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DE RUEHVEN #0382/01 2880819
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FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5265
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0350
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 0688

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000382 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE; USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2017 
TAGS: OSCE PREL PGOV UNMIK KV UNSC SR YI RU
SUBJECT: IF KOSOVO DECLARES INDEPENDENCE UNILATERALLY, WHAT 
HAPPENS TO THE OSCE FIELD MISSION? 
 
USOSCE 00000382  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kyle Scott, Reasons 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The likelihood that the OSCE will have to close its 
mission to Kosovo is increasing.  In the event of a 
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), Russia and 
Serbia have threatened to force closure of the OSCE Mission 
in Kosovo (OMiK), and they could easily do so.  Under such 
circumstances, the OSCE would either have to close OMiK's 
doors without any replacement, or transfer the mission or key 
programs to some other international entity -- UNMiK, the 
European Union or a coalition of the willing.  Because of 
political sensitivities, the OSCE Secretariat can plan only 
on a limited contingency basis, and has not fully explored 
any of these possibilities.  With the Kosovo status 
negotiations deadline falling ten days after the November 
29-30 Ministerial, USOSCE believes a concerted attempt should 
be made in Madrid to pressure Russia and Serbia to keep the 
mission open even in the event of UDI.  Failing that, it 
might be prudent now to plan for a possible transfer of the 
OSCE's programs and functions in Kosovo to another 
international body. End Summary. 
 
What OMiK does and why it matters . . . 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) With nearly a thousand international and local 
employees, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo remains the largest of 
the organization's 18 field missions.  With a current budget 
of 45 million dollars, it is also by far the organization's 
most expensive field mission, consuming nearly 20 percent of 
the OSCE's total budget.  UNSCR 1244 has charged OMiK since 
its establishment in 1999 with taking "the lead role in 
matters relating to institution- and democracy-building and 
human rights and the rule of law."  In addition to building 
good governance and a civil society, the mission oversees 
elections, monitors and promotes human rights, and provides 
early warning of ethnic tension, violence and instability. 
 
¶3. (U) Over the past two years, in anticipation of a status 
settlement, the mission has established a presence in each of 
Kosovo's municipalities in order to promote decentralization 
efforts and to serve as the international community's eyes 
and ears in the field.  The Ahtisaari status proposal, in 
fact, envisions utilizing the OSCE's extensive field presence 
to assist in the monitoring necessary for successful 
implementation of a settlement. 
 
. . . and why a UDI threatens OMiK's future 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Russia and Serbia have both stated clearly that they 
would block renewal of OMiK's mandate in the event of a 
unilateral declaration of independence.  They could do this 
as soon as the end of the calendar year, when OMiK's mandate 
is currently scheduled to expire.  If Serbia or Russia move 
to block a consensus decision for extension, the mission 
would be forced to close.  While Serbia has previously 
acknowledged the work that the mission does to monitor the 
welfare of the Serbian minority communities in Kosovo, 
Belgrade would view agreement to extend OMiK's mandate in the 
face of a UDI tantamount to acceptance of loss of sovereignty 
over the province.  The Russians have told us privately that 
even if UDI does not occur before the end of the year, they 
will not allow a one-year extension of the mandate, but will 
rather agree only to a shorter (likely month-to-month) 
renewal until the results of the troika negotiations become 
clear.  (Note:  Spanish Ambassador Sanchez de Boado 
reportedly told a recent FCO 
 delegation that the CiO believes it can get Serbia and 
Russia to agree to a three-to-six month extension prior to 
the Madrid ministerial.  We should support the CiO's efforts 
in this direction, but have seen no signs that this plan 
would be accepted by Serbia or Russia.) 
 
