VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYD #1234/01 2881306
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151306Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8223
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0028
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1656
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0048
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1931
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0778
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0203

C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 001234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C AND AF/C 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
PRETORIA FOR DHS/ICE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017 
TAGS: KCOR PREL PGOV CM
SUBJECT: CAMEROON CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS: RECENT 
MEETINGS WITH GRC AND CANADIANS 
 
REF: A. YAOUNDE 1160 NOTAL 
     ¶B. YAOUNDE 1068 NOTAL 
     ¶C. YAOUNDE 752 NOTAL 
 
Classified By: Poloff Tad Brown for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C)   Summary and action request.  The Ambassador's 
recent meetings with Cameroon Vice PM/Minister of Justice 
Amadou Ali and Canadian High Commissioner Jean Pierre LaVoie 
provided new information relevant to USG participation in 
Government of Cameroon (GRC) anti-corruption investigations 
(reftels).  Ambassador Garvey is in Washington October 13-19 
for the AF COM conference.  While there, she will seek to 
meet with INL/C and other offices to obtain lessons learned 
and best practices from USG involvement in similar 
investigations in Africa and to determine what assets the USG 
may bring to bear to advance this effort in Cameroon.  Post 
requests INL/C assistance to structure these conversations. 
End summary and action request. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Ambassador's 9/20 Meeting With Ali 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  During the Ambassador's September 20 courtesy call 
(ref a), Ali raised almost immediately the subject of USG 
cooperation with the GRC's efforts to gather information 
relating to corrupt GRC officials (refs b and c).  Ali 
asserted that the USG "knows all" about corrupt officials and 
pushed the Ambassador to share this information.  When the 
Ambassador countered that, in fact, the process is more 
complicated than Ali suggested, Ali replied "the ball is in 
your court."  Ali committed that the GRC would use any funds 
recovered in a transparent manner.  Ali said a successful 
effort would act as a "vaccine" to prevent further 
corruption, and that the culture of "impunity" would 
disappear.  Ali said that those who have stolen are "at 
peace" in thinking they do not have to fear prosecution. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Ambassador saluted the anti-corruption 
undercurrent in the September 7 cabinet shuffle, but 
emphasized that sustained commitment would be needed to make 
meaningful progress.  Ali concurred, saying that President 
Biya had called him on the eve of the shuffle, saying he was 
prepared to go further in dismissing corrupt officials once 
he had more evidence (which, Ali implied, meant information 
from the U.S. and other foreign partners).  Ali told 
Ambassador the shuffle removed "four of the most infamous" 
corrupt officials: 
 
--former Minister of Economy and Finance Polycarpe Abah Abah 
--former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Marie Atangana 
Mebara 
--former Minister of Public Health Urbain Awono Olanguena 
--former Minister Delegate at the Ministry of Communication 
Gervais Mendo Ze 
 
¶4.  (C)  Ali said that despite public appearances, Mebara was 
"improper" and, while Secretary General at the Presidency, 
had been involved in the so-called "Albatross affair" in 
which millions were spent from the GRC treasury for the 
purchase of a Boeing presidential airplane.  (Note: Biya 
stopped using the plane soon after receiving it when a 
technical problem raised concerns it would be used to 
assassinate him.  End note.)  Ali said that Olanguena had 
profited from his positions as Secretary General at the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance and as the Minister of Health. 
 
¶5.  (C)  When asked about the decision to choose 
French-Cameroonian national Francis Dooh Collins and American 
Robert Horwath, both based in Geneva, as the GRC's agents for 
this investigation, Ali said that he had personally chosen 
Dooh Collins because he came with a good reputation from a 
well-known Cameroonian family.  Ali said that his confidence 
in Dooh Collins grew when he learned (presumably from Dooh 
Collins himself) that the French Government was seeking to 
undermine Dooh Collins' efforts.  Ali quickly hedged, 
however, that he would drop Dooh Collins if we or others had 
reason to be concerned about him.  Post will report further 
on Collins' involvement and on the GRC's draft Mutual Legal 
Assistance (MLA) request septel. 
 
--------- 
Canadians 
--------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  On September 21, Canadian High Commissioner Jean 
Pierre LaVoie and Canadian Poloff told Ambassador that the 
Canadian Government had not yet taken action on Dooh Collins' 
earlier approach for their assistance because of internal 
administrative constraints.  The High Commission was 
preparing to write to Ottawa to request assistance with the 
investigation and first wanted to know what steps the USG had 
taken and what view the USG took of Dooh Collins.  We 
explained that Dooh Collins had met with USG officials in 
CONUS, but that the USG had not yet provided Dooh Collins 
with any hard information, and that Dooh Collins had 
generally failed to impress us in terms of his 
professionalism or ability to contribute to the 
investigation.  The Canadians expressed misgivings about Dooh 
Collins' involvement, noted that Dooh Collins had mentioned 
aspirations to be nominated as a GRC official, and worried 
about Dooh Collins' potentially hidden private agenda. 
Ambassador and Canadian High Commissioner agreed that the 
three diplomatic missions involved so far (US, Canada, UK) 
should meet to coordinate our response and should consider 
how best to approach other missions, especially the French. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment:  Moving forward 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  Ali's assertion that Biya is prepared to act but 
lacks the necessary evidence strikes us as unconvincing.  The 
Presidency has substanitial information about financial 
transactions in Cameroon.  Auditors within the offices of 
State Control (the GRC's equivalent of the Inspector General) 
have recounted instances where their reports, filled with 
incriminating evidence, have been passed to the Presidency 
with no response until, in some instances, the cases are 
brought forward at moments opportune for the GRC's 
anti-corruption credentials.  Rather, we perceive the GRC's 
priority in this effort to be the recovery of pilfered state 
funds, and the positive publicity that this would engender. 
Ali's "vaccine" comment is also somewhat misleading.  Corrupt 
officials--including sitting ministers--have been dismissed 
and thrown in jail before, with no apparent effect on the 
culture of corruption. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Nevertheless, we believe that Ali is sincere in his 
desire to advance anti-corruption efforts in Cameroon, and we 
take as credible his assertion that this is a "window of 
opportunity" that will not last indefinitely.  We believe 
that multiple USG interests are served by our continued and 
increased participation in this effort: first, there is the 
domestic imperative to investigate and follow-up on any 
crimes committed in the US or using USG institutions; second, 
there is the deterrent effect to prevent people from using US 
territory and banks in the future; third, there is the 
foreign policy impact -- whether or not we are able to locate 
looted funds on US soil, it behooves us to be able to say 
that we have fully participated in the GRC's anti-corruption 
efforts and to work with the GRC to improve its own capacity 
and understanding for anti-corruption, anti-money laundering 
operations.  End comment. 
NELSON