VZCZCXRO7202
OO RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD
DE RUCNDT #0903/01 2961612
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231612Z OCT 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2856
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 1589
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CEQ CONNAUGHTON, VAN DYKE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON KGHG SENV
SUBJECT: UNSYG BAN'S PRE-BALI CLIMATE CHANGE BRIEFER FROM 
UNFCCC 
 
REF: JAKARTA 2945 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) In an October 18 briefing memo to the UN 
Secretary-General summarizing events and possible actions 
 
SIPDIS 
leading up to the December ministerial in Bali, Yvo de Boer, 
the UN's top climate change official, says he expects an 
Indonesian-hosted pre-ministerial in Bogor October 23-25 to 
reveal a great deal about whether Bali will be a "success" or 
"failure," as well as guide the SYG on how best to wield his 
own influence to facilitate a successful outcome.  The SYG 
plans a busy travel agenda in coming months to further 
spotlight concerns on climate change.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Following UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's 
September 24 High-Level Event on climate change in New York, 
Ban convened an October 8 meeting of his climate change 
Special Envoys and principals of his informal Climate Change 
Team to strategize on how best to promote a successful 
outcome for the Bali Climate Change ministerial in December. 
Among the apparent outcomes of that process are the SYG's 
decisions to highlight climate change during upcoming visits 
to Antarctica (being facilitated by Chile, whose former 
president Ricardo Lagos is one of the SYG's special climate 
envoys), to Amazonia, and to Valencia, Spain for the November 
release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Fourth Assessment synthesis report.  The SYG will 
attend the high-level segment of the Bali conference as well. 
 The October 8 meeting also stimulated Yvo de Boer, Executive 
Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
SIPDIS 
(UNFCCC) Secretariat, to write a briefing and recommendations 
paper to the SYG, which was submitted on October 18.  (Note: 
A copy, which we obtained privately from a UN contact, has 
been forwarded to IO/EDA.  End note.) 
 
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Background on Bali 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) In his briefing paper, de Boer describes the five 
main meetings taking place during the Bali conference, 
focusing on the three "that will determine the outcome of 
Bali in terms of future negotiations": the Conference of 
Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 13), the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), and the Kyoto Protocol's Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
(AWG).  De Boer tells the SYG that the COP 13 will consider 
the report of an informal dialogue (begun in 2005) on four 
options for further action: 
 
-- continuation of the dialogue (favored by China); 
 
-- launch of discussions on future commitments/actions within 
the COP; 
 
-- launch of a negotiating group under the COP to develop a 
new agreement either to supplement or to succeed the Kyoto 
Protocol; or 
 
-- launch of joint negotiations under the Convention and the 
Kyoto Protocol in a single process. 
 
De Boer states that the first option would be considered a 
"failure" for Bali, while the developing states are likely to 
reject the final option.  He therefore asserts that either of 
the middle two options, and preferably the third, are the 
most likely outcomes of Bali. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The CMP will undertake a review of the Kyoto 
Protocol, but talks on this theme during previous 
ministerials broke down over splits among developed and 
developing countries.  Meanwhile, the AWG will discuss a 
workplan and timetable for Annex I Parties to complete a new 
negotiation for further greenhouse gas reductions (on the 
order of 25-40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020). 
 
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UNFCCC Recommendations on the SYG's Role 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) De Boer's memo emphasizes that the UNFCCC process is 
"government driven" where "parties guard their prerogatives 
jealously," warning the SYG and UN agencies from taking too 
proactive a role.  He also cautions the SYG against 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000903  002 OF 002 
 
 
establishing any new UN "coordination mechanisms" outside the 
UNFCCC Secretariat.  More broadly, however, he sees the most 
"urgent" requirement as the implementation by UN system 
agencies of existing mandates, particularly regarding 
adaptation to climate change.  "The UN system record in that 
respect is not what it could be and this is not lost in the 
eyes of the Parties."  De Boer recommends that the SYG's 
Climate Change Team stick to drafting statements and talking 
points for the SYG and his envoys, but not to get involved in 
Bali preparations or negotiations. 
 
¶6. (SBU) De Boer promises to brief the SYG on the outcome of 
an informal ministerial meeting of about 40 countries on 
October 23-25 in Bogor, Indonesia, which Indonesia is 
convening to help "prepare the ground" for Bali (reftel).  He 
predicts that the results of the Bogor meeting "will provide 
a clear indication of where we are going in terms of success 
or failure in Bali."  (Note: De Boer also requested to 
deliver a statement from the SYG at Bogor.  End note.)  "Once 
the Bogor results are known, that would be a good time... to 
approach countries that may have been most recalcitrant."  De 
Boer suggests employing the SYG's and his envoys' personal 
interventions.  "Having established yourself as an important 
voice and actor on climate change, your authority would need 
to be invoked on topics of strategic importance ('the high 
ground') without getting involved in the highly divisive 
technicalities of the negotiations."  De Boer concludes with 
a recommendation that the SYG's program for the December 
12-14 high-level segment in Bali be kept flexible in case he 
should choose to engage in "corridor and back-room diplomacy." 
WOLFF