Options on Replacing OMiK 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) There are a number of options for dealing with the 
loss of a mandate for OMiK.  The easiest, but least 
satisfactory, would be simply to disband the mission and let 
go its nearly one-thousand staff members.  The obvious 
downside of this option is that no other international 
organization is poised to assume the mission's 
capacity-building and monitoring responsibilities.  Even now, 
the international community is dependent on OMiK to oversee 
 
USOSCE 00000382  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
the election process in Kosovo. 
 
¶6. (C) The second option would be for UNMiK to absorb OMiK's 
mandate and staff directly, which is what OSCE Secretary 
General de Brichambaut has advocated here in Vienna and in a 
recent visit to UN headquarters.  Re-flagging the mission 
under UNMiK and giving it a new name would presumably be 
facilitated by the fact that OMiK has operated since its 
inception under the UN's ultimate authority as Pillar III of 
UNMiK.  For this option to work, however, the UN would also 
have to be persuaded to absorb OMiK's 45 million dollar 
annual budget and take over its personnel, facilities and 
equipment.  We believe that this would take considerable 
planning and organization and is a process that would take 
some time.  The concrete details of such a proposal should be 
worked out in advance, because there could be as little as a 
few weeks to engineer such a handover.  Our colleagues at 
USUN are better positioned to know the feasibility of such a 
proposal, although Secretariat officials here tell us there 
has been no follow-up from New York to de Brichambaut's 
earlier suggestions to this effect. 
 
¶7. (C) If this option proves unsatisfactory, a third option 
could be to integrate OMiK's staff and duties into the EU's 
ESDP rule of law mission, or some other EU structure.  We 
again defer to our USEU colleagues as to the likelihood of 
getting an EU mission up and running in a timely fashion. 
Without prior planning, it may be very difficult to effect a 
handover quickly enough to ensure continuity in OMiK's 
programs and personnel.  Planning for this option would also 
need to be started very soon for there to be a reasonable 
chance for a successful outcome. 
 
¶8. (C) If neither UNMiK or an ESDP mission is able to take 
over OMiK's functions, a fourth option could be to transfer 
OMiK's staff and duties to an ad hoc coalition of the 
willing.  This option could probably be done the most quickly 
and effectively.  Some type of legal entity would have to be 
set up to take over the functions, and the HQ operation in 
Pristina would have to take on all administrative and 
financial details currently managed by the OSCE centrally in 
Vienna.  This option would also require planning and 
preparation very soon. 
 
¶9. (C) If there is no plan in place for turning over OMiK to 
another body at the time of UDI, the mission's foreign 
personnel could be forced to depart quickly.  241 of OMiK's 
current staff, about a quarter of the mission's total, are 
international employees.  Some of them are contracted to the 
OSCE, but the vast majority is seconded by the EU, EU 
aspirants, the U.S. and Canada.  Most of these internationals 
would likely move on to new jobs outside of Kosovo quickly - 
taking with them valuable capacity-building experience and 
knowledge of Kosovo's unique circumstances and culture - 
unless they could be assured that the transition to a new 
international entity would be managed smoothly.  Within a 
short time, there would be little left to hand over. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶10. (C) The OSCE Secretariat is hamstrung by the fact that 
any contingency planning for UDI is very sensitive 
politically.  Beyond suggesting option two (re-flagging OMiK 
under UNMiK), the OSCE Secretariat has not actually started 
to look at the feasibility of this proposal, nor has it 
started to develop a possible plan of action.  The only 
planning to date has been in the realm of emergency 
evacuations in the event of violence in Kosovo.  The Madrid 
Ministerial provides an opportune occasion for high-level 
discussion on the work of the Mission and the importance of 
continuing its work.  Russia and Serbia need to be pressed to 
keep the mission open no matter what the outcome of the 
troika consultations on status.  We doubt they will be 
prepared to make such a commitment before the results of the 
process are known, however, so it is vital that we begin 
prudent planning for a transfer of the OSCE's programs and 
functions in Kosovo to another international body.  Mission 
would appreciate any possible guidance Department could offer 
in this regard.  End Comment. 
 
 
SCOTT