENT YAR'ADUA'S STRATEGY 
----------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Mukhtar said that President Yar'Adua had made the 
Niger Delta one of his top priorities, and had directed Vice 
President Goodluck Jonathan, a native of the region, to open 
direct channels of communication with all concerned parties. 
As a result, some militant leaders had recently expressed a 
desire to lay down their arms and enter into peace talks with 
the government, though he cautioned that full peace remained 
a distant goal, as the Delta remained a "money-spinning 
machine" for any group with a gun.  In Mukhtar's opinion, too 
many people in the region have strayed from their original, 
legitimate efforts at peaceful dissent, and instead had now 
resorted to criminal activities.  During recent discussions 
with militant leaders, the GON made clear that it considered 
hostage-taking to be a terrorist act, and warned them they 
would face arrest and legal action if engaged in it.  Mukhtar 
added that the GON had indeed arrested and initiated legal 
action against a number of militants involved in hostage 
taking.  He also noted that the GON had recently hosted a 
meeting of selected Delta elders in Abuja, and that group had 
subsequently called on youths in the region to abandon 
violence.  The GON was thus attempting to revive community 
leadership by identifying leaders who could be supported. 
Mukhtar acknowledged that the GON was fully aware of the 
unemployment, environmental, and political issues in the 
Delta, and was taking deliberate and serious steps to address 
them. 
 
BUNKERING, SMUGGLING, MONEY LAUNDERING: NEED FOR ASSISTANCE 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶6. (C) Mukhtar noted that some aspects of the Niger Delta 
conflict extend well beyond Nigeria's shores and the GON's 
control, necessitating assistance from the international 
community.   Weapons smuggling and oil bunkering (stealing) 
are critical problems which need to be addressed, before the 
larger problems of the region can be solved.  According to 
Mukhtar, the Nigerian navy is incapable of patrolling the 
entire Nigerian coast to detect and disrupt bunkering and 
smuggling. Both activities are closely linked, as stolen oil 
is often exchanged for weapons.  These activities draw 
significant amounts of external money into the region, and 
involve the same international cartels.  He also maintained 
that the GON lacked the capacity to police all of their 
pipelines, and needed the ability to monitor them for illegal 
taps.   The GON is unable to control international weapons 
dealers who often operate with impunity, smuggling 
foreign-made weapons into the Delta.  Mukhtar cited as an 
example the well-known international weapons dealer Victor 
Bout, and claimed that Delta militant leader Henry Okah 
(currently detained in Angola) is closely associated with 
Bout. 
 
¶7. (C) In an aside, Mukhtar opined that if the Angolans were 
to hand Okah over to Nigeria for prosecution, militant groups 
in the Delta would make his release a condition for peace. 
At the same time, he envisioned international criticism of 
Nigeria for detaining Okah, should he be remanded to Nigeria. 
 Mukhtar added that Okah had been involved in plans to 
overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea, and was 
fomenting secessionist sentiment in the Delta.  He complained 
that the international community has done little to stop 
known traffickers such as Bout, and asked for increased 
attention to and support for addressing the problem from the 
USG and international community. 
 
MONEY LAUNDERING 
---------------- 
¶8. (C) Mukhtar complained that while Nigerians are often 
criticized for being corrupt, other countries abetted 
larcenous individuals by welcoming their stolen funds. He 
claimed that some countries' economies were fully dependent 
 
ABUJA 00002450  003 OF 004 
 
 
on "dirty money," and accused their governments of openly 
welcoming it. Thus, Mukhtar requested more of a commitment 
from the international community to identify and stop the 
flow of funds from bunkerers and weapons smugglers. 
 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶9. (C) Mukhtar noted the following areas where the GON needed 
USG and international community assistance: enhanced 
intelligence sharing on, and actions against, weapons 
traffickers like Victor Bout; "high-tech" equipment to detect 
and interdict weapons deliveries and oil smuggling in 
Nigerian territorial waters; technical assistance with 
equipment which allows the timely and precise detection of 
taps on oil pipelines -- before the oil is stolen; tracing 
the origins of weapons smuggled into the delta by 
international traffickers and later seized by Nigerian 
authorities. 
 
¶10. (C) The Charge said the USG has been working with the GON 
and other partners through the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security 
Strategy (GGESS) to provide sensors and other equipment to 
assist in the detection of illegal activity along the 
Nigerian coastline and in the Delta.  The Deputy Secretary 
mentioned that the USG would be happy to trace serial numbers 
of confiscated weapons to determine origin, an offer that had 
been made previously within the GGESS context. The Deputy 
Secretary expressed his understanding of, and concern about, 
 
SIPDIS 
oil bunkering and weapons smuggling, and requested that 
Mukhtar allow him time to consult with colleagues in 
Washington and examine ways to increase the U.S. level of 
participation in the GGESS. 
 
TERRORISM 
--------- 
¶11. (C) The Deputy Secretary also solicited Mukhtar's views 
on terrorism, noting the GON's recent success in disrupting 
extremist activities in the north.   Mukhtar deferred to the 
Director General of the SSS, who reported that the GON had 
arrested 11 Nigerian Islamic militants in mid October and 
"several more" earlier this month.  The militants had been 
establishing a network of cells in northern Nigeria and 
planned to attack unspecified foreign targets, which he 
surmised included embassies, personnel, and other "foreign 
interests."  The captured militants were said to have not yet 
revealed to the SSS their specific targets.  Several other 
militants were said to have confirmed under interrogation 
that they had received training in camps in Mali and Algeria, 
and were in contact with Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (French acronym, GSPC) elements in both countries. 
The SSS also claimed to have a list of 11 Nigerians currently 
undergoing training in camps in Algeria and/or Mali, for 
which militants had provided details on their locations.  One 
group arrested had fertilizer, explosives, and AK-47 assault 
rifles.  Several of the detained militants were said to have 
been involved in uprisings in northern Nigeria in 2003 and 
2005, and to have been in possession of weapons used in those 
incidents.  The SSS is currently searching for a weapons 
cache buried by the group in 2005. 
 
¶12. (C) The Director General added that the SSS has 
information that the militants had been expecting 
unidentified Pakistanis to arrive in Nigeria to assist them, 
but that the SSS was not yet able to identify or locate the 
Pakistanis.  The SSS was said to have five separate teams 
deployed in northern Nigeria, who are still looking for two 
key individuals associated with the group.  The SSS was keen 
to note that it is taking time to ensure that the 
investigations and arrests are handled with proper care. 
Lastly, the Director General noted that the GON planned to 
charge the militants as early as the next couple of weeks. 
In response to a question from the Deputy Secretary about 
whether northern Nigeria was a fertile breeding ground for Al 
Qaida, Mukhtar responded that no, the type of Islam practiced 
in northern Nigeria was not open to fanaticism of the kind 
seen in other countries. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
--- 
 
ABUJA 00002450  004 OF 004 
 
 
Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer 
U.S. Charge d'Affaires Lisa Piascik 
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Gustavo Delgado 
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Edward Wittenstein 
Regional Affairs Office Chief Kevin Ward 
 
Nigeria 
------- 
National Security Advisor Major-General (Ret.) Abdullahi 
Sarki Mukhtar Director General of the State Security Service 
(SSS) Afakriya Gadzama Representative of the National 
Intelligence Agency (NIA) 
General Mukhtar's Military Assistant 
Director for Internal Affairs of the National Security Adviser 
Director for External Affairs of the National Security Adviser 
 
14.(SBU) D Staff has cleared this cable. 
PIASCIK